

# **Threatened with Marginalization: is Regionalization the Appropriate Strategic Response to Globalization?**

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**Abstract:** Regional Integration may be synonymous with globalization in as far as both allude to processes that increase the connectivity of markets and businesses via the mobility of goods, services, labor, technology and capital. With increasing globalization and regionalization there is a possibility that some states may not actively participate in the international political economy and therefore not benefit from the new global economic order. Developing countries are most susceptible to this threat and in order to avoid the pitfalls of marginalization are, therefore, responding to this challenge through regional integration. There is indeed a renewed commitment to regionalization in developing countries. This paper explores the prospects of regionalization in Africa and Southeast Asia where the phenomenon in the former has culminated in the New Partnership for Economic Development (NEPAD), Africa's version of the Marshall Plan and the conversion of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union; and renewed efforts at regionalization in the latter dubbed the 'new regionalism' (Shee, 2003). Using Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as examples, the paper argues that much as regionalization, particularly in Africa, may be a correct strategy to help its economies develop competencies for effective participation in the global political economy, a number of factors hinder the success of integrative processes on the continent. Chief among these are the civil conflicts that rock individual states resulting in a lack of peace, security, and stability, the lack of regional hegemonies willing to lead regionalism, and the inability of states here and the regional schemes thereof to withstand the pressures of policy recommendations from International Financial Institutions as well as pressures from citizens and civil society.

**Key Words:** African Union, Regional Integration/Regionalization, Globalization, International Financial Institutions, Sub Sahara Africa, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, COMESA, East Asia, Zambia.

### *Defining Globalization*

Regional Integration may be synonymous with globalization in as far as both are assumed to allude to processes through which global or regional economies and markets experience increases in the connectivity of markets, businesses, and so on therein through the mobility of goods, services, labor, technology, and capital. The difference would then lie in their respective scopes of coverage. More and more international and cross-border interactions have come to characterize the global political economy at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Though not a new phenomenon, the process of globalization owes its enhanced advancement in part to improvements and advances made in, *inter alia*, science and technology. Owing to innovations and improvements in transport and communication, for instance, barriers created by distance between different geographical locations have drastically reduced. It is easier and quicker to ship and transfer goods overseas today than it was over a century ago. Limitations created by time have equally shrunk. Today capital flows faster through the employ of information and communication technology (ICT). ICTs link global capital markets via national stock exchanges, for instance, and make the electronic transfer of large sums of money to any part of the world linked to the global economy within a short period of time possible. Businesses and financial investors in different locations of the globe are today better able to effectively trade across space and time like no other time before.

Globalization is not confined to the movement across space and time of goods, capital, or financial services. To some it connotes internationalization. Sugiyama (1992), for instance, characterizes the internationalization process as taking place at three levels including the national, organizational, and individual. Multinational corporations (MNCs) with their characteristic processes involving the movement of goods, capital, and labor, along with political and diplomatic relations between national economies would constitute the manifestation of internationalization at national level. The former also manifest internationalization at the organizational level in which may also be included technology transfer and cultural, educational, and civic exchanges involving movement of people. Bi- or multilingual individuals displaying knowledge of foreign languages and cultures too exhibit internationalization at the individual level.

To yet others globalization is seen as a process through which an international, multicultural, borderless, and even information society is being constructed. Castells (1996, 1997, & 1999), as shall be discussed shortly, is particularly rather gloomy and pessimistic about the eventual outcome of the process in his treatment of the phenomenon.

In light of the diversity of views and the absence of agreement on a single definition of globalization, we define it here in a narrow sense to mean the process through which the world's national economies, markets, and businesses are witnessing increasing connectivity. The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s had knock-on effects on not only most of the Asia-Pacific's

national economies, but also affected Asian trade and business with other regions like the EU. The latter's total trade with Asian national economies had come to account for 9 percent of total EU trade by 1996 but Europe would later experience a decline in its exports to (and increased imports from) Asian economies as the crisis unfolded (Bridges, 1999). This was all despite the optimism in Europe and the US that the crisis would barely affect their respective economies. Depreciation of local crisis-affected Asian national economies' currencies against major European currencies and the US dollar, rising unemployment, government austerity measures—such as reduction in importation of luxury goods—etc. had the effect of reducing local demand for European goods and, therefore, European exports to the region. The depreciated Asian currencies on the other hand, coupled with the export oriented policies of their governments adopted meant increased competitiveness of cheaper Asian products on the European market.

Though an undesirable illustration, the Asian financial crisis portrays globalization as not only a worldwide phenomenon through which goods, services, labor, technology, and capital have increasingly become mobile and economies in the present global political economy integrated, but it also highlights the increasing complexity of this connectivity among the world's national economies, markets and businesses. This notwithstanding, however, one could nonetheless say that globalization is “an extension beyond national borders of the same market forces that have operated for centuries at all levels of human economic activity—village markets, urban industries, or financial centers” (IMF, 2000).

Market expansion and integration providing wider export markets on the one hand and allowing increased access to technology, capital, cheap labor, imports, etc. on the other evidently accompany the globalization process. Globalization internationalizes the allocative function of the market and in the process enables specialization of production and the achievement of greater efficiencies through large-scale production. It seems plausible, in light of the foregoing, to say that if a national economy is joined to the global economy it stands to reap the benefits (and also risks the demerits) of globalization exhibited in the fore mentioned features among which is also a sharing in of global wealth. The more integrated a national economy is to the global, the greater the income it is likely to realize from this connectedness. A well integrated national economy into the global would exhibit a considerable degree of trade openness accompanied by relatively easy flow of factors and be in a position to attract foreign direct investment contributing to higher income. The rapid development the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIE) of East Asia witnessed in the early 1980s to the 1990s has been partly attributed to their trade openness and export oriented policies. Some of these economies were at par, or even less, than several African national economies in income terms prior to the 1960s.

Most African economies were indeed economically strong and performed well immediately following the attainment of political independence in the 1960s. Most of them would, however, witness declining growth from the mid 1960s onwards. In a study comparing per capita and per worker growth rates among groups of national economies on a spectrum — (1) representing the industrialized nations and (7) the least developed, Ross (2000: 22) argues that over the period 1965 to 1992 “whether measured in per capita or per worker terms, the difference between the extremes of the distribution (groups 1 and 7)...are such that, while group 1 had a per capita income 25 percent lower than group 7 in 1965, by 1992 incomes in the fastest growing economies were over five times higher than in the stagnating or declining economies of group 7”. Though not exclusively including Africa, groups 5, 6, and 7 according to the source’s categorization represent developing countries only. The majority of these are to be found in Africa.

Table 1 displays the performance of selected national economies in gross national product (GNP) per capita terms and its growth rate in the period 1965 to 1996.

**Table 1 Performance of Select National Economies and Regions (GNP Per Capita and Growth)**

	current exchange rate		converted by purchasing power parity 1995				
	1995	Rank	Average annual growth rate (%)			1995	Rank
			1965-96	1965-85	1985-95		
<b>Africa (Sub-Saharan)</b>	490		0.2	0.4 <sup>a</sup>	1.1 <sup>a</sup>	1,019 <sup>b</sup>	
Ethiopia	100	13	0.0 <sup>a</sup>	0.3	0.1 <sup>a</sup>	450	13
Nigeria	260	15	0.1	0.8	1.0	1,220	16
Kenya	280	14	1.5	1.5	0.8	1,380	14
<b>South Asia</b>	350		1.2	1.2 <sup>a</sup>	2.0	1,409 <sup>b</sup>	
Bangladesh	240	16	1.0	3.1	2.7	1,380	14
India	140	11	3.3	1.5	1.7	1,450	11
Pakistan	460	12	2.2	3.1	1.5	1,220	12
<b>East Asia</b>	800		5.5	5.2 <sup>a</sup>	7.2 <sup>a</sup>	3,469 <sup>b</sup>	
China	630	11	5.7	5.4	8.6	2,020	11
Indonesia	980	10	4.6	4.1	5.4	1,800	9
Thailand	2,740	8	5.0	4.8	7.1	2,540	7
Korea Rep.	3,700	5	7.3	7.1	7.6	1,450	5
<b>Latin America (and Caribbean)</b>	3,120		1.1	2.2 <sup>a</sup>	0.9 <sup>a</sup>	5,606 <sup>b</sup>	
Peru	2,110	9	0.3	1.2	1.2	1,720	10
Brazil	3,640	7	3.4	2.9	1.5	5,400	8
Argentina	0,020	6	0.3	1.1	1.1	8,310	6
<b>High Income (incl. D)</b>	28,911 <sup>c</sup>		2.1 <sup>d</sup>	2.4 <sup>d</sup>	1.7 <sup>d</sup>	24,179 <sup>b</sup>	
UK	18,700	4	1.9	1.8	2.0	19,260	4
France	24,990	1	2.1	2.4	1.6	23,040	1
USA	26,080	2	1.4	1.4	1.4	26,080	
Japan	17,640		1.6	4.0	2.9	22,110	2
<b>World</b>	4,280		1.2	n.a.	0.8	n.a.	

<sup>a</sup> Weighted average of 1965-80 and 1985-95 growth rates

<sup>b</sup> Weighted average of sample countries.

<sup>c</sup> 1985-95 average.

<sup>d</sup> Averages of Industrial Market Economies in World Development Report, 1987.

Sources: World Bank, World Development Report, 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1997; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1997; World Bank, World Development Indicators (CD-ROM), 1998

Source: Hayami, 2001.

From the table it is clear that on the whole Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed negative average annual growth rates of -0.2 percent, -0.4 percent, and 1.1 percent, respectively in comparison with East Asia which registered 5.5 percent, 5.2 percent, and 7.2 percent annual growth rates in the periods 1965-96, 1965-85, and 1985-96, respectively. Among the tabled individual national economies those in Africa either registered negative or lower rates of annual growth rates in comparison with national economies in East Asia. The national economy performing generally the least among those sampled in Africa, Ethiopia, recorded 0.0 percent, 0.2 percent, and -0.3 percent, respectively compared with the one likewise in East Asia, Indonesia, with 4.6 percent, 4.1 percent, and 5.4 percent, respectively during the same time periods.

### *Globalization as Threatening Marginalization*

*How does globalization pose (itself as) a threat to marginalize some economies from the global political economy?*

Notwithstanding the increased pace and complexity of the process of globalization, some developing national economies in places like Africa and Southeast Asia have in general experienced a downward trend in their performance. The decline in income and economic performance in most Sub-Saharan African national economies, for instance, stands in clear contrast with the increasing incomes of some in East Asia. The high performing national economies of East Asia, such as South Korea, have come to form the ‘convergence club’ comprising industrial economies that have attained relative levels of advancement and effectively grown faster than, and in the process caught up with, the developed industrialized national economies (Table 1; See Hayami, 2001; Barro, 1991). Sub-Saharan Africa is much further behind the advanced industrialized economies (Table 1).

Castells (1999) mentioned earlier, characterizes most of Africa (along with the former Soviet Union) as a ‘fourth world’; positioned opposite Europe, North America, and East Asia in an increasingly regionally polarized world economy. The polarization between the rich and the poor according to Castells is a consequence of ICTs, which have also had the effect of heightening the speed of the of globalization process. Castells also makes a link between the rise of information technology with the growth of a global currency market along with financial services industries centered in the global cities of London, New York, and Tokyo. Areas of the world and people that are unable to access the new technology will not only fail to tap into the benefits of globalization but also risk being further sidelined or pushed to the edges of global income, trade, and other forms of global economic and socio-political activities.

With continued globalization, therefore, chances are apparently that some national economies may not actively participate in the international political economy and consequently not benefit from the new global economic order. They are, moreover, threatened with being further sidelined or pushed to the margins of the global socio-political economy. The most susceptible national economies to this threat are those categorized as developing countries. These national economies are in urgent need of solutions to avoid the challenge and pitfalls that accompany the threat of marginalization in the face of a rapidly progressing globalization of the world political economy. Competitiveness characterizes the contemporary globalizing world demanding, among other things, efficiency in the use and allocation of resources—land, labor, capital, etc. The flow of investment from one part of the global economy to another may be indicative of efforts to achieve efficiency in the employment of resources. Locations with abundant and cheap labor, coupled with legal environments that are conducive for the conduct of business, for example, are likely to attract investment. There has been heightened transfer and globalization of investment along with other

factors manifesting the phenomenon. Not only do goods and services produced in such locations have to be of such quality as to compete effectively and penetrate highly competitive global markets, locations across the globe themselves also have to be competitive and attractive enough to attract and host investment. Inability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) also presents itself as another possible threat of marginalization to locations that fail to host it. For example, security risk is one important factor that would-be investors will consider before venturing into establishing themselves in a given locations. In this respect national economies or regions beset by war stand to lose out on any potential to compete for inward flows of investment.

### *Regionalization as a Strategic Response to the Threat of Marginalization*

*What is regional integration and what qualifies it as a means of achieving effective participation in the global political economy?*

Faced with the threat globalization poses of marginalizing them, African and some East Asian national economies are embracing regional integration as a means of developing their capacities to enhance their competitiveness in the global socio-political economy and as a stepping stone to development (Nshimbi, 2005; Fukasa & Martin, 2001).

There is indeed renewed commitment to regional integration in developing countries. In Africa, the phenomenon of regionalization comes in the wake of escalating poverty and has culminated in the New Partnership for Economic Development (NEPAD), Africa's version of the Marshall Plan and the conversion of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). In East Asia, Shee (2003) speaks of a 'new regionalism' manifested in renewed interest in the process by the region's national economies and particularly the Southeast Asian. The emerging new regionalism in East Asia comes in the wake of the 1997/1998 financial crisis and increasing concern and realization by the region's leaders that no state in the region can single handedly deal with a major regional crisis. This is in addition to the experience during the crisis when outside help was not very forthcoming to curb the crisis immediately following its occurrence.

*How does regionalization help avert the threat of marginalization?*

Several benefits accompany regionalization. Economic growth and increased openness through free trade in goods and services form the basis of international economic integration. Regional integration can for instance help a participating national economy effect domestic trade reforms and deregulation that will help achieve economic development. Political scientists consequently argue that economic integration is to a large extent dependent on support of the nation-state for instituting policies that favor free trade (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970 in Weiss, 1999). This is in addition to the need for a stable international political system. In Europe for instance integration was championed as a cause because it was held that its effects would work to end the state of war between France and Germany, help ward off the spread of communism from the then Eastern

Block, and also contribute to “the reestablishment of Western Europe as a world power” (Balassa, 1961).

To economists the process owes to the working or operation of the ‘invisible hand’ or to the ‘discipline of the market’ to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies between national economies in order to ensure economic growth resulting from increased transactions between the integrating national economies (Balassa, 1961). Market forces can help coordinate economic policies among different national economies on their behalf. A successful free market economy, however, can only thrive under certain, and a given and established political order. This makes political and economic factors interdependent in the process of economic integration.

Economic integration may manifest itself in three forms: the free flow of goods and services resulting from economic and political liberalization; development, resulting from and seen in the expansion in economies of scale and availability of capital, and increased market competition; and the coordination of policies among participating national economies. The more pronounced and latent these indicators are the more enhanced the process of integration in the region under study.

The concern of many an economist is to see to the removal of artificial barriers to trade and the smooth operation of the market in keeping with the conditions for market liberalization. The preferred condition is market equilibrium, i.e. to move towards the coordination, harmonization, or unification of elements or factors in the market that would contribute or lead to market equilibrium. Participation in an integration scheme can help a national economy effect policy reforms in keeping with this requirement and thus contribute to development. In Southeast Asia for example, it is hoped that the national economies of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam as new entrants to the regional organization’s free trade area (FTA) will work on programs of reform aimed at realizing these objective (Fukase and Martin, 2001).

The phases of the integration process can also help illustrate a couple advantages of regionalization. In principle there are four stages of international economic integration, and a fifth which includes complete integration:

- A Free Trade Area (FTA) is created when a group of national economies is constituted with an agreement to have no trade restrictions within the group, while each participant retains its own tariff and quota system on trade with third national economies.
- Customs Union (CU). This is created when the regionalizing group of national economies eliminates all restrictions on mutual trade and also adopts a common system of tariffs and quotas, or a common external tariff (CET) with respect to trade with third national economies.

- A customs union becomes a Common Market with the removal of all restrictions on the movement of factors within the group.
- An Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has in place supranational authorities that coordinate the grouping's economic policies. This type and stage of integration requires a single monetary system, a central bank, a unified fiscal system, and a common economic policy. Examples of this type of arrangement include the U.S., Belgium + Luxembourg in 1921.
- The Complete Integration stage of the integrative process entails total integration wherein all policies, whether fiscal, monetary, or social, etc. are brought together under a supranational authority with binding decisions over member national economies.

The foregoing highlights the emphasis economic integration theory places on the synthesis of national markets while not directly addressing issues of nation-state sovereignty (Balassa, 1961). Policy integration is inevitable as a follow up on the union of national markets but not so a unified institutional structure. In considering the stages of integration and especially from a neo-liberal economics perspective we see regionalization is a process and a means, not an end. Its objective is market extension, i.e. replacement of small national markets with large supranational markets coupled with the aim of achieving economic growth through increased international specialization, economies of scale, and expanded trade.

Like the process of globalization regional economic integration has its positive and negative effects. Among the benefits of regionalization can be cited economic and non-economic gains. Economic gains on their part yield either static or dynamic effects.

#### *Static Effects of integration*

In a classic analysis of customs unions Vinar (1950) made a distinction between trade creation and trade diversion effects of a customs union. Trade creation takes place when a member national economy in an integration scheme switches from consumption of goods produced domestically (at relatively high cost) to goods imported from a lower cost firm located in a partner national economy. Vinar argued that trade creation is welfare enhancing; bringing gains to both the supply and demand sides of an economy. Supply side gains come from the reallocation of resources away from protected industries towards more efficient firms producing goods for the regional market (assuming full employment), once protection in other member economies is reduced. On the demand side, consumers benefit by being able to buy from the lowest-cost producer in the region. The distributional consequences of these effects are that previously protected producers lose, while consumers and low-cost producers gain.

Trade diversion occurs when a member economy switches from consumption of lower cost goods imported from outside the region to higher cost goods produced within the region (which face lower tariffs after integration). This is generally welfare reducing in that government revenue is reduced following the replacement of imports from outside the region (with high tariffs) by imports from within the region (with lower tariffs). In spite of consumers facing lower prices, part of the price the consumers pay subsidizes producers in other member economies instead of accruing to the government for reallocation within the domestic economy.<sup>1</sup>

### *Dynamic Effects*

Vinar's static theory of the effects of integration ignores the dynamic effects the process has on economic growth. Some of the dynamic gains of regionalization include the possibility of firms in participating national economies being exposed to greater competition in regional markets (Radelet, 1999). A possible outcome of this is the achievement of greater efficiencies in production and marketing, including gains from the restructuring of industry.

We note again here that a noticeable dynamic consequence of a customs union is market extension along with implied higher productivity among efficient and well structured firms producing at optimal cost. Efficient producers in the region will enjoy relatively easier access to national markets of all member economies. Inefficient producers on the other hand stand to lose even their own national or domestic market share and be forced out of the market altogether. With access to foreign markets, competitive firms on the other hand can even achieve economies of scale, which may enable them to lower unit production costs (de la Torre and Kelly, 1992).

Also a dynamic gain following regionalization is increased competition given that domestic firms no longer enjoy protection from high tariffs. Increased competition implies the survival of low cost firms and lower prices as well as encourages product innovation. Heightened competition may spark greater investment, improvements in technology from imports of capital goods, and the importation of best practices and new technologies.

### *Non-Economic Gains*

On the non-economic gains side, first, national economies forming a regional group stand to have a 'bigger voice' and enhance their bargaining ability as a collective with non-members in the multilateral environment. Though not constitutive of a single regional organization, developing countries have of late displayed a united front and thus influenced the 'progress' of negotiations in such multilateral forums as the failed Seattle and Cancun World Trade Organization (WTO) trade talks. The absence of settled agreement in meetings like these may partly point to the increased

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<sup>1</sup> See Radelet (1999), for a detailed discussion.

negotiating ability of this group of nations when they speak with one voice. Moreover some issues of concern in the area of multilateral economic and trade relations, for example, might be better dealt with on regional basis. The European Union (EU) today, in the African Caribbean Pacific<sup>2</sup>—European Union partnership (ACP-EU) prefers to engage its partners in the south on regional basis through what are termed (Regional) Economic Partnership Agreements (R/EPA). Under an agreement concluded in 2000—the Cotonou agreement—all ACP countries are required to negotiate EPAs with the EU that are compatible with the WTO by the end of 2007. Prior to the conclusion of the Cotonou agreement economic and trade cooperation between the EU and ACP were guided by the Lomé Convention whose reform was necessitated by its discriminatory or bias towards only the developing economies of the ACP group. The terms of the Lomé Convention were in violation of WTO rules.

The Lomé Convention had been initiated by the EU under the Maastricht Treaty and meant to help ACP economies integrate into the world economy in the wake of globalization; the argument being that the best way to help the developing economies of the ACP group is by first developing their competences through regional integration before they can effectively participate in the global economy. The ACP group of nations were/are here offered the opportunity to pool their resources, widen their domestic markets through South-South trade, and, therefore, prepare for further participation in global trade (Pangeti, 1997). Pangeti argues that the small sizes of these national economies and their low levels of development raised the need for them to diversify their economies, but with an initial aim at the regional economies before plunging onto the global market. One of the key development objectives of the EU under the Maastricht Treaty was, therefore, the smooth and gradual integration of developing national economies into the global economy and thereby promoting sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication. Regional integration is seen as forming an essential part of the strategy for achieving this objective.

The Lomé agreement, while providing unilateral preferential treatment and, therefore, vital market access to ACP agricultural and other goods exports into Europe, however, its provisions were exclusive to ACP members only and not all developing economies. Neither are the preferences

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<sup>2</sup> The African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) group of nations consists of 77 African, Caribbean, and Pacific nations that entered into an aid and trade agreement— Lomé Convention—with the European Union (then European Community) allowing preferential trade access of their goods into the European market with the aim of helping the developing national economies attain self-sustaining and self-reliant development. See the ACP and EU websites for list of member nations and further details available on the World Wide Web:

[http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country\\_en.cfm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country_en.cfm), <http://www.acpsec.org/>, <http://www.ecdpm.org/>, etc.

restricted to developing nations only, making it incompatible with the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) “Enabling Clause”. Thus was entered into, the 2000 Cotonou agreement, an accord which brings in EPAs that are expected to conform to Article XXIV of GATT and assume the form of FTAs. The Cotonou agreement encourages South-South integration seeing that the EU prefers to enter into negotiation with regional organizations rather than individual national economies. Member economies of the ACP group are, therefore, currently working on their trade positions for negotiations under this agreement.

Somewhat similar initiatives in East Asia include arrangements like the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)—Closer Economic Relations (CER) Closer Economic Partnership (CEP)—(AFTA-CER CEP), the Japan—Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (Japan—Singapore EPA) and other Closer Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA) like the China—Hong Kong CEPA.

Established in 1995, the AFTA-CER CEP seeks to facilitate trade and investment between member economies of both ASEAN and the CER (comprising Australia and New Zealand) regions<sup>3</sup>. The Japan—Singapore EPA and China—Hong Kong CEPA differ from the ACP-EU arrangement in that they are more like bilateral arrangements. Generally, however, the EPAs in East Asia are comprehensive in their coverage seeking foreign trade facilitation, FDI liberalization and facilitation, economic and technical cooperation, etc.

A second non-economic gain of regionalization, as alluded to earlier, is that member commitment to the political objectives of common interests in a regional body may facilitate and help foster or force domestic reform in keeping with regional requirements. Regional bodies more often than not outline schedules to be attained through, for example, reduction and elimination of tariffs and non tariff barriers to trade among participating national economies. The implication is that these programs and their scheduled implementation are binding on national economies participating in the scheme. In nations where economic reform programs may face opposition in their implementation, governments may argue to various domestic interest groups that they have to reform to keep pace and an in line with the binding requirements of regional organizations.

A third non-economic result of joining a regional scheme is that when a national economy does so, it loses some aspects of its sovereignty. This can yield either positive or negative results, or both. The Asian financial crisis, for instance, presents an example of the difficulty open or liberal economies and their governments grapple with over some policy matters and their ability (or inability) to control policy. Krugman and Obstfeld (2000: 712-714) illustrate the point in their

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<sup>3</sup> See [http://www.dfat.gov.au/cer\\_afta/#freetrade](http://www.dfat.gov.au/cer_afta/#freetrade) for details.

discussion of the “macroeconomic policy *trilemma*<sup>4</sup> for open economies.” Most national economies seek to have an independent monetary policy, a stable exchange rate, and see to it that there is free mobility of capital. However, Krugman and Obstfeld argue, only two of these policy objectives can be reached simultaneously—one of the other two must be surrendered in order to achieve one. National economies that pegged their exchange rates until the late 1970s—including presently, China and India—were, for example, able to do so because they maintained exchange controls on the one hand and limited, to some extent, movements of capital. With (partly) improvements made in communications technology especially towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there was noticeable increase in the mobility of capital exposing adjustable peg regimes to speculation. Krugman and Obstfeld say as a consequence, most developing national economies have either been driven towards adopting fixed exchange rate regimes with no monetary autonomy, or the adoption of flexible or floating exchange rates. In light of this trilemma scholars like Bhagwati, and Rodrik suggest that developing economies should maintain or reintroduce controls over capital mobility so that they can exercise monetary autonomy and at the same time have stable exchange rates (1998; and 1998, cited in Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000). We see from this illustration that, by joining a regional organization and in keeping with the organization’s liberalization requirements, therefore, a national economy stands to compromise some of its control over some aspects of its economy. In light of what has been said so far, however, the benefits of joining a regional arrangement should be seen to outweigh the disadvantages if the threat of marginalization that comes with increasing globalization is to be averted. Even national economies hitherto regarded as non-reformist like China are today actively pursuing free trade agreements with other national economies or regional groupings. China’s engagement with ASEAN in the ASEAN plus China FTA does indeed entail a compromise on her sovereignty.

China’s engagement with ASEAN in the ASEAN plus China FTA also signifies a major shift in East Asian regional engagement wherein the latter group of national economies and China previously dealt with each other with suspicion owing to the Communist threat China posed in the region. Indeed some have argued that ASEAN was formed for purposes of averting the security threat a Communist China and its allied Cambodia and Vietnam posed to the Southeast Asian nations (Buszynski, 1997-98). There is a greater guarantee of regional security and order under the new and present circumstances. Similarly, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa started out with a design to not only reduce independent Southern African national economies’ economic dependence on apartheid South Africa (Malan, 1998), but also to curb the threat the South African minority regime posed to the region with its “Constellation of Southern African States” initiative in which the former hoped to co-opt the region’s weaker national economies and upon realizing economic benefit from the arrangement,

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<sup>4</sup> Authors’ italics

perpetuate its rule in the region. Regionalization can, therefore, also work to help foster regional security and order, factors that are crucial to development. It can provide an opportunity through which a region can work to seek peace as a common good.

In Europe too, for instance, the 1998-99 war in Kosovo and the resulting military and humanitarian crisis had the effect of giving almost all of both EU members and the national economies of Eastern Europe a united front to combat the crisis. "During no other period, including the conflict in Bosnia, have similar situations as...the Kosovo crisis been perceived as truly European and have become the preoccupation of both Western and Eastern European governments to the extent that they would be ready to resolve them in common and intervene with military force" (Andreev, 2004: 267). Andreev argues that both the EU as an organization and its members, their interests coinciding with and being served by proposed policies for action, reached a consensus on the need to adequately respond to the situation. The situation also proved critically important for Eastern European states applying for EU membership whose general public opinion favoured Western European co-operation with and intervention in their states' internal affairs.

*Conclusion: Assessing the Extent of Marginalization*

*What aspects of marginalization explain/indicate the threat?*

Globalization implies different things to different individuals, professionals, institutions, national economies, and so on. A neo-liberal economist, for instance, might view the process as a means through which markets can expand and in the process provide opportunities for more access to capital, cheap labor, technology, and so on. To the anti-globalization non governmental organization (NGO) activist on the streets of Seattle, Cancun, or Hong Kong on the other hand, the process poses a variety of threats to humanity ranging from impoverishing some sections of the global political economy, to endangering the natural environment. Globalization consequently evokes different reactions from different circles.

For the developing national economies of Southern Africa and Southeast Asia, globalization presents to them both a threat and an opportunity for active participation in the global political economy. In a highly globalizing world sentiments are that the global economy is increasingly becoming polarized: between groups of national economies with high and increasing income and others with low and ever decreasing income. National economies on the opposite side of those benefiting the most from the process are faced with the threat of being further marginalized as globalization proceeds. In the absence of working solutions to this problem, it may be posited, therefore, that these national economies are destined to experience declining activity in the global political economy. In other words, in the absence of solutions to the threat posed by globalization, the further the process progresses the more excluded the regions threatened with marginalization shall be from the activities that characterize the globalization process.

We defined globalization earlier as a process and also as a manifestation of the increasing *connectivity* of the world's markets, businesses, and so on, in which factors like goods, services, labor, technology, and capital are mobile. The connectivity is made via such activities as the export and importation of goods and services from and into a national economy from the global, in- and outflows of investment, market expansion, increasing productivity, sharing in global wealth commensurate with its increase, etc. Marginalized or national economies threatened with marginalization would, therefore, be taken to have minimal or no connectivity in a globalizing world economy by virtue of exhibiting a decline in or the total absence of these activities.

Taking this as an opportunity or challenge, the opposite is what regional integration seeks to achieve by working towards encouraging growth through promotion of trade, market expansion via the synthesis of regional markets, increased international specialization and exploitation of economies of scale, grouping up to gain a 'bigger voice' on the multilateral scene, and so on among other strategies. Whether this is a viable strategy can be partly determined by examining the behavior of the parameters that define the variables we have explained as indicative of connectivity. We can thus attempt to assess the behavior, in a regional and global context; of exports and imports from and to a given region to see how active or how much connectivity or interaction it has with the global political economy through trade; regional population to determine a region's market size and potential; regional income to indicate the share of its income and productivity vis-à-vis global income and productivity. We do this in the sections that follow and attempt to examine whether regionalization in the developing national economies of Southern African and Southeast Asia is a viable strategy for averting the threat posed by globalization.

*Regional Responses to Globalization: Regionalization in Asia and Africa.*

With a focus on the most viable regional schemes and economic activity, in this section we briefly outline the evolution of regional integration in Southeast Asia and in Southern Africa and then go on to assess the extent of connectivity or active participation of the respective regions in the global political economy. This is done by assessing trends in behavior of the respective regional national economies' and combined regional productivity or income, trade, population, and each of these parameters as respective shares of the global. Specifically, we seek to examine trends in these parameters as they stand; the national and regional economy parameters as shares of the global; and trends in these parameters as shares of the global.

*Regional Responses to Globalization: Evolution of Regionalization in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa.*

*The Association of Southeast Asian Nations*

Southeast Asia is home to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Established August 8 1967, ASEAN at its inception comprised the three founding members of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA)<sup>5</sup>, and Indonesia, and Singapore. Today the Association has a total membership of ten<sup>6</sup> and represents the most successful result of endogenously driven efforts at formal regionalization on the Asian side of the Asia-Pacific. This is despite the uncertain future it faced at its creation. The Communist challenge, for instance, and particularly represented by the threat Cambodia as well as a united Vietnam posed after 1975 only served as a galvanizing and strengthening factor in ASEAN's cohesion (Buszynski, 1997-98). Prior attempts at formal integration in the region including the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and ASA, for example, were apparently faced an unsuccessful future from their very inception on account of the perceived "close association [they had] with US foreign policy, especially on anti-Communism and China" (Pollard, 1970: 247) and as such as political means of containing China in the region. This accounted for the failure of the arrangements to expand into larger, and particularly, regional economic groupings.

Though conceived during the cold war, ASEAN at its formation tried to portray itself as different from ASA and SEATO with their ideological alignment with the West and its quest to contain China. ASEAN projected itself as an organization with a largely economic purpose. Some nonetheless argue that ASEAN acted as a means through which regional positions regarding the Communist rebellion and conflict in Cambodia were channeled (see for example Buszynski, 1997-98). Economic integration was not on ASEAN's initial agenda at its creation (Chia, 1997). Rather individual member economies at the time were inward looking and pursued import substitution policies to protect local industry and as industrialization strategy. Consequently, and owing to its political and diplomatic leaning, efforts at performing economic functions in ASEAN's early years yielded poor results.

The Cambodian communist challenge that ASEAN was faced with no longer poses a major threat and is today of no major concern to the latter. This coupled with the end of the cold war has meant a reasonable shift in focus on the part of ASEAN towards economic concerns affecting the organization and its members. Various political contentions and concerns between member

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<sup>5</sup> Malaysia (formerly the Federation of Malaya), the Philippines, and Thailand.

<sup>6</sup> ASEAN member states include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

national economies ranging from border and water disputes, to concerns over domestic conditions within some member national economies do, nonetheless, remain on the organization's agenda. However, the challenges facing ASEAN on the economic front today can be better illustrated in the context of wider East Asia and the global political economy.

*ASEAN FTA and the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme*

ASEAN launched the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme in 1992 and implemented it the following year with the objective of attaining an FTA within 15 years, ending 2008, of its introduction. Under the Scheme 41, 147 tariff lines on the Inclusion List would undergo reductions that would bring them down to a 0-5% range by the set date. There were also, respectively, a Temporary Exclusion List and a General Exception List that comprised of some tariff lines excluded from reduction on temporary basis and others permanently. The CEPT and its 2008 targeted FTA would later be revised with intentions of accelerating the achievement of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) within 10 years instead of the initially agreed 15. Under the revised agreement products on the Temporary Exclusion List would be moved to the Inclusion List starting January 1 1996 in five equal installments (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005). Table 2 below outlines the new levels of tariff reduction in ASEAN under the new Scheme.

**Table 2 New Program of Tariff Reduction**

Year	Regional Average Tariff Rate (%)
1996	7.66
1997	6.95
1998	5.76
1999	5.19
2000	4.02
2001	3.89
2002	3.47
2003	2.89

Source: ASEAN Secretariat

The dramatic nature with which national economies in ASEAN have reduced their tariffs is self-evident from the regional average rates displayed in the table. Along with this is the realization of the seriousness with which liberalization of trade is taken by the region's national economies. The new time frame implies that by 2003 all ASEAN members had average CEPT tariff rates within the 0-5% range that had initially been targeted for 2008. That is average regional tariff rate fell from 7.66% in 1996 to 4.02% in the year 2000. According to ASEAN Secretariat estimates all ASEAN members with the exception of two, had by 2000 average tariff rates in the 0-5% category. Table 3 below showing the average CEPT tariff rate under the new time frame for each member economy of ASEAN further illustrates this point.

**Table 3 Average CEPT Tariff Rates of ASEAN Members under the New Time Frame**

Country	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Brunei Darussalam	2.46	2.29	1.91	1.74	1.39	1.39	1.39	1.39
Indonesia	11.63	10.61	8.84	7.91	5.81	5.70	5.00	4.25
Malaysia	5.93	5.14	4.42	3.67	2.90	2.83	2.83	2.83
Philippine	9.17	8.33	7.16	6.53	5.42	4.90	4.89	3.73
Singapore	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Thailand	14.10	12.69	10.15	9.28	7.00	6.99	5.78	4.63
ASEAN	7.76	7.00	5.79	5.19	3.97	3.88	3.47	2.95

Source: ASEAN Secretariat

### *Southern Africa*

Southern Africa is home to several regional organizations the most prominent of which include the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),<sup>7</sup> the Southern African Customs Union (SACU),<sup>8</sup> and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).<sup>9</sup> Our study focuses on COMESA (and partly SADC) on account of history of attempts at integration through their respective visions and reflected in their trade liberalization and tariff reduction programs, and size. COMESA particularly serves as our main case because from the outset the organization sought the economic objective of regionalization as opposed to the political and, therefore, has a longer history of experimenting with trade liberalization, tariff reductions, and related integration issues. COMESA in its liberalization goals focuses on the demand side of liberalization in addition to other protocols and goals that characterize the regional body like harmonization of financial and monetary systems, production and investment promotion, quality improvement, free movement of people, and so on. COMESA programs are strategically focused on promotion of regional integration through trade development and investment promotion as the institution seeks to enable members make the adjustments necessary for them to become part of the global economy within the WTO framework and its regulations, and other global requirements.

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<sup>7</sup> COMESA has a membership of 20 including Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>8</sup> Originating in 1910, SACU is the oldest regional organization in Africa and is made up of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.

<sup>9</sup> SADC members include Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

### *The Southern African Development Community*

SADC owes its formation in part to the Front Line States Movement (FLS<sup>10</sup>) which is consequently held to have played a significant role in integrative processes and the definition thereof in Southern Africa. The political and security organisation give birth to the then Southern African Development Coordinating Committee (SADCC) in 1980 to counter colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa (Schoeman, 2002), as well as reduce its founding members' economic dependence on South Africa. This was a politically motivated economic move designed to completely liberate the region while seeking to fight apartheid and the threat it posed in the region. Around 1979, for instance, South Africa's minority government had plans, in its "Constellation of Southern African States" initiative, to co-opt the region's weaker national economies and upon realizing economic benefit from this, perpetuate its rule in the entire region. SADCC had been established to serve as an economic pillar to support the liberation struggle and stand against apartheid. Its approach towards fulfilling its objectives took a project coordination style (Oden 2001) and, consequently, the organization had not been particularly modeled to serve as an economic or a trade integration regional body. Though initially largely a politically driven organization, SADCC did nonetheless record some success in functional areas including rehabilitation of transport infrastructure, communication systems development, energy, agriculture, and soil conservation in the decade spanning 1980 to 1992.

With the end of the anti-colonial struggle and the abolition of apartheid in South Africa, Southern Africa's political economy and outlook took a new turn in the 1990s to focus less on conflict and confrontation and more on strengthening regional solidarity and development. SADCC likewise transformed to SADC. The organization also revised its objectives and approach to issues to now include, for example, trade aimed at market integration among its members.

To sum up, therefore, the SADCC Programme of Action was at inception built on a project-based structure that entailed cooperation among member states in specified tasks and projects. Under this highly decentralised arrangement member states were each assigned responsibility over specific sectors which were then coordinated by a small Secretariat in Gaborone. The idea was not so much to develop a regional economic integration organisation than to merely coordinate member state development initiatives in the hope of enhancing infrastructure along with productive sector development. Transport infrastructure came to constitute the organisation's prime concern (Schoeman, 2002) owing to the land-locked nature of member states and, therefore, bids to reduce dependence on apartheid South Africa for access to outside markets.

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<sup>10</sup> Comprising Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, and later Zimbabwe in 1980.

Each member state was further responsible for financing the sector assigned to it; a situation that despite creating a sense of equal responsibility among member states also undoubtedly worked to the organisation's disadvantage particularly owing to the general low levels of development, reflected in low incomes, among member national economies. This arrangement also raised the possibility of uneven development among different sectors depending on the importance each member attached on the development of the sector under its responsibility. Today SADC has an FTA launched in 2000 with eleven signatories out of its 13 members (SADC Indicative Strategic Plan). Total trade liberalization has been set for 2012, with liberalization of 85 percent of trade, excluding sensitive sectors, set for 2008. Unlike COMESA, however, SADC focuses on the supply side of trade as it seeks to relax constraints to trade by encouraging cooperation in various sectors like agriculture, transport and infrastructure, human resources, and so on (Khandelwal, 2004). Thus in addition to trade, SADC has several other protocols of cooperation.

#### *The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa*

COMESA first started as a preferential trade area (PTA) whose origin can be traced back to the immediate and prosperous post-independence 1960s. Fueled by the Pan—African spirit, the then politically independent national economies of Eastern and Southern Africa, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), after a series of meetings starting in the 1960s later in 1978 recommended the creation of a sub-regional economic community that would evolve through the phases of economic integration from a trade area to an Economic Community (COMESA, 2000).

The PTA agreement was reached in 1981 and became effective 1982 under a Treaty that envisaged its eventual transformation into a Common Market over a ten-year period. The Treaty aimed at establishing COMESA as a common market was signed about ten years later in 1993 and ratified in 1994. The COMESA integrative process was designed to proceed systematically after the establishment of the PTA with the PTA, as mentioned, earmarked for transformation into a Common Market in the year 2000, and later eventually progress into the Economic Community stage of integration. The organization's desired end is a region in which there is free flow of factors, regional peace and stability, etc., all leading to higher and better standards of living for its people. This vision is expected to be realized by 2025. On the ground, however, a considerable lot needs to be done if the vision is to be attained by the set date. The implementation of the organization's tariff reduction program over the ten year period through which it was expected to evolve into a common market by individual members, for example, reflects this need.

Most COMESA members had centrally planned economies and, like most Southeast Asian economies, pursued import substitution and inward looking policies prior to the establishment of the PTA. The decline that characterized most of these economies in the post 1960s period, together

with the necessity for reform could be partly attributed to these policies. The PTA was, therefore, an ideally appropriate means of liberalizing the region's trade. Liberalization under the PTA was, however, also inward looking to the region since it gave preferential treatment to members on the basis of a Common List of commodities. The number of items on this list would expand every two years until all goods were included as per the plan to convert into a common market over a ten-year period. In implementing the tariff reduction program, however, only reductions of 10 percent every two years from 1988-1996, 20 percent in 1998, and 30 percent in 2000 were agreed upon by the signatories to the agreement. Consequently, by 1993 only about 60 percent reductions in tariffs were realized. The same year the Common List was abolished and replaced by a new agreement to allow preferential treatment on all goods produced and traded within the region in a bid to hasten the pace of trade liberalization and expand intra-regional trade (Chanthunya, 2001).

**Table 4 New Program of Tariff Reduction**

Year	Level of Reduction (%)
October 1993	60
October 1994	70
October 1996	80
October 1998	90
October 2000	100

Source: Murinde, 2001.

Table 4 above shows the new program for tariff reduction that replaced the Common List. Starting with 1993 at 60 percent and representing tariff level reduction achieved over the period 1980-1993, the program proceeded with the same logic employed by the previous List of reducing tariffs every two years until the eventual elimination of all tariff barriers to attain FTA status in 2000. Thus by the end of 1994 a tariff reduction level representing 70 percent had been achieved, an 80 percent level over the period 1994-1996, 90 percent from 1996-1998, and 100 percent by October 2000. The COMESA FTA came into effect in 2000 but with only 9 of the total membership of 20 national economies participating<sup>11</sup>. Table ... below shows the trade relationships among all COMESA economies vis-à-vis their respective extents of participation in the COMESA FTA and the rates of preference effected on COMESA originating goods as of the year 2000.

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<sup>11</sup> Current participants in the COMESA FTA include Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

**Table 5 Tariffs and Preferences Applied on COMESA originating goods**

Country	Rate of duty applied on COMESA originating goods
Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe	Duty-free trade. No duties or <i>charges of equivalent effect</i> on all goods originating from these countries.
Comoros, Eritrea and Uganda	20% of general (MFN) duty rates
Congo, D R	30% of general (MFN) duty rates
Burundi and Rwanda	40% of general (MFN) duty rates
Ethiopia	90% of general (MFN) duty rates
Seychelles	Full MFN rates until June 2001 when the Seychelles joins the FTA
Namibia and Swaziland	Full MFN rates until the derogation lapses
Angola	Full MFN rates

Source: COMESA Secretariat.

#### *Regional Responses to Globalization: Assessing Connectivity*

We now turn to a consideration of whether regionalization is a viable strategy to avert the challenge posed by globalization of marginalizing some national economies from active participation in the global economy. We do this by assessing trends in productivity or income (GDP), trade (expressed by the import and export parameters), population; and each of these parameters as each respective national economy's and the region's shares of the global for each of the respective national economies in the regions under study and as regional aggregates. Dutta (2002: pp. 78 & 80) considers the share of an individual economy's exports in those of the world as a quantifiable measure of the economy's relationship with other economies. The parameters representing an economy's share in world output (denoted  $GDP_i/GDP_w$ ) and exports (denoted  $X_i/X_w$ )—and imports ( $M_i/M_w$ )—may thus be employed to illustrate its competitiveness and interaction with other economies and the world market. We apply this argument to assess ASEAN and COMESA interaction, connectivity, or relationship with the global economy. In the presentation that follows, like Dutta (2002: 78), we do not make any correction for intra-trade regime trade flows. Each respective region is taken as a single block when aggregated. We, however, limit the national economies for the study to those currently participating in the FTAs in both regions. Also, for ASEAN we exclude Brunei and the new entrants to the FTA—Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar—from the analysis on account of scanty data. We likewise only include the national economies participating in the COMESA FTA from the time it was launched and exclude the new entrants: Burundi and Rwanda. Djibouti is also excluded on account of absence of necessary data.

Data, except where indicated, are from World Development Indicators (WDI) Online and are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions of US dollars. The study covers the period 1980-2000 and the tables depict data for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and the year 2000. The figures in the appendix, however, display yearly data extending from 1980 to 2004, where data is available. GDP is purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted in year 2000 (constant) and in billions of US dollars. All export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars. Export and import data for Singapore are from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and in billions US dollar. For the rest of the economies trade data are from WDI Online. All population figures are in millions and from WDI Online.

#### *Southeast Asia: Globalizing or being marginalized?*

Of the five ASEAN national economies in our study three—Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand—fall in the category lower medium income.<sup>12</sup> Indonesia is severely indebted while the latter two are labeled moderately indebted. Malaysia is an upper middle income moderately indebted economy and Singapore a high income non OECD economy with no classification as regards its debt condition.

Though severely indebted, Indonesia takes up a significant share of ASEAN GDP (PPP)<sup>13</sup> and population. Table 6 displays GDP and population figures for select years among the sample of ASEAN national economies. In 1990, for instance, Indonesia took up 39.07% (\$404.18 billion) and 56.38% (178.23 million) of the selected regional economies' GDP and population, respectively and 38.59% (\$624.63 billion) 55.59% (206.27 million) of the region's GDP and population, respectively in the year 2000. The economy with the least shares in the sample in this respect, Singapore, had 4.30% (\$44.47 billion) and 0.96% (3.05 million) GDP and population of the regional total, respectively in 1990 and 5.86% (\$94.86 billion) and 1.08% (4.02 million) GDP and population, respectively in the year 2000.

At the global level, however, Indonesia's share in income (GDP) declines significantly in comparison with its position at the ASEAN level. Table 7 displays the shares of each of ASEAN's national economies' parameters under study in the global. Indonesia's GDP represents about 1.22% and 1.39% (\$404.18 billion and \$624.63 billion) of global income in 1990 and 2000, respectively. Its population, however, remains relatively significant in the global context and is

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<sup>12</sup> See the World Bank for classification of National Economies on the basis of income:

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html#hiincome>.

<sup>13</sup> All GDP values in this paper are in US\$ PPP at constant 2000 prices from Word Development Indicators Online, the World Bank. Subsequent mention of GDP should be taken to mean this.

higher than that of Japan at 3.39 % and 3.41% (178.23 million and 206.27 million) in the respective years, whereas that of the latter is around 2% of the global in the years under review. Singapore's shares in the global for the same periods find themselves at 0.13 % (\$44.47 billion) and 0.21 % (\$94.86) GDP in 1990 and 2000, respectively. Population shares of global population are 0.06% (3.05 million) and 0.07 % (4.02 million) in 1990 and 2000, respectively. The parameters for the other economies in the sample range between those of Indonesia and Singapore.

When aggregated the sampled Southeast Asian national economies together display noticeable increases in income (GDP) and population over individual consideration. Thus the total income for the five selected ASEAN economies for the years 1990 and 2000, respectively valued at \$1,034 billion and \$1,618.77 billion were 3.12% and 3.6% of global income (Table 7). Population-wise the group's global shares exceed those of the US and Japan, respectively.

On the whole, both individually and as a group, the Southeast Asian national economies have, except for period immediately following the financial crisis and a brief point in the mid 1980s, recorded progressive increase in real GDP as Figure 1 shows. It can also be observed from the figure that the group was quick to rebound in output (GDP) following the crisis.

Trade wise trends in exports exhibit more or less similar characteristics as those in the preceding case—progressive increase, except for a slump in the early 1980s and following the financial crisis (Tables 12 and 13; Figures 2 and 3). Within the group and over the period under study Indonesia initially (1980 and 1985) had the highest export earnings amounting to 1.30% (or \$32.68 billion) and 0.80% (or \$24.34 billion) of global exports followed by Singapore whose earnings represented 0.77% (or \$19.38 billion) and 0.75% (or \$22.81 billion) of global exports in 1980 and 1985, respectively.<sup>14</sup> Least in export earnings among the sampled ASEAN members, Thailand held a 0.33% (\$8.22 billion) share in global exports in 1980 and 0.40% (\$12.13 billion) in 1985. From 1990 onwards Singapore rose to highest exporter in the region with earnings accounting for 1.27% (\$52.73 billion), 2.15% (\$118.27 billion), and 1.73% (\$137.80 billion) of global exports in 1990, 1995, and the year 2000, respectively. The Philippines on the other hand has since 1985 had the least share at regional and global levels in exports among the ASEAN 5. It is the only economy among the sampled that has had relatively low and varying progression in exports (see Figure 2). This notwithstanding, the region's export performance is reflective of the seriousness with which these economies approach exports as an essential instrument for growth.

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<sup>14</sup> Trade data for Singapore were unavailable in the World Trade Indicator database. Consequently the displayed data are taken from International Financial Statistics. Owing to difference in sources there may be some slight difference in conformity between data for Singapore and those of the rest of the sampled ASEAN members.

Together the Southeast Asian group took up 5.55% (\$441.80 billion) of global exports in the year 2000. Though an increase in real terms, this represented a decline from the 6.25% (\$343.79 billion) share of global exports it held in 1995. The regional shares in global exports in the years 1980, 1985, and 1990 were 3.5% (\$88.99 billion), 2.96% (\$90.41 billion), and 4.20% (\$343.79 billion), respectively. As said earlier these economies individually, with the exception of the Philippines and the decline in the mid 1980s and the region as a whole recorded steady increase in real export earnings.

With respect to imports, Singapore's share in the region and its standing in global imports top the region from the mid 1980s onwards (Table 13). On the low side as is the case with exports, the Philippines ranks fifth for all the years in Table 13 except 1980. Contrary to exports, however, imports do not exhibit equally significant increases as the rebounding exports in the years following the financial crisis (Compare Figure 2 with Figure 3).

#### *Southern Africa: Globalizing or being marginalized?*

Except for Egypt and Mauritius all selected COMESA members in our study are low income countries according to World Bank classification. Egypt is categorized lower middle income while Mauritius is an upper middle income economy. Of the low income economies Kenya and Madagascar are moderately indebted and the rest severely so. Among the severely indebted, Malawi, Sudan, and Zambia (including moderately indebted Madagascar), have attained the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) status. Zambia has since (2005), however, reached her HIPC completion point.

The lower middle income economy Egypt takes up more than half the selected economies' total GDP in the period under study as Table 8 and Figure 4 show. Thus in 1990 and the year 2000, for instance, her \$153.22 billion and \$226.11 GDP accounted for 57.60% and 59.13% of total COMESA output, respectively. Sudan follows Egypt with figures representing 10.76% (\$28.63 billion) and 14.52% (\$55.54 billion) in 1990 and 2000, respectively. Malawi is least among the selected economies in share terms of regional income with 1.66% (\$4.41 billion) and 1.61% (\$6.17 billion) of COMESA GDP.

With respect to population Egypt also takes the lead in regional share terms accounting for over a third of the region's population (Table 8) during the period under study. Sudan is next and accounts for 17.81% (24.93 million) and 17.96% (31.44 million) of the region's total population in 1990 and 2000, respectively. Least in share terms population wise among the selected COMESA members is Mauritius and accounts for 0.76% (1.06 million) and 0.68% (1.19 million) of the same in 1990 and 2000, respectively.

Egypt's dominant share among the selected COMESA economies shrinks to a minimal 0.46% (\$153.22 billion) and 0.50% (\$226.11 billion) of global income in 1990 and 2000, respectively. Sudan's \$28.63 billion and \$55.54 billion, for the same years, are reduced to 0.9% and 0.12%, respectively. Malawi as the least in output in our sample accounts for only 0.01% with her \$4.41 billion and \$6.17 billion incomes in both 1990 and the year 2000, respectively.

The same applies with regard to population—individual national values shrink to minimal share in the global context. For example, Egypt's 52.44 million people in 1990 account for only 1% of global population and the 63.98 million in the year 2000, for 1.06% of global population. For Sudan, her shares of population in global population are 0.47% (24.93 million) and 0.52% (31.44 million) in 1990 and 2000, respectively. Mauritius' 1.06 million and 1.19 million in 1990 and 2000 represent 0.02 % of global population in each of the latter respective years.

Together these 8 COMESA economies (see Table 9) have GDP that accounts for 0.80% and 0.85% of global income in 1990 and 2000, respectively, while their population in the same respective years is larger than Japan's shares accounting for 2.66% (139.94 million) and 2.89% (175.06 million). Though small, figures for both output and population for the individual and the regional economies in the COMESA area, and during the period under study (1980-2000) indicate real increases in GDP and population; save for the declines recorded in the mid 1980s (see Table 9 and Figure 4). The real increase is more pronounced when the respective parameters under study are aggregated. Despite this, however, COMESA and its constituent national economies' GDP and population represent minimal (below 1% in the case of GDP) values as shares of the global.

If the picture painted by the performance of output and population in COMESA is encouraging, then trade presents the opposite. COMESA trade parameters paint a gloomy picture of both individual national economies and the regional. Not only do the trade parameters represent very shares in the global but they have also been characterized by real decline from 1980-2000 and beyond. Tables 14 and 15 display export and import data for the selected COMESA economies, respectively. Figures 5 and 6 display the same data unbroken and running from 1980 to 2004.

Egypt is the number one export earner in the region since 1980. Her global export shares in 1990 and 2000 were 0.27% (\$11.05 billion) and 0.20% (\$16.17 billion), respectively. Kenya has been consistently second to Egypt in export earnings since 1980 despite the wide gap between them and except for the year 2000 when it was replaced as second in the region by Mauritius which had an export share of 0.04% (\$2.8 billion) in total world exports in the year 2000. For the years it was second in export shares of world total exports within the sampled economies, Kenya accounted for 0.06% (\$1.46 billion), 0.05% (\$1.52 billion), 0.06% (\$2.35 billion), and 0.05% (\$2.76 billion) of total world exports in 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995, respectively. In 1990 Sudan had the least export

earnings among the sampled economies amounting to 0.01% (\$0.33 billion) of global total exports and in the year 2000 Malawi ranked least with the same percentage share in global total exports as Sudan (but amounting to \$0.45 billion).

The region as a whole holds less than a percentage point (for example, 0.44% or \$18.17 billion, and 0.35% or \$28.05 billion in 1990 and 2000 respectively) in shares of world total exports. Imports portray similar values. Table 15 and Figure 6 show COMESA and individual national economy imports and their corresponding shares in global total imports.

#### *Southeast Asia and Southern Africa and Globalization: Taking Stock*

Taken individually most, if not all, our sampled economies exert minimal influence in the global economy, particularly if we consider US, Japan, German, and French influence in similar respect (compare Tables 7 and 9 with Table 10. Also see Table 11). This is more pronounced for Southern Africa than Southeast Asia. The threat of marginalization seems more real in the former than in the latter. To conclude that this, in and of itself, is indicative of marginalization, however, would be an overstatement. Some national economies in the high income OECD group also present figures more or less similar with some in Southern Africa. Compare, for instance, Egypt with Luxembourg and Ireland (Table 9 and Table 10).

When taken as a block Southeast Asia exerts more significant influence in the global than Southern Africa. Southeast Asian performance is even better when trade is considered. Unlike the comparable economies in Asia and Europe (in GDP terms) the African have been registering declining exports and imports since 1980. Arguably trade wise their activity in the global economy has been on the decline and suggests something more of marginalization.

#### *Regional Responses to Globalization: Non-Trade Cooperation*

In the foregoing discussion we have laid emphasis on global and regional integration as they relate to income, the flow of goods and services, and population to the neglect of another crucial factor, labor. Restrictions on the movement of labor *per se* from one national economy to another, in the regions under study remain relatively high. This notwithstanding, human mobility itself within these regions and across the globe in general has increased owing to improvements in, *inter alia*, transportation, technology, etc. which we earlier associated with the globalization process. In as far as globalization may be viewed as also manifesting the ease with which humanity flows from one place to another it poses another challenge: the spread of infectious disease, the hosts of which are commuting humans. This challenge has plagued humanity for long but seems to have heightened of late in light of globalization among other factors. More so because health provision is held to be the responsibility of government: it is a public good.

Disease outbreaks, however, sometimes—as is increasingly evident—go beyond the ability of a single national government to control as their incidence, patterns, effects, etc. go beyond national boundaries. The outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in the early 2000s, for instance, proved a great challenge whose containment could not be left to a single national government in East Asia. The HIV/AIDS scourge and diseases with long histories like malaria and cholera in Southern Africa have effects that go beyond a single national government's ability to cope with. The sooner individual national governments and regional organizations come to this realization the better particularly in circumstances where disease outbreaks require quick response.

When SARS broke out in East Asia in 2003 several ASEAN based meetings and initiatives were called to look into ways of containing the outbreak and deal with health hazards of similar nature in the future. The Special ASEAN Leaders' Meeting, the Special ASEAN-China Leaders' Meeting on SARS, the ASEAN Expert Group on Communicable Diseases (AEGCD), and the ASEAN + 3 Senior Officials Meeting on Health, for example, were among the many responses that sought to look into ways of jointly addressing the threat posed by the outbreak (see the ASEAN website for details on the functions and operation of some of these initiatives). Among the immediate outcomes of these meetings and initiatives were the issuing of joint statements and declarations to combat the outbreak. The Leaders' meetings, for instance, issued the Joint Declaration of the Special ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on SARS, and the Joint State of the Special ASEAN-China Leaders' Meeting on SARS, respectively. The issued statement and declaration outlined documented measures and resolutions to contain the outbreak such as establishment of a Joint Ministerial Task Force to monitor the implementation of measures arrived at on combating the outbreak, research and training into containing SARS, information exchange, etc (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003). China even went as far as proposing the establishment a China-ASEAN Special Fund, to supplement efforts to control and prevent SARS.

Crises, be they financial, social, or natural, etc. have had the effect of bringing regional (and global) leaders and their peoples together to seek joint solutions to the threats and challenges they pose.

HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa has had similar effects. The SADC/COMESA region in particular is the worst hit by the pandemic. Though making up roughly 3% of global population<sup>15</sup> (Table 9) the COMESA/SADC region accounts for over 37% of people living with HIV/AIDS in the world (SADC, 2005). Faced with the realization of the gravity of this reality, SADC has intensified efforts to combat the pandemic. At a summit held in 2003 the organization issued the Maseru

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<sup>15</sup> The SADC region according to the SADC Secretariat constitutes 3.5% of the world's population. See [http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page\\_id=hiv\\_programme](http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page_id=hiv_programme).

Declaration on Combating of HIV and AIDS in the SADC region and also came up with the SADC Strategic Framework and Programme of Action (2003-2007). Consequently a SADC HIV and AIDS Unit was set up in the organization's Secretariat to look into the implementation of an approved five-year Business Plan. SADC seeks to reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS in the region and the threat it poses to public health while working towards harmonizing policies and laws related to the prevention of HIV (See SADC website for details). SADC efforts at combating HIV/AIDS are indeed supplemented by cooperation from international non governmental organizations as well as donor and bilateral programs. The argument therefore that, crises have had the effect of bringing regional (and global) leaders and their peoples together in search of joint solutions to the threats and challenges they pose does hold here too if the HIV/AIDS pandemic is viewed as such. So does, sometimes, and one hopes this becomes increasingly so, the management of natural and depleting resources. It has been argued in some circles, for instance, that water is among the limited resources that will give rise to future conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Cooperation and joint use of resources of this sort by national economies sharing them can work to enhance regionalization in addition to contributing to sustainable development. This seems to have been realized by national economies sharing the Mekong River in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) within ASEAN, and those sharing the Zambezi River in the Zambezi River Basin (ZRB) within the COMESA/SADC region.

The situation has changed for the better in the GMS. The subregion seems geared for development following the formalization of cooperation in the 1990s by ASEAN and the national economies sharing the Mekong River; all of which, with the exception of China, are members of ASEAN. These include Myanmar, Laos PDR, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The project to encourage cooperation among the stakeholders in the Mekong river precedes ASEAN but progress in its implementation and work towards realizing set goals were slowed down following the outbreak of the Vietnam war in the 1960s. Even after the war ended, however, the project could not take off for some time due the rivalry bred by the Cold War that characterized the region and the Communist challenged discussed earlier. It was only after Cambodia, headed by a legitimate and regionally accepted government in 1993, was readmitted to the Mekong Committee responsible for the project's programs that the said committee became fully functional (Ojendal, 2000). Furthermore, Laos PDR, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam under the auspices of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1995 established the Mekong River Commission (MRC) to serve as coordinator of development work in the region (Dosch, 2005). In addition to this, ASEAN also established the ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (ASEAN-MBDC) in 1996 aimed at multilateral infrastructure development among other projects.

Notable cooperation in the subregion goes beyond water management to also include donor funded projects like the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) program to fight HIV/AIDS

in Southeast Asia (Medical News Today, 2005). In short, a hive of activity surrounds the joint use of scarce resources like water in areas such as the GMS providing opportunity for national governments and other stakeholders involved to engage in meaningful regionalization. The challenge facing national economies in the GMS and the ASEAN region at large is either joint resource use and management or receding into conflict over a commodity that is increasingly considered to be on the decline.

In Southern Africa the ZRB is shared by Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and houses four hydroelectric power schemes that supply most of the SADC region's electricity. It also is the principal water source for countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe which jointly run a power-generating scheme—the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA)—based on the ZRB.

Lead chiefly by Zambia and Zimbabwe's power supply parastatals, the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) and Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), respectively, the ZRA was enacted by an act of parliament (the Zambezi River Authority Act) passed simultaneously in both Zambia and Zimbabwe (ZRA, 2005) with a mandate to, *inter alia*, make by-laws on matters pertaining to the use of the stretch of water on the Zambezi from Kazungula in Zambia to Kanyenba in Zimbabwe; run and monitor the Kariba complex; regulate the water levels in the Kariba reservoir; etc. Though adequately managed by Zambia and Zimbabwe the ZRA faces some constraints that prevent it from realizing its full potential which could otherwise be the ignition needed to set regionalization in Southern Africa into full throttle. ZRA's mandate is limited as it is specific: its jurisdiction only covers a small part of the Zambezi River from Kazungula to Kanyenba, focuses more on electricity generation at the expense of other viable ventures, and the project does not involve the direct participation of all national economies sharing the Basin.

A lot more productive activities from electricity to agriculture, food and fisheries, tourism, forestry and conservation, etc. depend on water. The basin's proper use for sustainable development cannot be overemphasized. Its potential to either enhance cooperation or be a source of conflict among states sharing it is great. As stated earlier water is likely to be a source of conflict in future. Water is life and neither should the power generated from it be taken for granted<sup>16</sup>. Sustainable use of the resource is possible providing opportunity for socio-economic development for the national economies sharing either the Mekong River Basin or, in this case, the ZRB. Such use can itself

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<sup>16</sup> "Water is life" is the motto for the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company; a company that provides water and sewerage services to Lusaka residents in Zambia, while ZESCO always carries the cliché "don't take power for granted" in its advertisements in the Zambian media.

both lead to and result from dynamic regional cooperation that will improve the livelihoods of all stakeholders in the nations covered by the basin and beyond.

Room and challenges remain for further development and joint exploitation of such resources. Effective policy coordination in these and similar sectors among national economies in a region could lead to better and higher levels of integration, both formal and informal.

*Regional Responses to Globalization: A Concluding Note*

The challenge of increasing poverty in Africa and the 1997/98 financial crisis in East Asia serve among the factors spurring efforts at (regional) integration in the respective regions. Add to this the incidence of diseases of regional nature exacerbated by human mobility in the face of globalization. In general we can say that crises of regional (and even global) nature, themselves arising in part due to globalization, act as motivators of integration in as far as they have the effect of bringing national economies in a given region together to confront the threat the crises pose to human life. At the same time, the need to jointly manage limited and depleting 'shared' resources serves as an opportunity and avenue through which regional economies can work together. Essential commodities like health and water provide the opportunity while raising the need for regional governments to work together and in the process cement integrative processes. Contrasting the performance of particularly Southern African economies in income and trade terms, one is, however, left with the conclusion that regionalization is a necessary but not sufficient strategy with which to face the globalization threat. More attention may be needed within individual economies.

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## **Appendix: Tables and Figures**

**Table 6 GDP & Population—ASEAN**

Year Country / Parameter	1980 GDP (Percent)	1980 Population (Percent)	1985 GDP (Percent)	1985 Population (Percent)	1990 GDP (Percent)	1990 Population (Percent)	1995 GDP (Percent)	1995 Population (Percent)	2000 GDP (Percent)	2000 Population (Percent)
Indonesia	216.79 (35.43)	148.30 (57.21)	288.44 (39.03)	163.04 (56.84)	404.18 (39.07)	178.23 (56.38)	580.35 (40.30)	192.75 (56.06)	624.63 (38.59)	206.27 (55.61)
Malaysia	55.69 (9.10)	13.76 (5.31)	74.14 (10.03)	15.68 (5.47)	100.28 (9.69)	18.20 (5.76)	158.36 (11.00)	20.61 (5.99)	208.32 (12.87)	23.27 (6.27)
Philippines	199.85 (32.66)	48.04 (18.53)	194.00 (26.25)	54.23 (18.91)	237.02 (22.91)	61.04 (19.31)	255.36 (17.73)	68.34 (19.88)	305.32 (18.86)	76.63 (20.66)
Singapore	23.39 (3.82)	2.41 (0.93)	29.62 (4.01)	2.77 (0.95)	44.47 (4.30)	3.05 (0.96)	68.56 (4.76)	3.53 (1.03)	94.86 (5.86)	4.02 (1.08)
Thailand	116.25 (19.00)	46.72 (18.02)	152.87 (20.68)	51.15 (17.83)	248.60 (24.03)	55.60 (17.59)	377.36 (26.21)	58.61 (17.05)	385.64 (23.82)	60.73 (16.37)
Total	611.97	259.23	739.07	286.83	1,034.56	316.12	1,439.98	343.84	1,618.77	370.91
World	23,941.47	4,429.97	27,594.72	4,821.97	33,159.26	5,253.39	37,656.78	5,660.05	45,007.28	6,052.43
Euro-zone	6,033.37	355.27	6,539.80	358.68	7,698.79	364.56	8,328.96	371.53	9,507.87	377.14
US	5,136.76	227.23	5,991.23	237.92	7,087.08	249.62	8,036.96	266.28	9,592.53	282.22
Japan	1,980.20	116.78	2,297.25	120.75	2,895.93	123.54	3,117.63	125.44	3,325.21	126.87

Source: World Development Indicators Online, 2005.

Note: (1) GDP figures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and are constant at the year 2000. (2) Population is in millions.

**Table 7 Share (%) of Global GDP & Population—ASEAN**

Year	1980	1980	1985	1985	1990	1990	1995	1995	2000	2000
Country /	GDP	Population	GDP	Population	GDP	Population	GDP	Population	GDP	Population
Parameter	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)
Indonesia	216.79 (0.91)	148.30 (3.35)	288.44 (1.05)	163.04 (3.38)	404.18 (1.22)	178.23 (3.39)	580.35 (1.54)	192.75 (3.41)	624.63 (1.39)	206.27 (3.41)
Malaysia	55.69 (0.23)	13.76 (0.31)	74.14 (0.27)	15.68 (0.33)	100.28 (0.30)	18.20 (0.35)	158.36 (0.42)	20.61 (0.36)	208.32 (0.46)	23.27 (0.38)
Philippines	199.85 (0.83)	48.04 (1.08)	194.00 (0.70)	54.23 (1.12)	237.02 (0.71)	61.04 (1.16)	255.36 (0.68)	68.34 (1.21)	305.32 (0.68)	76.63 (1.27)
Singapore	23.39 (0.10)	2.41 (0.05)	29.62 (0.11)	2.77 (0.06)	44.47 (0.13)	3.05 (0.06)	68.56 (0.18)	3.53 (0.06)	94.86 (0.21)	4.02 (0.07)
Thailand	116.25 (0.49)	46.72 (1.05)	152.87 (0.55)	51.15 (1.06)	248.60 (0.75)	55.60 (1.06)	377.36 (1.00)	58.61 (1.04)	385.64 (0.86)	60.73 (1.00)
Total	611.97 (2.56)	259.23 (5.85)	739.07 (2.68)	286.83 (5.95)	1,034.56 (3.12)	316.12 (6.02)	1,439.98 (3.82)	343.84 (6.07)	1,618.77 (3.60)	370.91 (6.13)
World	23,941.47 (100)	4,429.97 (100)	27,594.72 (100)	4,821.97 (100)	33,159.26 (100)	5,253.39 (100)	37,656.78 (100)	5,660.05 (100)	45,007.28 (100)	6,052.43 (100)
US	5,136.76 (21.46)	227.23 (5.13)	5,991.23 (21.71)	237.92 (4.93)	7,087.08 (21.37)	249.62 (4.75)	8,036.96 (21.34)	266.28 (4.70)	9,592.53 (21.31)	282.22 (4.66)
Japan	1,980.20 (8.27)	116.78 (2.64)	2,297.25 (8.32)	120.75 (2.50)	2,895.93 (8.73)	123.54 (2.35)	3,117.63 (8.28)	125.44 (2.22)	3,325.21 (7.39)	126.87 (2.10)

Source: World Development Indicators Online, 2005.

Note: (1) GDP figures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and are constant at the year 2000. (2) Population is in millions.

**Table 8 GDP & Population—COMESA**

Year	1980	1980	1985	1985	1990	1990	1995	1995	2000	2000
Country/ Parameter	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)
Egypt	93.63 (53.63)	40.88 (38.65)	134.12 (59.71)	46.51 (37.94)	153.22 (57.60)	52.44 (37.47)	175.99 (57.57)	58.18 (37.07)	226.11 (59.13)	63.98 (36.54)
Kenya	17.45 (9.99)	16.63 (15.73)	19.87 (8.84)	19.87 (16.21)	26.56 (9.99)	23.35 (16.69)	28.38 (9.28)	26.69 (17.01)	30.14 (7.88)	30.09 (17.19)
Madagascar	10.06 (5.76)	8.87 (8.39)	9.59 (4.27)	10.12 (8.26)	10.99 (4.13)	11.63 (8.31)	10.92 (3.57)	13.3 (8.47)	12.76 (3.34)	15.52 (8.87)
Malawi	3.77 (2.16)	6.18 (5.85)	4.03 (1.80)	7.25 (5.91)	4.41 (1.66)	8.51 (6.08)	5.16 (1.69)	9.21 (5.87)	6.17 (1.61)	10.31 (5.89)
Mauritius	3.95 (2.26)	0.97 (0.91)	5.01 (2.23)	1.02 (0.83)	6.89 (2.59)	1.06 (0.76)	8.81 (2.88)	1.12 (0.71)	11.42 (2.99)	1.19 (0.68)
Sudan	21.39 (12.25)	19.37 (18.31)	22.77 (10.14)	22.52 (18.37)	28.63 (10.76)	24.93 (17.81)	39.61 (12.96)	28.08 (17.89)	55.54 (14.52)	31.44 (17.96)
Zambia	6.66 (3.81)	5.74 (5.43)	7.16 (3.19)	6.7 (5.46)	7.47 (2.81)	7.78 (5.56)	6.84 (2.24)	8.89 (5.66)	7.68 (2.01)	9.89 (5.65)
Zimbabwe	17.69 (10.13)	7.13 (6.74)	22.09 (9.83)	8.62 (7.03)	27.86 (10.47)	10.24 (7.32)	29.96 (9.80)	11.48 (7.31)	32.60 (8.52)	12.65 (7.23)
Total	174.59 (100)	105.77 (100)	224.63 (100)	122.61 (100)	266.03 (100)	139.94 (100)	305.68 (100)	156.93 (100)	382.43 (100)	175.06 (100)
World	23,941.47	4,429.97	27,594.72	4,821.97	33,159.26	5,253.39	37,656.78	5,660.05	45,007.28	6,052.43
Euro-zone	6,033.37	355.27	6,539.80	358.68	7,698.79	364.56	8,328.96	371.53	9,507.87	377.14
US	5,136.76	227.23	5,991.23	237.92	7,087.08	249.62	8,036.96	266.28	9,592.53	282.22
Japan	1,980.20	116.78	2,297.25	120.75	2,895.93	123.54	3,117.63	125.44	3,325.21	126.87

Source: World Development Indicators Online, 2005.

Note: (1) GDP figures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and are constant at the year 2000. (2) Population is in millions.

**Table 9 Share (%) of Global GDP & Population—COMESA**

Year	1980	1980	1985	1985	1990	1990	1995	1995	2000	2000
Country / Parameter	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)
Egypt	93.63 (0.39)	40.88 (0.92)	134.12 (0.49)	46.51 (0.96)	153.22 (0.46)	52.44 (1.00)	175.99 (0.47)	58.18 (1.03)	226.11 (0.50)	63.98 (1.06)
Kenya	17.45 (0.07)	16.63 (0.38)	19.87 (0.07)	19.87 (0.41)	26.56 (0.08)	23.35 (0.44)	28.38 (0.08)	26.69 (0.47)	30.14 (0.07)	30.09 (0.50)
Madagascar	10.06 (0.04)	8.87 (0.20)	9.59 (0.03)	10.12 (0.21)	10.99 (0.03)	11.63 (0.22)	10.92 (0.03)	13.3 (0.23)	12.76 (0.03)	15.52 (0.26)
Malawi	3.77 (0.02)	6.18 (0.14)	4.03 (0.01)	7.25 (0.15)	4.41 (0.01)	8.51 (0.16)	5.16 (0.01)	9.21 (0.16)	6.17 (0.01)	10.31 (0.17)
Mauritius	3.95 (0.02)	0.97 (0.02)	5.01 (0.02)	1.02 (0.02)	6.89 (0.02)	1.06 (0.02)	8.81 (0.02)	1.12 (0.02)	11.42 (0.03)	1.19 (0.02)
Sudan	21.39 (0.09)	19.37 (0.44)	22.77 (0.08)	22.52 (0.47)	28.63 (0.09)	24.93 (0.47)	39.61 (0.11)	28.08 (0.50)	55.54 (0.12)	31.44 (0.52)
Zambia	6.66 (0.03)	5.74 (0.13)	7.16 (0.03)	6.7 (0.14)	7.47 (0.02)	7.78 (0.15)	6.84 (0.02)	8.89 (0.16)	7.68 (0.02)	9.89 (0.16)
Zimbabwe	17.69 (0.07)	7.13 (0.16)	22.09 (0.08)	8.62 (0.18)	27.86 (0.08)	10.24 (0.19)	29.96 (0.08)	11.48 (0.20)	32.60 (0.07)	12.65 (0.21)
Total	174.59 (0.73)	105.77 (2.39)	224.63 (0.81)	122.61 (2.54)	266.03 (0.80)	139.94 (2.66)	305.68 (0.81)	156.93 (2.77)	382.43 (0.85)	175.06 (2.89)
World	23,941.47 (100)	4,429.97 (100)	27,594.72 (100)	4,821.97 (100)	33,159.26 (100)	5,253.39 (100)	371.53 (100)	5,660.05 (100)	45,007.28 (100)	6,052.43 (100)
United States	5,136.76 (21.46)	227.23 (5.13)	5,991.23 (21.71)	237.92 (4.93)	7,087.08 (21.37)	249.62 (4.75)	8,036.96 (21.34)	266.28 (4.70)	9,592.53 (21.31)	282.22 (4.66)
Japan	1,980.20 (8.27)	1116.78 (2.64)	2,297.25 (8.32)	120.75 (2.50)	2,895.93 (8.73)	123.54 (2.35)	3,117.63 (8.28)	125.44 (2.22)	3,325.21 (7.39)	126.87 (2.10)

Source: World Development Indicators Online, 2005.

Note: (1) GDP figures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and are constant at the year 2000. (2) Population is in millions.

**Table 10 Share (%) of Global GDP & Population—Euro-Zone**

Year	1980	1980	1985	1985	1990	1990	1995	1995	2000	2000
Country / Parameter	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)
Austria	142.99 (0.60)	7.55 (0.17)	154.14 (0.56)	7.56 (0.16)	180.07 (0.54)	7.73 (0.15)	201.55 (0.54)	7.95 (0.14)	230.59 (0.51)	8.01 (0.13)
Belgium	189.68 (0.79)	9.85 (0.22)	198.68 (0.72)	9.86 (0.20)	230.85 (0.70)	9.97 (0.19)	245.20 (0.65)	10.14 (0.18)	281.13 (0.62)	10.25 (0.17)
Denmark	102.54 (0.43)	5.12 (0.12)	114.86 (0.42)	5.11 (0.11)	122.37 (0.37)	5.14 (0.10)	132.51 (0.35)	5.23 (0.09)	152.58 (0.34)	5.34 (0.09)
Finland	81.60 (0.34)	4.78 (0.11)	94.71 (0.34)	4.90 (0.10)	111.52 (0.34)	4.99 (0.09)	107.63 (0.29)	5.11 (0.09)	132.32 (0.29)	5.17 (0.09)
France	992.73 (4.15)	53.88 (1.22)	1,089.71 (3.95)	55.17 (1.14)	1,279.55 (3.86)	56.74 (1.08)	1,350.73 (3.59)	57.84 (1.02)	1,520.94 (3.38)	58.89 (0.97)
Germany	1,363.45 (5.69)	78.30 (1.77)	1,442.04 (5.23)	77.70 (1.61)	1,704.12 (5.14)	79.43 (1.51)	1,916.84 (5.09)	81.64 (1.44)	2,094.79 (4.65)	82.21 (1.36)
Greece	137.54 (0.57)	9.64 (0.22)	141.26 (0.51)	9.93 (0.21)	148.38 (0.45)	10.16 (0.19)	157.14 (0.42)	10.63 (0.19)	190.37 (0.42)	10.92 (0.18)
Ireland	34.91 (0.15)	3.40 (0.08)	42.81 (0.16)	3.54 (0.07)	54.04 (0.16)	3.51 (0.07)	69.04 (0.18)	3.60 (0.06)	115.48 (0.26)	3.81 (0.06)
Italy	974.68 (4.07)	56.33 (1.27)	1,068.67 (3.87)	5.59 (1.17)	1,242.07 (3.75)	56.72 (1.08)	1,325.12 (3.52)	57.20 (1.01)	1,444.31 (3.21)	57.69 (0.95)

Luxembourg	8.70 (0.04)	0.36 (0.01)	8.46 (0.03)	0.37 (0.01)	1,265.97 (0.04)	0.38 (0.01)	15.5 (0.04)	0.41 (0.01)	25.60 (0.06)	0.44 (0.01)
Netherlands	274.18 (1.15)	14.15 (0.32)	293.46 (1.06)	14.49 (0.30)	348.17 (1.05)	14.95 (0.28)	378.78 (1.01)	15.46 (0.27)	458.57 (1.02)	15.92 (0.26)
Portugal	104.17 (0.44)	9.77 (0.22)	112.31 0.41	10.01 (0.21)	140.58 (0.42)	9.90 (0.19)	151.71 (0.40)	10.03 (0.18)	186.98 (0.42)	10.23 (0.17)
Spain	500.84 (2.09)	37.39 (0.84)	537.1 (1.95)	38.41 (0.80)	667.67 (2.01)	38.84 (0.74)	717.29 (1.90)	39.21 (0.69)	873.64 (1.94)	40.50 (0.67)
Sweden	150.65 (0.63)	8.31 (0.19)	168.81 (0.61)	8.35 (0.17)	190.96 (0.58)	8.56 (0.16)	199.76 (0.53)	8.83 (0.16)	230.03 (0.51)	8.87 (0.15)
UK	974.71 (4.07)	56.33 (1.27)	1,072.79 (3.89)	56.69 (1.18)	1,265.97 (3.82)	57.56 (1.10)	1,360.16 (3.61)	58.25 (1.03)	1,570.55 3.49	58.88 (0.97)
Total	6,033.37 (25.20)	355.27 (8.02)	6,539.80 (23.70)	358.68 7.44	7,698.79 (23.22)	364.56 (6.94)	8,328.96 (22.12)	371.53 (6.56)	9,507.87 (21.13)	377.14 (6.23)
World	23,941.47 (100)	4,429.97 (100)	27,594.72 (100)	4,821.97 (100)	33,159.26 (100)	5,253.39 (100)	37,656.78 (100)	5,660.05 (100)	45,007.28 (100)	6,052.43 (100)
US	5,136.76 (21.46)	227.23 (5.13)	5,991.23 (21.71)	237.92 (4.93)	7,087.08 (21.37)	249.62 (4.75)	8,036.96 (21.34)	266.28 (4.70)	9,592.53 (21.31)	282.22 (4.66)
Japan	1,980.20 (8.27)	1116.78 (2.64)	2,297.25 (8.32)	120.75 (2.50)	2,895.93 (8.73)	123.54 (2.35)	3,117.63 (8.28)	125.44 (2.22)	3,325.21 (7.39)	126.87 (2.10)

Source: World Development Indicators Online, 2005.

Note: (1) GDP figures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and are constant at the year 2000. (2) Population is in millions.

**Table 11 GDP & Population-Regions**

Year	1980	1980	1985	1985	1990	1990	1995	1995	1995	2000
Region/ Parameter	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)	GDP (Percent)	Population (Percent)
ASEAN	611.97 (2.56)	259.23 (5.85)	739.07 (2.68)	286.83 (5.95)	1,034.56 (3.12)	316.12 (6.02)	1,439.98 (3.82)	343.84 (6.07)	1,618.77 (3.60)	370.91 (6.13)
COMESA	174.59 (0.73)	105.77 (2.39)	224.63 (0.81)	122.61 (2.54)	266.03 (0.80)	139.94 (2.66)	305.68 (0.81)	156.93 (2.77)	382.43 (0.85)	175.06 (2.89)
Euro-Zone	6,033.37 (25.20)	355.27 (8.02)	6,539.80 (23.70)	358.68 (7.44)	7,698.79 (23.22)	364.56 (6.94)	8,328.96 (22.12)	371.53 (6.56)	9,507.87 (21.13)	377.14 (6.23)
US	5,136.76 (21.46)	227.23 (5.13)	5,991.23 (21.71)	237.92 (4.93)	7,087.08 (21.37)	249.62 (4.75)	8,036.96 (21.34)	266.28 (4.70)	9,592.53 (21.31)	282.22 (4.66)
Japan	1,980.20 (8.27)	116.78 (2.64)	2,297.25 (8.32)	120.75 (2.50)	2,895.93 (8.73)	123.54 (2.35)	3,117.63 (8.28)	125.44 (2.22)	3,325.21 (7.39)	126.87 (2.10)
World	23,941.47 (100)	4,429.97 (100)	27,594.72 (100)	4,821.97 (100)	33,159.26 (100)	5,253.39 (100)	37,656.78 (100)	5,660.05 (100)	45,007.28 (100)	6,052.43 (100)

Source: World Development Indicators Online, 2005.

Note: (1) GDP figures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and are constant at the year 2000. (2) Population is in millions.

**Table 12 Export/ Share (%) of Global Exports—ASEAN**

Year	1980	1980	1985	1985	1990	1990	1995	1995	2000	2000
Country/ Parameter	Export	Percent	Export	Percent	Export	Percent	Export	Percent	Export	Percent
Indonesia	32.68	1.30	24.34	0.80	35.83	0.86	60.81	1.11	67.62	0.85
Malaysia	12.9	0.51	18.18	0.60	35.04	0.85	73.89	1.34	112.37	1.41
Philippines	15.81	0.63	12.96	0.42	20.56	0.50	32.48	0.59	42.06	0.53
Singapore	19.38	0.77	22.81	0.75	52.73	1.27	118.27	2.15	137.80	1.73
Thailand	8.22	0.33	12.13	0.40	29.87	0.72	58.34	1.06	81.95	1.03
Total	88.99	3.53	90.41	2.96	174.02	4.20	343.79	6.25	441.80	5.55
World	2520.64	100	3049.96	100	4145.73	100	5496.96	100	7954.37	100

Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars. (2) Export and import data for Singapore are from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and in billions US dollar.

**Table 13 Import/ Share (%) of Global Imports—ASEAN**

Year	1980	1980	1985	1985	1990	1990	1995	1995	2000	2000
Country/ Parameter	Import	(Percent)	Import	(Percent)	Import	(Percent)	Import	(Percent)	Import	(Percent)
Indonesia	19.93	0.76	25.61	0.85	30.40	0.72	57.95	1.07	50.26	0.63
Malaysia	13.18	0.50	16.57	0.55	31.95	0.75	76.08	1.41	94.35	1.19
Philippines	15.12	0.58	10.36	0.34	22.27	0.53	35.46	0.66	40.61	0.51
Singapore	24.01	0.91	26.29	0.87	60.77	1.43	124.51	2.30	134.55	1.69
Thailand	12.92	0.49	13.84	0.46	38.45	0.91	73.56	1.36	71.36	0.90
Total	85.16	3.24	92.68	3.08	183.85	4.34	367.54	6.79	391.13	4.93
World	2,625.57	100	3,008.08	100.00	4,240.76	100	5,410.11	100.00	7,940.97	100

Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars. (2) Export and import data for Singapore are from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and in billions US dollar.

**Table 14 Export/ Share (%) of Global Exports—COMESA**

Year	1980	1980	1985	1985	1990	1990	1995	1995	2000	2000
Country/ Parameter	Export	(Percent)	Export	(Percent)	Export	(Percent)	Export	(Percent)	Export	(Percent)
Egypt	6.89	0.27	7.44	0.24	11.05	0.27	14.24	0.26	16.17	0.20
Kenya	1.46	0.06	1.52	0.05	2.35	0.06	2.76	0.05	2.74	0.03
Madagascar	0.98	0.04	0.63	0.02	0.76	0.02	0.93	0.02	1.19	0.01
Malawi	0.31	0.01	0.34	0.01	0.35	0.01	0.38	0.01	0.45	0.01
Mauritius	0.73	0.03	0.91	0.03	1.74	0.04	2.21	0.04	2.8	0.04
Sudan	0.76	0.03	0.59	0.02	0.33	0.01	0.40	0.01	1.9	0.02
Zambia	0.81	0.03	0.68	0.02	0.56	0.01	0.57	0.01	0.68	0.01
Zimbabwe	0.65	0.03	0.80	0.03	1.03	0.02	1.83	0.03	2.12	0.03
Total	12.60	0.50	12.9	0.42	18.17	0.44	23.31	0.42	28.05	0.35
World	2,520.64	100	3,049.96	100	4,145.73	100	5,496.96	100	7,954.37	100

Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars.

**Table 15 Import/ Share (%) of Global Imports—COMESA**

Year	1980	1980	1985	1985	1990	1990	1995	19.95	2000	2000
Country/ Parameter	Import	(Percent)	Import	(Percent)	Import	(Percent)	Import	(Percent)	Import	(Percent)
Egypt	20.92	0.80	22.85	0.76	18.3	0.43	20.49	0.38	22.78	0.29
Kenya	2.05	0.08	1.21	0.04	1.99	0.05	3.41	0.06	3.76	0.05
Madagascar	1.83	0.07	1.01	0.03	1.03	0.02	0.97	0.02	1.47	0.02
Malawi	0.80	0.03	0.69	0.02	0.74	0.02	0.63	0.01	0.66	0.01
Mauritius	0.83	0.03	0.77	0.03	1.79	0.04	2.15	0.04	2.89	0.04
Sudan	1.74	0.07	1.54	0.05	1.08	0.03	1.1	0.02	2.19	0.03
Zambia	1.98	0.08	1.29	0.04	1.18	0.03	1.20	0.02	1.02	0.01
Zimbabwe	0.62	0.02	0.77	0.03	0.99	0.02	1.89	0.04	1.96	0.02
Total	30.77	1.17	30.13	1.00	27.12	0.64	31.85	0.59	36.72	0.46
World	2,625.57	100	3,008.08	100	4,240.76	100	5,410.11	100	7,940.97	100

Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars.

**Table 16 Export/ Share (%) of Global Exports—Euro-Zone**

Year Country/ Parameter	1980 Export	1980 (Percent)	1985 Export	1985 (Percent)	1990 Export	1990 (Percent)	1995 Export	1995 (Percent)	2000 Export	2000 (Percent)
Austria	33.98	1.35	42.05	1.38	53.18	1.28	60.88	1.11	95.74	1.20
Belgium	78.73	3.12	91.72	3.01	122.64	2.96	148.35	2.70	195.32	2.46
Denmark	25.99	1.03	32.9	1.08	42.37	1.02	48.40	0.88	69.77	0.88
Finland	16.46	0.65	18.87	0.62	21.20	0.51	30.97	0.56	51.55	0.65
France	128.73	5.11	152.25	4.99	196.27	4.73	253.9	4.62	373.54	4.70
Germany	206.95	8.21	267.17	8.76	349.97	8.44	421.46	7.67	632.10	7.95
Greece	11.48	0.46	11.06	0.36	13.19	0.32	16.28	0.30	28.69	0.36
Ireland	10.1	0.40	14.92	0.49	22.82	0.55	41.62	0.76	92.27	1.16
Italy	112.64	4.47	136.67	4.48	175.36	4.23	250.12	4.55	304.01	3.82
Luxembourg	6.69	0.27	8.59	0.28	12.06	0.29	15.96	0.29	29.78	0.37
Netherlands	84.51	3.35	99.75	3.27	130.11	3.14	174.89	3.18	250.08	3.14
Portugal	9.51	0.38	12.86	0.42	20.29	0.49	24.18	0.44	33.58	0.42
Spain	38.31	1.52	55.64	1.82	64.72	1.56	103.67	1.89	169.22	2.13
Sweden	34.32	1.36	44.72	1.47	52.13	1.26	72.00	1.31	110.46	1.39
UK	159.61	6.33	183.61	6.02	225.32	5.44	292.58	5.32	404.01	5.08
Total	958	38.01	1,172.79	38.45	1,501.63	36.22	1,955.26	35.57	2,840.10	35.70
World	2,520.64	100	3,049.96	100	4,145.73	100	5,496.96	100	7,954.37	100
Japan	211.60	8.39	291.54	9.56	333.50	8.04	388.53	7.07	512.74	6.45
US	323.5	12.83	328.3	10.76	552.5	13.33	778.2	14.16	1096.3	13.78

Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars.


**Table 17 Import/ Share (%) of Global Imports—Euro-Zone**

Year Country/ Parameter	1980 Import	1980 (Percent)	1985 Import	1985 (Percent)	1990 Import	1990 (Percent)	1995 Import	1995 (Percent)	2000 Import	2000 (Percent)
Austria	37.28	1.42	42.52	1.41	52.84	1.25	64.09	1.18	96.90	1.22
Belgium	80.79	3.08	84.73	2.82	120.16	2.83	143.95	2.66	188.32	2.37
Denmark	22.75	0.87	27.85	0.93	33.73	0.80	40.67	0.75	60.35	0.76
Finland	16.39	0.62	18.17	0.60	24.54	0.58	26.31	0.49	40.46	0.51
France	138.33	5.27	144.27	4.80	205.41	4.84	242.36	4.48	357.3	4.50
Germany	237.10	9.03	256.13	8.51	351.26	8.28	428.40	7.92	625.17	7.87
Greece	11.84	0.45	12.87	0.43	19.23	0.45	22.89	0.42	38.27	0.48
Ireland	13.58	0.52	15.88	0.53	22.28	0.53	35.67	0.66	79.94	1.01
Italy	109.15	4.16	124.7	4.15	187.13	4.41	217.21	4.01	293.49	3.70
Luxembourg	6.75	0.26	8.04	0.27	11.1	0.26	13.74	0.25	25.68	0.32
Netherlands	87.40	3.33	95.69	3.18	123.11	2.90	159.03	2.94	230.71	2.91
Portugal	11.31	0.43	10.93	0.36	22.49	0.53	30.19	0.56	45.54	0.57
Spain	32.82	1.25	34.8	1.16	76.24	1.80	105.42	1.95	181.78	2.29
Sweden	38.96	1.48	44.57	1.48	56.39	1.33	64.05	1.18	96.53	1.22
UK	138.35	5.27	169.42	5.63	238.01	5.61	279.98	5.18	433.59	5.46
Total	982.79	37.43	1,090.57	36.25	1,543.91	36.41	1,873.97	34.64	2,794.01	35.18
World	2,625.57	100	3,008.08	100	4,240.76	100	5,410.11	100	7,940.97	100
Japan	164.63	6.27	182.139	6.05	313.87	7.40	369.18	6.82	444.86	5.60
US	310.9	11.84	469.8	15.62	607.1	14.32	849.1	15.69	1475.8	18.58

Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars.


Figure 1 ASEAN: Share of Global Total GDP



Source: World Development Indicators Online, 2005.

Note: (1) GDP figures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and are constant at the year 2000. (2) Population is in millions.


Figure 2 ASEAN: Share of Global Total Exports



Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars. (2) Export and import data for Singapore are from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and in billions US dollar.


Figure 3 ASEAN: Share of Global Total Imports



Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars. (2) Export and import data for Singapore are from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and in billions US dollar.


Figure 4 COMESA: Share of Global Total GDP



Source: World Development Indicators Online, 2005.

Note: (1) GDP figures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and are constant at the year 2000. (2) Population is in millions.


Figure 5 COMESA: Share of Global Total Exports



Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars.


Figure 6 COMESA: Share of Global Total Imports



Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars.


Figure 7 Euro-Zone: Share of Global Total GDP



Source: World Development Indicators Online, 2005.

Note: (1) GDP figures are expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and are constant at the year 2000. (2) Population is in millions.


Figure 8 Euro-Zone: Share of Global Total Exports



Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars.

Figure 9 Euro-Zone: Share of Global Total Imports



Source: WDI Online, 2005.

Note (1) Export and import data are at the year 2000 (constant) in billions US dollars.