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Michel Beine
Balazs Egert
Thierry Mayer
Bernhard Herz
Miguel Leon-Ledesma
Larry Dongxiao Qiu
Horst Raff
Maurice Schiff
Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann
Mathias Thoenig
Wing Thye Woo
Philippe Aghion
Steve Ambler
Philippe Bacchetta
Marius Brülhart
André Cartapanis
Yin-Wong Cheung
Simon J. Evenett
Paul de Grauwe
Marion Jansen
Ronald Mac Donald
Paul Masson
Jacques Melitz
Peter Neary
Joaquim Oliveira Martins
Gianmarco Ottaviano
Roberto Perotti
Luca Ricci
Jacques-François Thisse
English
  N° 123  
Issue 3 2010  
Emergence of a New Regulation: Informational Disclosure Modalities in the Hedge Fund Opacity World  
Sandra Rigot
Yamina Tadjeddine
 
The 2007-2008 crisis has highlighted the tensions related to lack of transparency and asymmetrical information in the hedge fund industry. Damage can be estimated at a micro level by a misallocation induced by a double (ex ante and ex post) asymmetry and at a macro level by increasing financial and banking instability. One way to resolve market failures is to require hedge funds to disclose more information, but information can be revealed in different ways. We propose an original typology of disclosure modalities by distinguishing the aim of informational disclosure (macro/ micro allocation) and the modality (by free bargaining, by a standardized contract, by an obligation toward the regulatory authorities, by publicity). We use Kohonen maps to classify issued proposals and reports. We define two typologies: one of informational disclosure modalities and of financial regulation policy. Abstract
   
Informational asymmetry; disclosure; financial regulation; hedge funds Keywords
D43; G23; G28 JEL classification
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