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ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ASSIMILATION AND INTEGRATION
OF IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE

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ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ASSIMILATION AND INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE

NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY

While European countries are witnessing an especially vivid debate about immigrants' assimilation and integration into receiving societies, this paper offers an analysis of whether such assimilation is indeed taking place. Using the European Social Survey conducted in 16 countries, we suggest that, being a complex phenomenon, assimilation may be taking place along different dimensions and with different speed, and also differ across immigrants of various origins going to various destination countries.

We report that first-generation immigrants differ in the most important way from native-born along such rather obvious dimensions as language and citizenship, and also along other outcomes, such as civic involvement, religiosity, trust, perceived discrimination, occupations, and income. However, these differences are no longer the same for second-generation immigrants. In fact, a considerable progress is observed between generations with respect to language, naturalizations, and also religiosity, which is usually considered to be a relatively rigid feature; likewise, the progress is observed along occupations and income. In contrast, perceived discrimination and unemployment may actually aggravate for second-generation immigrants, while trust may not only diminish, but even reverse, as compared to native-born and to first-generation immigrants. At the same time, we also find that there is an important heterogeneity in these outcomes not only across immigrant generations, but also across destination countries and migrant origins.

Assimilation patterns along cultural and economic outcomes may be related one to another. For example, one may expect that learning a language of the receiving country may help immigrants to find a better job. We explore the relationship between assimilation along different behaviors, but do not find very strong or consistent patterns between them. In fact, for first-generation immigrants, we rather observe that progress on some dimensions may compensate the lack of progress on other dimensions; and also that a big discrepancy in one dimension is not necessarily a handicap, or an impediment, for assimilation on other grounds. Preserving some of the behaviors may actually be of help to immigrants to progress on others. For second-generation immigrants, we find a very weak relationship between possessing citizenship and economic outcomes or language. However, the relationship is particularly strong between discrimination and trust in the police. Since the perceived discrimination reflects immigrants' experiences with the attitudes and behaviors of native-born in the receiving societies, the latter finding suggests that immigrant assimilation is interdependent with the attitudes and acceptance of immigrants on the part of the native-born.

Finally, we relate immigrants' assimilation to integration policies available in the European countries. We find that policies favoring labor market access of immigrants are positively related to assimilation in terms of employment. However, the link between other policies and behaviors is less clear. One of the reasons for this is that migration policies are also very complex. The same policy, such as, for example, antidiscrimination, may favor economic assimilation in providing more equal opportunities in the labour market; but at the same time, these very opportunities of equal treatment may favor the preservation, and not the change, of cultural behaviors. If this is the case, this can also partly explain why we observe assimilation on some, but not all, dimensions. This finding also opens a debate of

what constitutes good integration policies, what policies we would like to have, and how to assess the effectiveness of policies that affect various aspects of life.

ABSTRACT

This paper documents assimilation of immigrants in 16 European countries along cultural, civic, and economic dimensions, distinguishing by immigrants' generation, duration of stay, and origin. It suggests that assimilation may have multiple facets, and take place at different speed depending on the outcome in question. While assimilation along some economic outcomes may be correlated with assimilation along some cultural outcomes, such correlations are not systematic, and imply that progress on some dimensions may compensate the lack of progress on other dimensions; and also that a big discrepancy in one dimension is not necessarily a handicap, or an impediment, for assimilation on other grounds. Correlation of immigrants' outcomes and specific policies aimed at immigrants' integration are rather disparate, raising further questions regarding both their effectiveness and differentiated effect on various aspects of life.

Key Words: J1, F22, Z13

JEL Classification: assimilation, integration, migration policies, Europe

L'ASSIMILATION ET L'INTÉGRATION ÉCONOMIQUE ET CULTUREL DES IMMIGRÉS EN EUROPE

RÉSUMÉ NON TECHNIQUE

L'assimilation des immigrants dans les sociétés d'accueil est aujourd'hui un sujet largement débattu en Europe. Ce document se propose d'analyser si une telle assimilation est effectivement en cours, à partir de données de l'*European Social Survey* portant sur 16 pays et distinguant les immigrants selon leur génération, la durée de leur séjour et leur pays d'origine.

Nous montrons que les plus grandes différences entre les immigrants de première génération et les autochtones ont généralement trait à l'usage de la langue du pays de résidence au sein de la famille et à la nationalité. Elles ont aussi trait à la participation civique, à la pratique religieuse, à la confiance dans les institutions, à la discrimination perçue, aux postes occupés et aux revenus. Cependant, ces différences ne sont plus les mêmes pour les immigrants de la deuxième génération. Un progrès considérable de l'assimilation est observé d'une génération à l'autre. Il est particulièrement net en termes de langue, de naturalisation, ainsi que de pratique religieuse ; de même, des progrès sont observés quant aux postes occupés et aux revenus. En revanche, la discrimination perçue et le chômage peuvent s'aggraver pour les immigrants de deuxième génération. Surtout, l'écart de niveau de confiance s'inverse, par rapport aux natifs et par rapport aux immigrants de première génération. Cependant, nous constatons qu'il existe une hétérogénéité importante dans toutes ces caractéristiques, non seulement d'une génération d'immigrants à l'autre, mais aussi selon les pays d'origine et d'accueil des immigrants.

Les schémas d'assimilation culturelle et économique peuvent être liés les uns aux autres; on pourrait, par exemple, s'attendre à ce que l'apprentissage de la langue du pays d'accueil aide les immigrants à trouver un meilleur emploi. En fait, nous observons que, pour les immigrants de première génération, des progrès sur certains aspects peuvent compenser l'absence de progrès sur d'autres, et qu'un écart important vis-à-vis des natifs selon une dimension n'est pas nécessairement un handicap pour l'assimilation selon d'autres caractéristiques. Conserver certains comportements peut en fait aider les immigrants à s'assimiler selon d'autres dimensions. Pour les immigrants de deuxième génération, nous trouvons une relation très faible entre la nationalité acquise et les résultats économiques, ou la langue parlée à la maison. Cependant, la relation, négative, entre la discrimination perçue et la confiance dans la police est particulièrement forte pour cette deuxième génération. Puisque la discrimination perçue par les immigrants résulte des attitudes et des comportements des autochtones dans les sociétés d'accueil, ce constat suggère qu'il existe une relation entre l'assimilation des immigrants et l'acceptation des immigrants par la société d'accueil.

Finalement, nous rapportons l'assimilation des immigrants aux politiques d'intégration dans les pays d'accueil. Nous constatons une relation positive entre les politiques favorisant l'accès des immigrants aux marchés du travail et leur assimilation en termes d'emploi. Le lien entre les autres politiques et les comportements est moins clair. L'une des raisons en est que les politiques migratoires sont très complexes. Par exemple, la lutte contre la discrimination peut favoriser l'assimilation économique en assurant plus d'égalité des chances sur le marché du travail, mais en même temps, ces possibilités d'égalité de traitement peuvent favoriser la conservation, et non le changement, de certains comportements culturels. Si c'est le cas, cela pourrait en partie expliquer pourquoi l'assimilation ne se

produit que selon certaines dimensions. Toutes ces observations contribuent à éclairer le débat sur ce qui constitue une bonne politique d'assimilation, sur la définition des priorités ces politiques, et sur la façon d'évaluer l'efficacité de mesures qui touchent différents aspects de la vie.

RÉSUMÉ COURT

Cet article traite de l'assimilation économique, culturelle et civique des immigrés en Europe à partir de données de l'European Social Survey portant sur 16 pays et distinguant les immigrés selon leur génération, la durée de leur séjour, et leur pays d'origine. L'assimilation comporte différentes dimensions et peut se produire à des rythmes différents sur chacune d'elles. L'assimilation économique, par exemple, peut être corrélée à l'assimilation culturelle, mais cette corrélation n'est pas systématique. Des progrès sur certaines dimensions peuvent compenser l'absence de progrès sur d'autres. Une différence importante entre immigrés et natifs selon une dimension n'est pas nécessairement un handicap pour l'assimilation selon d'autres caractéristiques. Enfin, les corrélations entre le processus d'assimilation et les politiques visant à l'intégration des immigrés apparaissent très différenciées, ce qui soulève des questions concernant à la fois leur efficacité et leur impact différencié sur les différents aspects de la vie.

Classification JEL : J1, F22, Z13

Mots-clefs : assimilation, intégration, politiques migratoires, l'Europe

**ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ASSIMILATION AND INTEGRATION
OF IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE**

Mariya Aleksynska¹Yann Algan²**1. INTRODUCTION**

Modern European countries are witnessing an especially vivid political and social debate about immigrants' assimilation and integration into receiving societies. These discourses were particularly vibrant in 2010, when the French Minister of immigration and integration led a country-wide debate on what constitutes national identity; as well as in 2009-2010 in France, Switzerland, and Belgium, with respect to integration of religious minorities, and wearing a full-face Islamic veil as an affront to the national values.

A high concern about the failure of integration remains; while the large and growing empirical literature has not reached a consensus on this question. One of the reasons for this is that for the most part, the literature tends to focus on one specific aspect of assimilation at a time, without considering an interplay between the various dimensions of assimilation across different spheres of life, and neither considering the role of policies in this process.

There is an important body of research on the classical questions of immigrants' economic assimilation, such as in terms of wages (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1995; Hu, 2000; Algan et al, 2010), occupations (Chiswick, 2002; Green, 1999; Chiswick and Miller, 2009b), participation to welfare programs (Borjas, 2002; Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Riphahn, 2004). Numerous papers also look at social and cultural dimensions, such as fertility adjustment (Blau, 1991; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009), perceived national or ethnic identity of immigrants (Dustman, 1996; Bisin et al., 2008; Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann, 2009; Manning and Roy, 2010), socialization (De Palo et al, 2007), or citizenship acquisition (Bueker, 2005; Chiswick and Miller, 2009a). One observation that emerges from this literature is that assimilation is a complex phenomenon, and that it may be taking place along some, but not all dimensions. For example, it may happen along language improvement, citizenship acquisition, or employment, but not necessarily religiosity. Its speed also varies greatly depending on the outcome in question. Further, assimilation may also be heterogeneous across destinations, across origin groups, or both. As most of the studies are done on different subsamples of immigrants, in

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different countries, and often using a different methodology, it is difficult to reach a conclusion on the overall assimilation.

While not claiming to provide one-and-for-all evidence on assimilation of immigrants in Europe, this paper is trying to fill an existing gap, and its contribution is three-fold. First, using the European Social Survey, we offer a comprehensive analysis of assimilation along economic, cultural, and civic outcomes of the same individuals, applying the same methodology to studying each of these dimensions, and contrasting different immigration waves and immigrant generations in Europe. Wherever possible, we look at assimilation patterns of immigrants from specific origins, as heterogeneity of origin countries plays an important role in the assimilation processes. Also, the comparative analysis is performed across numerous European countries that differ in their migration histories and migration policies, all of which also has implications for immigrants' adjustment processes.

Second, we explore a potential relationship between these assimilation processes. For example, the progress in mastering the language of the country of residence may be important in its own right, but it also affects the speed of assimilation along other dimensions (Chiswick, 1991; Dustman, 1994). The interest is hence to assess the degree of interplay between assimilation along other cultural and economic outcomes.

Finally, we also look at the link between assimilation and integration opportunities offered by the receiving societies, the latter being measured in terms of the immigrant-specific institutions and policies in the destination countries. To this end, we employ the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which is a cross-country index of six main policy areas of the integration of immigrants: "anti-discrimination", "access to nationality", "family reunion", "political participation", "labor market access", and "long-term residence".

Throughout the paper, we are careful in distinguishing the notions of "assimilation" and "integration". Immigrant assimilation – a process of convergence of immigrant behavioral and preferential outcomes to the outcomes of the native-born – is mostly a one-way, absorption, process. It may be rather necessary, and even desirable, for some outcomes, such as, for example, possibility to occupy a high-skilled position for immigrants with comparable education. However, it is not necessarily advantageous for other outcomes, where rather integration may be wanted. Integration can be defined as a process of providing immigrants with equal chances to access opportunities available to native-born. As such, it reflects the extent to which receiving societies are willing to go towards immigrants, accept them, and provide them with equal rights to express their behaviors and preferences along with the native-born, while potentially preserving and fully expressing of their differences.³ Integration is thus most framed by specific measures and policies at the destination country that allow – or not - for the inclusion of immigrants into different life dimensions. The interest of this chapter is hence to assess to what extent there exist links between opportunities for integration provided by receiving societies and the assimilation processes.

³ To quote the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, 1966: "I do not regard [integration] as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a 'melting pot', which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone's misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman... I define integration, therefore, not a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance". Quotation borrowed from Algan et al (2010).

Our main findings are the following. First, the differences in outcomes between native-born and different types of migrants (by duration and generation) vary substantially depending on the outcome in question. For first-generation immigrants, the largest gaps are observed in such expected outcomes as language and citizenship, but also almost in all other dimensions, notably civic involvement, religiosity, perceived discrimination, trust, occupations, and income. The gaps in language and citizenship, but also, contrary to what may be expected, in religiosity, diminish in the most spectacular way between first- and second-generation immigrants; however, in a number of countries, second-generation immigrants still have a significantly higher rate of non-citizenship as opposed to native-born, a finding that raises concerns regarding the lack of opportunities provided by the receiving countries to gain citizenship. The gaps in perceived discrimination and unemployment actually widen as we move from first to second generation immigrants in some countries. Interestingly, we also find quite a universal “disillusion” among immigrants: while newcomers have higher satisfaction with democracy and higher level of trust, these feelings disappear and even reverse for second-generation immigrants. Second-generation immigrants distrust significantly more the police than the native-born and than the first-generation immigrants. Potentially, these differences in discrimination feeling, and trust, go hand in hand.

Second, we find that there is a large heterogeneity of gaps depending on migrants’ origin and destination. For example, for language outcome, more variation is observed across the destination countries rather than within the same country of destination between different immigrants.

Further, correlations between differences in outcomes among native-born and various types of immigrants reveal very few regularities. For first-generation immigrants, strong correlations are observed between naturalization and the use of destination country’s language; naturalization and income; being unemployed and being religious; income, discrimination, and trust. In general, however, we do not find very strong correlation patterns between various types of outcomes, contrary to what might have been expected. For example, there is virtually no correlation between language and unemployment, or trust and occupying low-skilled jobs. This finding suggests that progress on some dimensions may compensate the lack of progress on other dimensions; and also that a big discrepancy in one dimension is not necessarily a handicap, or an impediment, for assimilation on other grounds. Preserving some of the behaviors may actually be of help to immigrants to progress on others.

For second-generation immigrants, the patterns of interplay between cultural and economic outcomes are, for the most part, different, and linked both to the fact that assimilation is taking place, and also that the composition of two immigrant groups is not the same. Citizenship gaps are of little relevance for economic gaps, while language is correlated only with income. In contrast, we find a very strong negative correlation between trust in the police and perceived discrimination. Since the perceived discrimination reflects immigrants’ experiences with the attitudes and behaviors of native-born in the receiving societies, the latter finding suggests that immigrant assimilation is interdependent with the attitudes and acceptance of immigrants on the part of the native-born.

Last but not least, we find little correlation between migration policies and differences in outcomes. Of notable exception are high correlations between differences in unemployment and policies favoring labor market access of immigrants; as well as praying and anti-discrimination policies. Small and unsystematic correlations raise questions about the effectiveness of such policies. However, we also acknowledge that the same policies may have a very complex impact on various outcomes. For example, better enforcement of antidiscrimination legislation may favor economic assimilation in

providing immigrants with more equal opportunities in the labour market; but at the same time, these very opportunities of equal treatment may favor the preservation of cultural behaviors, rather than encourage convergence of immigrants' outcomes to the ones of the native-born. The same policy can thus enhance assimilation on one dimension and facilitate integration on another ground; and if this is the case, this can partly explain why we observe individual progress on one dimension, but not the other. By the same token, the same policy can also be more effective in one sphere of life, and not the other, and hence the assessment of its effectiveness should be done among all possible dimensions.

This finding once again stresses how multifaceted assimilation and integration can be, and how specific policies may spillover on various life domains. It also leads us to raising a question of what actually constitutes "good policies": should "good" policies aimed at immigrants' inclusion change, or, to the contrary, preserve and allow for a free exercising, of immigrant outcomes? What should the goals of such policies be? We leave this debate open to further research.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used for the analysis. Section 3 outlines the methodology. In Section 4, we present the results for economic, social, and cultural assimilation of immigrants, while sections 5 and 6 provide the analysis of their interplay, as well as their correlation with migration policies. Section 7 concludes.

2. DATA

To get comparable data for performing cross-country correlations, we use a unified database: the cumulative European Social Survey (ESS) from 2001 to 2009. This survey is conducted in most of the European countries every two years, and reports information on different dimensions of immigrants' life. The same questions of the survey are asked to all individuals in all participating countries, with a particular effort made to ensure the cross-country comparability of questions and concepts (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2005). The random sampling "on full coverage of eligible resident populations" aims at objectivity and equivalence of sampling strategies in all participating countries (Jowel et al, various issues).

Using the ESS, we measure the cultural and civic integration processes with indicators of family arrangements, language spoken at home, religiosity, socialization, various dimensions of trust, perceived discrimination, civic life and citizenship acquisition. We capture economic integration by using indicators of labor market outcomes, such as employment, type of occupation, and income penalty.

The ESS also reports key information on the country of origin, the country of destination of all immigrants, as well as whether parents are foreign-born, allowing to distinguish native-born individuals, second and first generation immigrants, as well as individuals with one foreign-born parent. For immigrants, information on years of residence is also available.

Our analysis covers a large set of Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, data on immigrants are not available for Italy. Table 1 reports the sample statistics: the percentage of native-born individuals (native born with both native born parents), first-generation immigrants (foreign-born with both foreign-born parents) by

duration at destination, second generation immigrants (native born individuals with foreign-born parents), and native-born individuals with one foreign born parent in the European countries of the sample. In Table 2, we also report the percentage of first-generation immigrants by country of origin, all European destinations grouped together. In addition, Appendix I shows the distribution of first-generation immigrants by origin and by destination.

Appendix II further contains descriptive statistics for five types of individuals: native-born individuals, second-generation immigrants, first-generation immigrants depending on the duration of their stay, as well as individuals with one foreign-born parent, aggregated for all European countries of the sample. Those characteristics, for which the differences are the largest, are highlighted in italics. As we can see, while some differences are observed in socio-economic characteristics, the most pronounced differences are in cultural and civic outcomes at first sight. The next chapters explore further this heterogeneity in the integration process of immigrants by controlling for the sampling composition of immigrants, their individual characteristics, and their country of destination.

3. METHODOLOGY

We are following the methodology of Algan et al (2010) and Card et al (1998) which consists in measuring the gaps between native-born and various sub-groups of immigrants in cultural and economic outcomes. Wider gaps are informative of big differences in behaviors, and if these gaps diminish from one generation to another, or for the same generation over time, such tendencies are usually taken as signs of assimilation. For example, if the assimilation process is perfect, for second-generation immigrants, who are likely to be fluent in host country's language and completed their schooling in the host country, there should be little differences in the outcomes as compared to native-born. The existence of the gaps signals the persistence of original traits, which can be taken as the lack of assimilation, especially when this concerns economic and civic outcomes. Such view is coherent if the goal is to achieve the convergence of outcomes of immigrants and native-born. The persistence of the gaps may, however, also be taken as an evidence in favor of integration, especially when it concerns cultural outcomes, if integration is viewed as the right to preserve and freely exercise own features.

To compute these gaps, we estimate the following specification:

$$\begin{aligned} Outcome_{ijko} = & \beta_1 FirstGenImmLess20 + \beta_2 FirstGenImmOver20 + \\ & + \beta_3 SecondGenImm + \beta_4 HalfGen + X_i' \alpha + D_j' \gamma + r_k' \rho + o_m' \varphi + e_{ijko} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where $Outcome_{ijko}$ is one of the economic, cultural, or social outcomes of interest, of an individual I , living in country j , in year k , and of origin o ; β_1 , β_2 , β_3 , and β_4 measure the impact of being a first-generation immigrant with less than 20 years of residence, a first-generation immigrant with more than 20 years of residence⁴, a second-generation immigrant, or an individual with one foreign-born parent, as compared to native-born individuals with both native-born parents. *FirstGenImmLess20*,

⁴ Splitting first-generation immigrants in these two sub-groups by duration at destination has the convenience of splitting them in two almost equal parts.

FirstGenImmOver20, *SecondGenImm*, and *HalfGen* are dummies equal to 1 if an individual belongs to a corresponding group, and zero otherwise. The comparison between coefficients β_1 , β_2 , β_3 , and β_4 allows understanding whether there are differences in gaps between these immigrant groups as opposed to native-born.

Unfortunately, as we work with the pooled ESS data over a relatively short period of time, the estimations provide a rather static picture of differences in gaps that exists in the 2000-es. Different immigrant generations today may, however, be quite different from each other, both in the composition of their origins, in sorting across destination countries, and in migration reasons. Thus, the estimated coefficients, rather than presenting the pure assimilation dynamics, also capture the degree to which these groups are different from the native-born. We partly correct for this by including the fixed effects for the survey year, r_k , and a cohort dummy equal to one for younger generations (individuals aged less than 30).

In each estimation, we also control for a set of individual-specific parameters, X_i , which include age, gender, education, and fathers' education. The latter is an exogenous proxy for individual's potential socio-economic predisposition that helps to control for intentionally omitted income variable, which we use as one of the outcomes. All regressions also include dummy variables for one of the six origin groups, o_m ⁵, and a set of host country dummies D_j .

As a second step, we perform similar estimations separately for each host country, pooling together all first-generation, second-generation immigrants, and native-born; excluding individuals with one foreign-born parent; and plotting the obtained coefficients on first-generation and second-generation dummies in a series of figures.

Lastly, we repeat similar regressions in a pooled sample of native-born and first-generation immigrants only, taking all European countries as a unique destination, and focusing on the impact of immigrants' belonging to a specific origin group. In these regressions, we are additionally able to control for duration of stay of first-generation immigrants:

$$\begin{aligned} Outcome_{ijk} = & \sum_k \beta_k OriginGroup_k * FirstGenImm + \\ & + YearsOfResidence * FirstGenImm + X_i' \alpha + D_j' \gamma + r_k' \rho + e_{ijk} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Unfortunately, small number of second-generation immigrants reporting the birth country of their ancestors precludes from doing a similar analysis for second-generation immigrants.

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

4.1. Cultural integration

⁵ These are Maghreb and North Africa (MENA); Africa; Asia; South America; developed OECD countries; as well as Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union and Former Yugoslavia. See Appendix III for the list of countries that constitutes each sub-group.

We start by analyzing the various dimensions of cultural outcomes of immigrants. These are family arrangements, such as the marital status and the age gap between spouses, but also the language spoken at home, the frequency of praying, and the frequency of socialization. Table 3a reports gaps in these outcomes based on estimating (1) for various sub-types of immigrants as opposed to the native-born, in all European countries grouped together. Table 3b further distinguishes gaps for first-generation immigrants from different origins, and is based on estimating equation (2).

From Table 3a, first-generation immigrants have a higher probability of being married, and those with over twenty years of destination, also a higher probability of being divorced, as compared to the native-born of the same age. Table 3b further shows that higher marriage rates among first-generation immigrants are mostly due to higher marriage rates among immigrants from MENA and Asia; while higher divorces are observed among South Americans. Back to Table 3a, second-generation immigrants, and individuals with one foreign-born parent, actually have lower marriage rates as opposed to native-born with both native-born parents; although those with one foreign-born parent also have higher divorce rates. In terms of age gap between spouses, there is little overall difference between first-generation immigrants and native-born, although differences actually appear among origin groups: MENA, African, and Asian couples have higher age gap than native-born couples (although, unfortunately, we do not have any information on the nationality of the spouse, which could have allowed getting more insight into this question). For second generation immigrants, the age gap is smaller than for the native-born.

Much large differences are observed for the language outcome. Language is measured in a dichotomous way, where one is assigned to individuals who report any official language of a country as first-mentioned language spoken at home, and zero otherwise (data on official country languages come from CIA fact book)⁶. Speaking the language is among the most important outcomes for immigrants, as not only it reflects assimilation, but it also, in its turn, affects the speed of assimilation along other dimensions (Chiswick, 1991, Dustman, 1994). The gaps in language spoken at home are significant and initially large for all types of non-native-born individuals. In a notable way, for this outcome, the gaps between any immigrant group and native-born never disappear completely. This, in itself, is not necessarily a negative phenomenon, as those individuals who report a non-official country's language as the first language spoken at home may still be fluent in an official country's language; and simply be multilingual. What is interesting, however, is a particularly strong "closing" of these gaps, the nearer we get to the "native-born with both native-born parents" status. First generation immigrants with less than 20 years of residence have a 33 percentage points lower probability of speaking an official country's language at home, as compared to native-born. This gap is still statistically significant for second-generation, but the magnitude drops dramatically to 6 percentage points, and to significant 3 percentage points for individuals with one foreign-born parent. Figure 1 plots the gaps in probability of speaking one of the country's official language at home as the first mentioned language, for first- and second-generation immigrants, by destination country. We observe a similar pattern for all destination countries: second-generation immigrants have lower gaps in speaking the language of the country than the first-generation immigrants (all effects are placed below the 45 degree line). The only exception is Ireland, for which both first- and second-generation immigrants have similar gaps, as opposed to native-born.

⁶ We use the term "probability" of speaking the language by immigrants, rather than "percent" of people who speak another language at home; as even among native-born individuals, 2% report a language other than official as their first language spoken at home.

Figure 2 also shows differences in language gaps by destination and origin pair, suggesting a large variation in outcomes⁷. Not surprisingly, first-generation South-Americans in Spain have no language gaps as compared to the native-born, while highest gap is observed for Africans in Austria. More generally, immigrants from MENA and Asian countries have relatively high language gaps regardless of the destination. But there is also a large heterogeneity across the destination countries. Take the situation of immigrants from Maghreb. The gap in the probability of speaking a different language at home ranges from 22 percentage points in France, 42 percentage points in Germany, to 80 percentage points in Austria. By and large, there is more heterogeneity in these gaps across the destination countries than within the same country of destination between the different immigrants. This result may be due to several reasons, such as the existence of several languages spoken in a country, difficulty of learning particular language for any of the origin groups, or a different sorting across countries. To the extent that we obtain these estimates by controlling for country of origin fixed effects, they seem to reflect, in a large part, genuine specificities in the integration process of each destination country.

We now turn to religiosity, considered to be perhaps the most persisting cultural trait. We measure religiosity as the frequency of praying, relating it to answers to the question “Apart when you are at religious services, how often if at all do you pray”. The answer takes on values 1 for every day, 2 for more than once a week, 3 for once a week, 4 for at least once a month, 5 for only on special holidays, 6 for less often, and 7 for never; and we convert them into days per year. Table 3a first shows a much higher frequency of praying among first generation immigrants relative to natives, although it drops significantly between new-comers and those with over 20 years at destination. Table 3b also shows that the frequency of praying is significantly higher among immigrants from MENA, Africa, and Asia, and to a lesser extent from South America, relative to native-born. There are no differences in religiosity among OECD, Eastern-European, former Yugoslavia, former Soviet Union immigrants. Besides, the overall gap persists among second generation immigrants, however, it further drops significantly: second-generation immigrants report praying almost three times less than newly-arrived first-generation immigrants. This result is interesting, as it goes against a common perception of high persistency of religiosity traits. However, it is not unreasonable either: higher praying may serve as a source of strength and the search of answers to profound questions, which may be particularly important in the times of big life changes (Lehrer, 2010), such as notably immigration and settlement in a new country; it may thus diminish once more stability and familiarity with new conditions is acquired.

Figure 3 further shows heterogeneity of changes along this dimension across destinations, suggesting that not only differences between first- and second-generation immigrants may go in different direction depending on the destination country in question, but also that in some countries, such as Portugal, Austria, Switzerland, and Ireland, both first- and second-generation immigrants actually pray less than native-born.

Lastly, we find some evidence that newly arrived immigrants have lower propensity of socialization (Tables 3a, 3b), measured by the question “how often do you take part in social activities compared to others of the same age”, and with answers ranging from 1 to 5; 1 indicating “much less than most”, and 5 indicating “much more than most”. This concerns mostly immigrants from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. There is, however, no evidence, that immigrants lack a close person with whom they can discuss personal matters.

⁷ Reported gaps are computed by estimating equation such as (1), by destination country, for a sub-sample of largest immigration countries. First-generation immigrants are pooled together, and individuals with one foreign-born parent are excluded from estimations.

4.2 Integration in civic life and feeling of discrimination

In a similar fashion, this section offers insight into gaps in civic outcomes, such as being naturalized, the probability of being civically involved into various types of activities, expressing various types of trust, being satisfied with the way democracy works, and having particular preferences for redistribution.

Becoming a citizen of a destination country can – albeit arguably – be considered as one of the most ultimate outcomes for immigrants. It is framed by the policies of the destination countries, as much as by the migration reasons and migration intentions. While naturalization means acquiring equal rights of a citizen and thus opening ways to further assimilation on many economic, cultural, and civic dimensions, it may also be considered by itself as a civic act, a conscious step towards becoming a full member of the hosting society (Gropas, 2008; Chiswick and Miller, 2009a). As such, it can be viewed as a behavioral civic outcome in its own right. In this chapter, the outcome citizen is measured on a zero-one scale, with one standing for having the citizenship of the country of current residence.

Tables 4a and 4b show that among all types of non-natives, as well as first-generation immigrants of all origins, there are significantly high percentages of non-citizens. But as with language, the closing of the gaps on this dimension is rather pronounced. The probability of being a citizen for second-generation immigrants is twice as high as for first-generation immigrants with more than 20 years at destination. However, it is still 20 percentage points lower than that of the native-born, for whom the probability is 100%. Furthermore, the probability of being a non-citizen remains relatively high among native-born with one foreign-born parent. The latter two results raise particular concerns, as they signify either a lack of assimilation on the part of immigrants along this dimension, or a lack of opportunities provided by receiving countries for gaining citizenship for second-generation immigrants born in the country; or both.

Figure 4 shows that second-generation immigrants are at a disadvantage as contrasted to native-born in a sizeable number of countries. The gap in naturalization among second generation immigrants almost disappears in France, Ireland, and Spain; however, it remains statistically significant in all other countries of the sample, and is especially high in Luxembourg, Germany and the Netherlands.

Descriptive statistics of Figure 5 also provides insight into the heterogeneity of naturalization among various countries. The lowest rates of naturalization among first-generation immigrants are observed in Luxembourg and in Spain. While in the former country this fact is due to its migration specifics (most immigrants are temporary immigrants from other OECD countries), in the latter, this is also partly due to the fact that the majority of immigrants have come very recently. If we constrain the sample of immigrants to Spain to those with over 20 years of residence, we find that as many as 72% have been naturalized.

A closely related measure of belonging to a “polity” is a notion of immigrants’ civic participation. We measure it with a help of a dummy variable equal to 1 if a respondent reports doing in the last year at least one of the following: being a member or volunteering for a political party, a trade union, or another organization or association; taking part in a legal demonstration; signing a petition; or wearing a badge. Table 4a shows that there is an 18,3 percentage points lower probability to be involved in civic life among first generation immigrants with less than twenty years at destination, and it is

attributable to all origin groups (Table 4b). However, this gap not only vanishes quickly, but also reverses for individuals with one foreign-born parent.

We further turn to various measures of social capital and attitudes, such as trust in others, trust in country's police, parliament, politicians, and in the European parliament. Table 4a shows that newly arriving first generation immigrants actually are no different in trusting people in general, as compared to native-born. However, first-generation immigrants with longer stay, and also second-generation immigrants both have significantly lower propensity of trusting, with the gap reaching 31,9 percentage points for the latter group. Even more pronounced reversals are observed in other measures of trust: while newly arriving immigrants tend to trust more than native-born the police, the parliament, the politicians of the receiving countries, this trend is fully reversed for second generation and individuals with one foreign-born parent. In a similar way, satisfaction with democracy is higher among immigrants of first generation regardless of their origin, but not among second-generation immigrants; and it is actually lower for individuals who have one foreign-born parent.

Figure 6 shows that the gap in distrust widens for second-generation immigrants in almost all countries, exceptions being Sweden, Spain, Luxembourg, and Denmark. From Figure 7, the widening gaps in distrust in the police is observed also almost universally, except Denmark, Austria, and Greece. Second generation immigrants distrust significantly more the police than the native-born and than the first generation immigrants.

The obtained results on trust are rather alarming. Newly arriving immigrants tend to have a significantly more positive outlook than others, and hence more trust, both because they are self-selected, and because they have high hopes associated with migration decisions. The fact that this positive outlook vanishes quickly is, inevitably, due to disillusion that immigrants encounter, it may also however signal potential problems with the acceptance and integration policies of the receiving countries.

This latter idea is partly explored by analyzing the question on perceived discrimination: "Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country on grounds: nationality? religion? color and race? language? ethnicity? gender?". The answer takes on the value of 1 for yes and 0 for no. In a descriptive way, Figure 9 shows the variation in the grounds for perceived discrimination for immigrants in all destinations grouped together. First-generation immigrants feel in general discriminated against more than any other group, and are followed by second-generation immigrants and by individuals with one parent born abroad in this perception. The main reason for perceived discrimination is nationality, followed by color/race and religion. Strikingly, nationality is at the top of the preoccupation for first-generation immigrants, while the discrimination for color, religion or ethnic origin is more prevalent among second-generation immigrants.

For a selection of countries, Figure 10 reports where immigrants feel the most discriminated against, all grounds for discrimination grouped together. It shows that the feeling of discrimination is spread out in a different way among immigrants depending on the destination country. Immigrants from MENA feel the most discriminated in Spain (40 percent), Germany (29 percent), France (26 percent) and Sweden (24 percent). They feel much less discriminated in Switzerland (15 percent), and Great Britain (11 percent). Africans feel the most discriminated in Germany (40 percent), followed by France (34 percent). All, including other-OECD immigrants, report significant degrees of discrimination.

Table 4a reports the corresponding estimates of gaps in perceived discrimination. Newly arriving first generation immigrants have a 7 percentage points higher probability of feeling discriminated compared to natives, while this probability is 9 percentage points for second-generation immigrants. Table 4b shows that immigrants from MENA and Africa display the highest perceived discrimination, which is higher by 13,2 and 12,9 percentage points than the perceived discrimination of natives, respectively.

From Figure 11, in almost two thirds of the sampled countries, second-generation immigrants feel significantly more discriminated against as opposed to the first-generation immigrants. Interestingly, countries where second-generation immigrants feel less discriminated than first-generation immigrants, are also the same countries where second-generation immigrants have more trust in the police (Greece, Austria, Denmark). In other countries, the finding of increasing feeling of discrimination, coupled with the finding on widening gaps in trust, once again raises concerns about the success of integration processes of immigrants. Since the perceived discrimination reflects immigrants' experiences with the attitudes and behaviors of native-born (potentially also of the police, administration, and politicians) in the receiving societies, this finding hints at the failure of immigrants' acceptance. "Culture clash" or "culture club" (Manning and Roy, 2010) is a two-way process; and pure willingness to assimilate on the part of immigrants is not enough: it is also the receiving societies that have to accomplish a certain work of accepting and integrating them.

Finally, the last line of Table 4a reports differences in preferences for redistribution. We find a significantly lower redistribution preferences among newly arriving immigrants, while no significant differences among other groups.

4.3 Economic integration

This section turns to immigrants' economic assimilation. We estimate the gaps in outcomes such as probability of being unemployed or inactive, probability of being employed in a high- or low- skilled job, as well as gaps in incomes.

Table 5a suggests that both recent and second-generation immigrants, as well as individuals with one foreign-born parent, have a significantly higher propensity of being unemployed. The unemployment gap, although slightly lower for second-generation immigrants, is actually rather persistent, potentially reflecting, among other factors, immigrants' discrimination. Among first-generation, the highest employment penalty is observed for immigrants from MENA (5,6 percentage points), Asia (5,3), and Eastern Europe (5,5). There is also a cross-country heterogeneity in the evolution of the employment penalty across types of immigrants. Figure 12 shows that the persisting – and widening - unemployment gap seems to be mostly driven by France and Great Britain, where immigrants from second-generation have particularly higher probability of being unemployed, as opposed to native-born and to first-generation immigrants.

For those who are employed, the distribution of jobs across type of skill is of interest. We consider gaps in probabilities of being employed in low-skilled, elementary occupations (ISCO classification codes 9), and also the probability of being employed in high-skilled occupations (ISCO classification codes 1, 2, and 3). Recent first-generation immigrants have a significantly higher probability of performing worse jobs, regardless of their potentially higher level of education. This result is mostly

driven by South American and Eastern European immigrants. The literature suggests various reasons for this, such as the potential mismatch of occupations and qualifications (Chiswick and Miller, 2009b) and slow assimilation, or different valuation and non-recognitions of diplomas at the destination (Dumont and Monso, 2007). Remarkably, however, the biggest progress towards assimilation along the economic dimension is observed in occupation distribution. Figure 13 shows that for all destination countries, second-generation immigrants have a significantly lower probability of performing an elementary job, as opposed to first-generation immigrants and, in majority of countries, also as opposed to native-born (except Spain, Britain, and Sweden).

Finally, we also consider differences in incomes. Unfortunately, the European Social Survey does not contain information on earnings, neither on individual income. Thus, we use the household income and divide it by the number of household members, but as the information on the number of children is not available either, we are not able to apply equivalence scales and treat each member of the household as an adult. Hence, our measure of gaps in individual incomes is rather crude, and also reflects the differences in the compositions of native and immigrant families. Results of the regression analysis show that immigrants' initial individual incomes are much lower than for the native-born, but that the catch-up is strong, and that immigrants with over 20 years at destination actually have higher incomes than native-born. In contrast, second-generation immigrants are no different from native-born across this dimension. Figure 14 shows that second-generation immigrants are doing better than the first-generation ones in half of the countries considered.

5. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC ASSIMILATION

As we have seen, immigrants' assimilation is indeed a complex phenomenon, which may take place along some, but not necessarily all dimensions, and that the speed of changes varies across the dimensions. This section explores further whether there is any relationship between these dimensions of cultural, civic, and economic assimilation across European countries. Tables 6a-6b report correlations in gaps of a selection of outcomes for first- and second-generation immigrants.

To start with, for first-generation immigrants, there is a strong positive correlation between citizenship and language gaps, which we also report in Figure 15. Gaps in citizenship are also correlated with gaps in income (see also Figure 16); however, the correlation is relatively low with other economic outcomes, such as unemployment and the probability to occupy a low-skilled position. Interestingly, there is a negative correlation between gaps in citizenship and gaps in generalized trust.

In its turn, language gap is strongly correlated with redistribution preferences and income, but, once again, not with other economic variables, and neither with cultural variables such as praying. Potentially, this is because unemployment and probability to occupy a low-skilled position for first-generation immigrants are framed by other effects. For example, there is a strong correlation between unemployment and praying (Figure 17), while the probability of occupying a low-skilled position is not much correlated with any economic, cultural, or civic outcomes in general.

Other relatively strong correlations include a negative correlation between income and trust, as well as positive correlation between trust and discrimination (Figure 18), and redistribution and trust.

For most of the other variables, we do not find very strong correlation patterns. For example, the correlation is next to nil between praying and language, language and unemployment, trust and occupying low-skilled jobs, unemployment and preferences for redistribution or perceived discrimination, discrimination or trust in the police. This finding of low correlations is interesting in itself, as it suggests that progress on some dimensions may compensate the lack of progress on other dimensions; and also that a big discrepancy in one dimension is not necessarily a handicap, or an impediment, for assimilation on other grounds. Preserving some of the behaviors may actually be of help to immigrants to progress on others.

For second-generation immigrants, the patterns of interplay between cultural and economic outcomes are, for the most part, different (Table 6b), and are linked both to the fact that assimilation is taking place, and also that the composition of two immigrant groups is not the same. For example, language and citizenship gaps are no longer strongly correlated, and citizenship is correlated even less with economic outcomes. Gaps in low-skilled occupations for second generation immigrants are positively correlated with both preferences for redistribution (Figure 19) and perceived discrimination. As for the first-generation immigrants, there is a strong negative correlation between trust and income, and also a positive, and stronger, correlation between praying and redistribution preference. For both groups, we observe a strong correlation between trusting police and preference for redistribution (Figure 20). At the same time, there is a reversal of the link between trust and discrimination: second-generation immigrants in countries where they perceive higher discrimination than native-born, also distrust the police more than natives (Figure 21), reflecting an earlier observation about the potential link between these variables. We leave for future research the exploration of the causality mechanism between these two variables, which may be contaminated by simultaneity issues (i.e.: it may be that more negative individuals simultaneously trust less, are less trustworthy, and perceive discrimination). What is interesting, however, is that the level of perceived discrimination is relatively similar between first- and second-generation immigrants, while the level of trust changes dramatically, and becomes strongly correlated with discrimination for second-generation immigrants. The “disillusion” is a universal feature for all immigrants, but it is more pronounced in the countries with higher discrimination.

Overall, a similar impression for second-generation remains: it is difficult to trace a systematic pattern of correlation between economic, cultural, and civic outcomes, suggesting that each of them reflects a qualitatively different aspect of assimilation, and that there is not necessarily a uniform link between them.

6. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ASSIMILATION AND POLICIES

As a next step, of interest is to relate the progress along these dimensions to opportunities for integration, or specific migration policies, provided by destination countries. Yet, relating current policies to the gaps in outcomes between native-born and first or second generation immigrants is not very informative, as these gaps only reflect the existing differences, but not the progress along different dimensions.

To measure progress, we estimate regressions such as (1), however, we now measure the gap between first and second generation immigrants, rather than between immigrants and native-born. As already

mentioned, in the current setting, we are not able to perfectly control for cohort effects; which means that the gaps in outcomes between first and second generation immigrants capture both convergence and group composition effect. Nevertheless, they still can be informative. For example, finding small outcome gaps between the two groups means that there has been either little assimilation, or that both groups have equally hard (easy) time changing their behavior at destination regardless of their composition. Finding small gaps is thus informative of resilience, or rigidity, of outcomes. At the same time, it may also signify that integration has been taking place, in the sense that immigrants of both generations were able to preserve their behaviors or preferences. If, however, the gaps in outcomes are large, this means that either there has been a lot of assimilation (and assimilation is easy), or that one immigrant group has a considerable advantage over the other in analyzed outcomes.

Our measures of policies are from the MIPEX database, which assembles indices measuring the friendliness of policies in integrating migrants in European countries. These indices cover 140 policy indicators, grouped into 6 main dimensions: labor market access, family reunion, political participation, long term residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination.

We focus on three policy dimensions. The first one is Labor Market access. According to the MIPEX documentation, this index measures whether a migrant worker or entrepreneur is eligible for the same opportunities as EU nationals to work in most sectors. The index ranges from 100 when migrants have exactly the same rights as natives, to 0 when migrants have no rights at all. In the case of 100, or best practice, an immigrant faces full integration policies, such as skills recognition, measures to adjust to the professional demands of the labour market, access to training, and language improvement. Secure in her employment, an immigrant can renew most types of work permits, remain in the country and search for work in case of unemployment, be free to change employer and industry or sector, and join a trade union.

The second dimension is anti-discrimination policies. This index also ranges from 0 to 100, and is a composite of anti-discrimination laws that guarantee equal opportunities in economic, social and public life for all members of society, including a migrant and her descendants. In the case of best practice, the state helps to seek justice through strong enforcement mechanisms, such as bringing forward a case without fear of reprisals; application of wide range of sanctions by courts, such as financial compensation, measures to stop further discrimination; robust legal standing to help all victims on the part of equality bodies. The state takes up its responsibility to lead public dialogue and systematically promote equality in its functions.

Lastly, we also look at policies favoring political incorporation of immigrants, such as including them into consultative processes, giving voting rights and rights to stand in elections, allowing them to join political parties and form associations.

Table 7 reports correlation coefficients between integration policies across the European countries and gaps in outcomes between first and second generation immigrants. Figures 19-21 also relate the gaps in most interesting economic and cultural outcomes, such as probability of being unemployed, trust, and discrimination, to these policy measures. There is a high positive correlation between gaps in unemployment and policies favoring labour market access of immigrants. This suggests that either the progress towards employment is fast in countries with favorable labour market inclusion of immigrants; or that one immigrant group has a considerable advantage over the other in favorable labour market environments; or both. Similarly, a positive correlation is observed in gaps in political and antidiscrimination policies: countries with best antidiscrimination practices observe large

differences in religiosity among immigrants. In contrast, better political incorporation of immigrants is associated with resilience of such features as trust. In other words, trust gap widens from one immigrant generation to another if immigrants are less likely to have opportunities for political and civic involvement, potentially reflecting the deception gap observed in earlier sections.

More typically, however, we observe rather disparate, unsystematic, and mostly low, correlations in policies and outcomes. For example, labor access policies have little correlation with the type of occupation or income of immigrants; while easiness of naturalization is virtually unrelated to actual citizenship acquisition. As far as it stands, we rather find that assimilation processes in economic outcomes are taking place irrespective of policies. In contrast, mostly negative correlations are found between better policies and cultural outcomes, such as trust, preferences for redistribution, and language, potentially also suggesting that better policies actually allow for integration in the sense of preserving behaviors and preferences pertinent to immigrants.

This leads us to raising a question of what actually constitutes “good policies”: should “good” policies aimed at immigrants’ inclusion change, or, to the contrary, preserve and allow for a free exercising, of immigrant outcomes? What should the goals of such policies be? Of course, we expect that policies such as those specifically targeting better labour market inclusion of immigrants, should indeed favor labour market assimilation of immigrants, in the sense of closing up the outcome gaps between immigrants and native-born. On the other hand, the impact of other policies, such as antidiscrimination, is considerably more complex, and hence the assessment of their effectiveness is more complicated. For example, better antidiscrimination policies improve economic outcomes of immigrants, thus enhancing economic assimilation, but they also favor the preservation and free exercising of cultural outcomes, which may be taken for the lack of assimilation, but at the same time may indicate higher integration. The same policy can thus enhance assimilation on one dimension and facilitate integration on another ground; and if this is the case, this can partly explain why we observe individual progress on one dimension, but not the other. By the same token, the same policy can also be more effective in one sphere of life, and not the other, and hence the assessment of its effectiveness should be done among all possible dimensions.

Clearly, a better understanding of the multifaceted impact of policies, of what constitutes “good” and “bad” policies, and what kind of policies we may want to have, is needed. Also, a more careful research is needed to examine in more detail the interplay between policies and outcomes, notably, which origin groups are affected the most by specific policies, and which ones not at all. We leave this analysis to further research.

7. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has offered a systematic assessment of differences between European native-born and different types of immigrants, distinguished by generation, duration of residence, and origin, along the most important cultural, civic, and economic dimensions. In addition to measuring the differences, we also undertook a first attempt to understand whether there is a link between differences in economic and cultural outcomes *of the same* individuals, as well as differences in outcomes and specific migration policies. Throughout the paper, we came across several important findings that opened up numerous questions for further research. Notably, these are the questions of what constitutes “good”

integration policies, what should be a correct way of assessing policies when they affect numerous life domains, and how to design policies that would target and/or spillover to other domains.

Lastly, the question of a benchmark, with respect to which the assimilation should be measured, also came through as being important. While we analyzed both the progress of first-generation immigrants as compared to native-born, and as compared to second-generation immigrants, the heterogeneity of native-born in Europe remains of a particular concern for this type of analysis. For example, Bretons and Corsicans in France may be more different than Italians in Switzerland. Thus, further research may also be enriched by stepping away from the use of an “average” native-born as a benchmark for immigrants, and encompass a more regional and ethnical perspective.

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Table 1. Sample Statistics: Focus on Destination Countries; 2002-2009

	Total number of observations (=100% of the sample)	Native- born with both native- born parents, %	First- generation immigrants, %	Second generation immigrants, %	Individuals with 1 parent born abroad, %	Immigrants with >20 years of residence, % of first- generation immigrants
Austria	6862	75,70	7,30	9,50	7,50	53,30
Belgium	7099	77,20	7,50	9,60	5,80	47,90
Switzerland	7717	60,30	18,40	12,60	8,70	48,00
Germany	11316	81,00	7,30	6,90	4,90	64,70
Denmark	6012	85,80	4,70	5,10	4,40	57,20
Spain	7763	90,20	6,60	1,80	1,50	91,20
Finland	7983	95,20	1,40	1,70	1,60	85,20
France	7265	73,80	7,90	11,10	7,20	33,30
The UK	8531	79,70	8,20	7,30	4,80	52,40
Greece	4810	81,00	8,00	8,10	2,80	82,60
Ireland	5924	86,90	6,00	3,70	3,50	72,50
Luxembourg	3129	39,90	29,40	19,00	11,70	57,80
The Netherlands	6056	82,00	7,30	6,20	4,60	47,30
Norway	6938	86,30	5,50	4,30	3,90	66,50
Portugal	7939	92,90	3,90	2,00	1,30	67,00
Sweden	7634	75,40	10,00	8,30	6,30	46,20

Table 2. Sample Statistics: Focus on Origin Countries; 2002-2009

Largest countries of immigrant origin:	DE	IT	PT	FR	TR	GB	PL	RU	MA	FI
As % of all first-generation immigrants	7,7	5,2	5,1	4,6	4,4	3,9	3,4	2,9	2,9	2,3
Largest countries of non-EU-15 immigrant origin:	TR	PL	RU	MA	AL	BA	RO	BR	DZ	IN
As % of first-generation immigrants	4,4	3,4	2,9	2,9	1,9	1,8	1,8	1,5	1,4	1,4

Table 3a. Average Gaps In Cultural Outcomes between Immigrants and Native-born in the EU

VARIABLES	1st gen. immigrants with > 20 years of residence		1st gen. immigrants with < 20 years of residence		Second-generation immigrants		Individuals with 1 parent born abroad		N Obs	R-sq
Married	0,101***	(0,015)	0,027*	(0,015)	-0,069***	(0,018)	-0,045***	(0,013)	101749	0,150
Divorced	0,013	(0,009)	0,024***	(0,009)	-0,011	(0,008)	0,024***	(0,008)	101749	0,020
Age gap between spouses	0,174	(0,182)	0,081	(0,177)	-0,386**	(0,191)	0,065	(0,156)	70633	0,016
Language of the country spoken at home	-0,330***	(0,014)	-0,130***	(0,012)	-0,060***	(0,013)	-0,031***	(0,007)	101749	0,197
Frequency of praying (days a year)	44,625***	(4,522)	28,767***	(4,633)	18,364***	(5,320)	-11,269***	(3,371)	100622	0,150
Anyone to discuss personal matters	0,030***	(0,009)	0,002	(0,010)	0,002	(0,011)	-0,003	(0,007)	101277	0,035
Frequency of taking part in social activities	-0,174***	(0,030)	0,018	(0,030)	0,045	(0,039)	-0,011	(0,025)	100362	0,039

Table 3b. Average Gaps in Cultural Outcomes between First-Generation Immigrants, by Origin, and Native-born

VARIABLES	MENA		African		Asian		South American		OECD		East. European, FSU, FY		N Obs	R-sq
Married	0,102*	(0,044)	0,019	(0,048)	0,115*	(0,047)	-0,051	(0,047)	-0,010	(0,040)	0,036	(0,042)	95093	0,144
Divorced	-0,001	(0,021)	-0,014	(0,024)	-0,055*	(0,022)	0,049*	(0,024)	-0,006	(0,019)	-0,014	(0,020)	95093	0,019
Age gap between spouses	1,844**	(0,525)	1,413*	(0,590)	2,036**	(0,535)	0,392	(0,562)	0,142	(0,465)	0,294	(0,459)	66403	0,017
Language of the country spoken at home	-0,281**	(0,050)	-0,128*	(0,053)	-0,357**	(0,053)	0,089	(0,049)	-0,094*	(0,046)	-0,199**	(0,049)	95093	0,213
Frequency of praying (days a year)	109,299**	(15,544)	151,549**	(16,727)	120,797**	(17,449)	72,706**	(16,406)	17,718	(14,174)	23,206	(14,749)	94024	0,156
Anyone to discuss personal matters	0,058	(0,032)	0,078*	(0,036)	0,096*	(0,038)	0,085*	(0,034)	0,042	(0,029)	0,059*	(0,030)	94640	0,041
Social activities	-0,051	(0,087)	-0,160	(0,097)	-0,190	(0,098)	-0,129	(0,096)	-0,056	(0,080)	-0,204*	(0,081)	93789	0,534

Each line represents a separate regression, where the first column defines the dependent variable, and other columns' headings define the independent variables of interest. All regressions additionally include age, gender, education, parental education, origin fixed effects (upper Table), destination country and survey round fixed effects, and are estimated accounting for the survey design and population weights. Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%.

Table 4a. Average Gaps In Civic Outcomes between Immigrants and Native-born in the EU

VARIABLES	1st generation immigrants with > 20 years of residence		1st generation immigrants with < 20 years of residence		Second-generation immigrants		Individuals with 1 parent born abroad		N Obs	R-sq
Citizen	-0,709***	(0,013)	-0,400***	(0,014)	-0,204***	(0,012)	-0,088***	(0,007)	101723	0,458
Civic participation	-0,183***	(0,016)	-0,023	(0,016)	0,011	(0,020)	0,036***	(0,014)	101749	0,118
General. trust (1-10)	-0,037	(0,074)	-0,191**	(0,074)	-0,319***	(0,090)	-0,078	(0,061)	101505	0,096
Trust in police	0,400***	(0,077)	-0,001	(0,075)	-0,238**	(0,095)	-0,155**	(0,065)	101063	0,062
Trust in country's parliament	0,503***	(0,080)	0,111	(0,079)	-0,191*	(0,097)	-0,188***	(0,064)	98933	0,069
Trust in politicians	0,461***	(0,076)	-0,053	(0,076)	-0,188**	(0,092)	-0,235***	(0,060)	100207	0,078
Trust in the Eur. parliament	0,788***	(0,082)	0,374***	(0,082)	0,243**	(0,096)	-0,014	(0,064)	91559	0,075
Satisfaction with democracy	0,130***	(0,014)	0,049***	(0,015)	0,027	(0,019)	-0,031**	(0,013)	101749	0,052
Preferences for redistribution	-0,032**	(0,016)	0,006	(0,015)	0,007	(0,018)	-0,016	(0,013)	101749	0,071
Perceived discrimination	0,071***	(0,012)	0,013	(0,010)	0,092***	(0,016)	-0,023***	(0,008)	101283	0,058

*Each line represents a separate regression, where the first column defines the dependent variable, and other columns' headings define the independent variables of interest. All regressions additionally include age, gender, education, parental education, origin fixed effects, destination country and survey round fixed effects, and are estimated accounting for the survey design and population weights. Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%.*

Table 4b. Average Gaps in Civic Outcomes First-Generation Immigrants, by Origin, and Native-born

VARIABLES	MENA		African		Asian		South American		OECD		East. European, FSU, FY		N Obs	R-sq
Citizen	-0,457**	(0,054)	-0,316**	(0,056)	-0,284**	(0,058)	-0,370**	(0,054)	-0,605**	(0,051)	-0,266**	(0,053)	95072	0,534
Civic participation	-0,150**	(0,043)	-0,166**	(0,050)	-0,267**	(0,047)	-0,156**	(0,046)	-0,155**	(0,041)	-0,275**	(0,041)	95093	0,120
Gen. trust (1-10)	0,213	(0,207)	0,086	(0,219)	0,266	(0,217)	0,123	(0,215)	0,331	(0,181)	0,466*	(0,189)	94861	0,096
Trust in police	0,443	(0,228)	0,321	(0,250)	0,563*	(0,248)	0,058	(0,240)	0,324	(0,207)	0,427*	(0,216)	94442	0,062
Trust in countrs. Parliament	0,535**	(0,207)	0,605**	(0,234)	0,874**	(0,219)	0,201	(0,220)	-0,006	(0,188)	0,305	(0,193)	92473	0,069
Trust in politicians	0,898**	(0,212)	0,828**	(0,228)	1,084**	(0,232)	0,513*	(0,233)	0,347	(0,189)	0,648**	(0,199)	93660	0,079
Trust in the Eur. Parliament	0,766**	(0,206)	0,784**	(0,219)	0,953**	(0,218)	0,238	(0,230)	0,500**	(0,187)	0,476*	(0,195)	85532	0,076
Satisfaction with democracy	0,176**	(0,034)	0,184**	(0,039)	0,221**	(0,034)	0,093*	(0,036)	0,119**	(0,032)	0,140**	(0,032)	95093	0,053
Preferences for redistribution	0,015	(0,043)	0,055	(0,049)	0,014	(0,049)	0,063	(0,045)	-0,026	(0,041)	0,013	(0,043)	95093	0,072
Perceived discrimination	0,132**	(0,037)	0,129**	(0,043)	0,001	(0,036)	0,039	(0,039)	-0,075*	(0,032)	0,023	(0,034)	94662	0,048

Each line represents a separate regression, where the first column defines the dependent variable, and other columns' headings define the independent variables of interest. All regressions additionally include age, gender, education, parental education, destination country and survey round fixed effects, and are estimated accounting for the survey design and population weights. Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%.

Table 5a. Gaps in Economic Outcomes between Immigrants and Native-born in the EU

VARIABLES	1st generation immigrants with >20 years of residence		1st generation immigrants with < 20 years of residence		Second-generation immigrants		Individuals with 1 parent born abroad		N Obs	R-sq
Unemployed	0,026***	(0,008)	-0,000	(0,007)	0,021*	(0,011)	0,011*	(0,007)	101749	0,020
Inactive	0,011**	(0,005)	0,008*	(0,005)	0,003	(0,008)	0,003	(0,004)	101749	0,005
Occupation: high skilled	-0,041***	(0,014)	-0,005	(0,014)	0,042**	(0,017)	0,019	(0,012)	101749	0,247
Occupation: low skilled	0,049***	(0,010)	0,009	(0,010)	-0,011	(0,011)	-0,009	(0,007)	101749	0,051
Individual income (log)	-0,158***	(0,029)	0,052**	(0,025)	0,043	(0,034)	0,027	(0,024)	81931	0,217

Table 5b. Gaps in Economic Outcomes First-Generation Immigrants, by Origin, and Native-born

VARIABLES	MENA		African		Asian		South American		OECD		East. European, FSU, FY		N Obs	R-sq
Unemployed	0,056*	(0,025)	0,051	(0,027)	0,053*	(0,026)	0,047	(0,027)	0,031	(0,022)	0,055*	(0,025)	95093	0,018
Inactive	-0,007	(0,021)	-0,016	(0,021)	-0,031	(0,020)	-0,018	(0,022)	-0,026	(0,019)	-0,020	(0,020)	95093	0,006
Occupation: high skilled	-0,042	(0,036)	-0,038	(0,042)	-0,054	(0,041)	-0,094*	(0,038)	0,005	(0,035)	-0,072*	(0,035)	95093	0,247
Occupation: low skilled	0,014	(0,032)	0,027	(0,035)	-0,019	(0,037)	0,081*	(0,036)	0,015	(0,029)	0,055	(0,031)	95093	0,053
Individual income (log)	-0,293**	(0,083)	-0,273**	(0,097)	-0,287**	(0,087)	-0,103	(0,089)	-0,057	(0,076)	-0,208*	(0,083)	76582	0,224

Each line represents a separate regression, where the first column defines the dependent variable, and other columns' headings define the independent variables of interest. All regressions additionally include age, gender, education, parental education, origin fixed effects (upper Table), destination country and survey round fixed effects, and are estimated accounting for the survey design and population weights. Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%.

Table 6a. Correlations between Differences in Outcomes between First Generation Immigrants and Native-born; Selected Outcomes

	Citiz	Lang	Unempl	Low skilled	Ind income	Relig	Discrim	Pref.	Trust	Trust in police
Citizenship	1,00									
Language	0,45	1,00								
Unemployed	-0,20	0,15	1,00							
Low skilled	-0,14	-0,13	0,26	1,00						
Individual income	0,55	0,28	0,38	0,20	1,00					
Religiosity	0,21	0,06	0,42	0,15	0,43	1,00				
Discrimination	-0,22	0,21	0,07	-0,27	-0,36	-0,53	1,00			
Pref. for redist.	-0,06	0,40	-0,01	0,11	-0,22	0,22	0,33	1,00		
Generaliz.trust	-0,40	-0,28	-0,42	-0,06	-0,76	-0,32	0,55	0,37	1,00	
Trust in police	-0,29	0,22	-0,04	0,13	-0,48	0,32	0,08	0,66	0,46	1,00

Table 6b. Correlations between Differences in Outcomes between Second Generation Immigrants and Native-born; Selected Outcomes

	Citiz	Lang	Unempl	Low skilled	Ind income	Relig	Discrim	Pref.	Trust	Trust in police
Citizenship	1,00									
Language	0,16	1,00								
Unemployed	0,04	0,24	1,00							
Low skilled	0,09	-0,11	0,59	1,00						
Individual income	-0,04	0,35	0,30	-0,08	1,00					
Religiosity	-0,27	0,07	0,17	0,21	0,09	1,00				
Discrimination	0,31	-0,19	0,18	0,30	0,10	0,32	1,00			
Pref. for redist.	-0,23	0,27	0,12	0,36	-0,12	0,62	-0,12	1,00		
Generaliz.trust	0,14	-0,08	0,05	0,05	-0,56	-0,02	-0,31	0,32	1,00	
Trust in police	-0,23	0,45	0,00	0,06	-0,15	0,11	-0,64	0,76	0,50	1,00

Table 7. Correlations between Specific Migration Policies and Differences in Outcomes between First and Second Generation Immigrants

	Labour Market Access	Anti- discrimination	Political Incorporation	Access to Nationality
Citizenship	-0,332	-0,037	0,205	-0,025
Unemployed	0,378	0,019	0,238	-0,094
Occupation: low skilled	0,049	-0,529	-0,266	-0,458
Civic Participation	0,041	0,205	0,255	0,163
GeneralizedTrust	-0,112	0,140	-0,231	-0,034
Perceived Discrimination	-0,348	-0,042	-0,243	-0,203
Language	0,034	-0,325	0,085	-0,133
Occupation: high skilled	0,386	0,156	0,405	0,173
Religiosity	0,224	0,383	0,230	0,561
Pref. for redistribution	-0,182	-0,566	-0,137	-0,321
Individual income (log)	0,131	-0,206	-0,308	-0,030

Figure 1. Gaps in Speaking the Destination Country’s Language at Home among First- and Second-Generation Immigrants as Opposed to Native-Born




Figure 2. Gaps in the Probability of Speaking the Language (1st and 2nd generation) as Opposed to Native-Born, by Largest Origin Groups and Destination Countries




Figure 3. Gaps in Religiosity among First- and Second-Generation Immigrants as Opposed to Native-Born




Figure 4. Gaps in Naturalization among First- and Second-Generation Immigrants as Opposed to Native-Born




Figure 5. Naturalization of First and Second Generation Immigrants by Destination




Figure 6. Gaps in Generalized Trust among First- and Second-Generation Immigrants as Opposed to Native-Born




Figure 7. Gaps in Trust in the Police among First- and Second-Generation Immigrants as Opposed to Native-Born




Figure 8. Gaps in Preferences for Redistribution among First- and Second-Generation Immigrants as Opposed to Native-Born




Figure 9. The Dimensions of Discrimination




Figure 10. Who Feels Discriminated, and Where?




Figure 11. Gaps in Perceived Discrimination First- and Second-Generation Immigrants as Opposed to Native-Born




Figure 12. Gaps in Unemployment among First- and Second-Generation Immigrants as Opposed to Native-Born




Figure 13. Gaps in Probability of Occupying a Low-Skilled Job as Opposed to Native-Born




Figure 14. Gaps in (logarithm of) Individual Income as Opposed to Native-Born




Figure 15. Relationship between Language and Citizenship Gaps of First-Generation Immigrants




Figure 16. Relationship between Citizenship and Income Gaps of First-Generation Immigrants




Figure 17. Relationship between Unemployment and Praying Gaps of First-Generation Immigrants




Figure 18. Relationship between Gaps in Discrimination and Gaps in Generalized Trust of First-Generation Immigrants




Figure 19. Relationship between Gaps in Low-Skilled Occupation and Preferences for Redistribution, Second-Generation Immigrants




Figure 20. Relationship between Gaps in Preferences for Redistribution and Trust in the Police, Second-Generation Immigrants




Figure 21. Relationship between Gaps in Trust in the Police and Perceived Discrimination, Second-Generation Immigrants




Figure 22. Relationship between Preferences for Redistribution and Praying, First and Second Generation Immigrants




Figure 23. Gaps in Unemployment between First- and Second-Generation Immigrants, and Labour Market Access





Figure 24. Gaps in Praying between First- and Second-Generation Immigrants, and Antidiscrimination



Note: Correlation is 0,573 if Greece and Norway are excluded

Figure 25. Gaps in Trust between First- and Second-Generation Immigrants, and Political Inclusion Policies



Appendix I.**First-Generation Immigrants by Origin, as Percent of Total Number of First-Generation Immigrants, by Destination**

Destination/Origin	MENA	African	Asian	South American	Eastern European, F.Soviet Union, F. Yugoslavia	OECD	Total
Austria	11,13	1,39	3,38	0,80	48,51	34,79	100,00
Belgium	19,92	8,83	5,83	1,70	7,70	56,01	100,00
Switzerland	5,56	4,24	5,21	4,71	14,99	65,29	100,00
Germany	17,05	2,43	5,72	0,85	59,68	14,26	100,00
Denmark	12,98	5,26	21,75	1,05	16,49	42,46	100,00
Spain	18,86	3,54	3,73	42,83	15,52	15,52	100,00
Finland	2,61	3,48	13,04	0,87	59,13	20,87	100,00
France	36,43	13,13	3,85	5,25	6,48	34,85	100,00
The UK	2,87	21,38	29,27	6,31	5,88	34,29	100,00
Greece	13,21	3,63	3,37	3,11	67,10	9,59	100,00
Ireland	1,42	6,23	7,37	0,85	15,01	69,12	100,00
Luxembourg	0,54	5,10	2,28	1,09	8,79	82,19	100,00
The Netherlands	19,52	6,28	20,88	15,79	8,32	29,20	100,00
Norway	3,14	3,40	25,13	3,40	17,54	47,38	100,00
Portugal	0,32	51,46	2,27	27,83	11,65	6,47	100,00
Sweden	8,83	3,69	14,36	4,87	19,37	48,88	100,00

Appendix II. Descriptive Statistics by Immigrant Status (Means)

	First- generation Immigrants, >20 years of residence	First- generation Immigrants, < 20 years of residence	Second- generation immigrants	Individuals with 1 parent born abroad	Native-born
Socio-Economic Indicators:					
Years of education	12,74	11,82	12,63	12,85	12,07
Tertiary education	0,26	0,22	0,20	0,24	0,20
Unemployed	0,09	0,04	0,08	0,06	0,04
Inactive	0,03	0,02	0,03	0,02	0,02
Occupation: high skilled	0,22	0,31	0,30	0,34	0,30
Occupation: low skilled	0,15	0,11	0,07	0,08	0,09
Cultural Indicators:					
Married	0,57	0,63	0,42	0,44	0,55
Divorced	0,08	0,10	0,06	0,08	0,07
Age gap between spouses	2,73	2,38	2,23	2,29	2,28
Partner economically active	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01	0,01
Speaking an official language of a country as first language at home	0,61	0,80	0,86	0,93	0,98
Belonging to the main religion of the country	0,29	0,33	0,32	0,34	0,49
Frequency of praying (days a year)	129,00	135,57	97,90	74,88	82,57
Perceived discrimination	0,22	0,15	0,22	0,13	0,05
Frequency of socialization (on the scale from 1 to 7)	5,01	4,88	5,21	5,17	4,96
Anyone to discuss intimate matters with	0,901	0,871	0,916	0,917	0,914
Generalized trust (1-10)	4,99	4,74	4,42	4,72	4,82
Trust in police	6,51	6,20	5,69	5,86	6,02
Trust in country's parliament	5,32	4,77	4,29	4,38	4,37
Trust in legislation	5,95	5,30	5,01	5,07	5,00
Trust in politicians	4,19	3,69	3,41	3,43	3,42
Trust in the European parliament	5,29	4,53	4,54	4,46	4,43
Trust in the United Nations	5,42	5,02	4,95	5,08	5,18
Civic Indicators:					
Citizen	0,42	0,69	0,89	0,95	1,00
Civic participation	0,33	0,47	0,50	0,53	0,46
Satisfaction with emocracy	0,82	0,71	0,66	0,64	0,65
Preferences:					
In favor of redistribution	0,65	0,70	0,72	0,68	0,69

Source: Authors' Calculations based on the ESS.

Note: Tabulations are done accounting for survey design and population weights

Appendix III. List of Countries in Immigrants' Origin Sub-groups:**MENA :**

Alger, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, Arab Emirates

East European, FSU, FY:

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina

African:

Angola, Burkina Faso, Benin, Burundi, Congo, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Uganda, Gambia, Kenya, Cameroon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Chad, Togo, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Asian:

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Brunei, China, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Macao, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam,

South American:

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Surinam, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Guatemala, Paraguay

OECD:

Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Island, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Portugal, Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Japan, Luxembourg, the US, Sweden

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