Editorial Director
Managing Editor
 
PRESENTATION ARCHIVES
  N°125  
Issue Q1 2011  
Anti-dumping with heterogeneous firms  
Christian Gormsen
 
This paper analyzes antidumping (AD) policies in a two- country model with heterogeneous firms. One country enforces AD so harshly that firms exporting to the country choose not to dump. In the short run, the country enforcing AD experiences reduced competition to the benefit of local firm and detriment of local consumers, but in the long run AD protection attracts new firms, increasing competition and consumer welfare. In the country’s trading partner, competition initially increases: Some firms give up exporting, but those that remain will lower their domestic prices. Consumers therefore benefit in the short run. In the long run, however, fewer firms will enter the unprotected country, and competition will eventually decrease, resulting in welfare losses. Abstract

   
TRADE POLICY ; ANTI-DUMPING ; MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION ; HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS ; Keywords
F12 ; F13 ; JEL classification
Order form