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  Mentions légales
  N° 2000 - 22 CEPII Working Paper
December

Trade Rules and Global Governance: a Long Term Agenda

The Future of Banking in Europe

French-German Economic Forum
7th meeting
 
The purpose in the paper "a Long Term Agenda" is to argue that there is much more in the current anti-globalisation crusade than the sheer amplification of anti-capitalist ideologies through media coverage and the Internet. We interpret the recent, incipient backlash against globalisation as a symptom of policy failure, as policy makers not only have provided partial responses at best to legitimate concerns linked to globalisation, but also have failed to grasp the challenges of collective action at the multilateral level. We argue that the time is now ripe to seriously address central issues related to global governance well beyond the remit of the WTO and that failure to do so could result in the progressive demise of the multilateral system that has been so effective in underpinning economic prosperity in the second half of the 20th century. But recent experience suggests that there is a two-fold challenge : how to enlist the civil society in the discussion (1st challenge)? what guiding principles should underpin global governance efforts (2nd challenge)?
The approach taken in the paper about "The Future of Banking in Europe" is therefore to outline an informal microeconomic framework or "model" for the future of continental European banking. Its structure is summarised in Figure 1 at the end of the paper. Besides being informal and incomplete, this "model" has some weaknesses. Firstly, to a certain extent the intermediary variables are themselves features of banking systems which are partially observable. Secondly, they are not independent of one another. Furthermore, the lists of external factors, of intermediary variables and of observable attributes are incomplete; and last but certainly not least, the links between the elements are incomplete and highly speculative. Nevertheless, I hope that this framework will serve the purpose of structuring my presentation and the ensuing discussion.
Abstract
   
Governance, Collective action, Corporate Finance, Banking, Europe, Trade rules Keywords
F4, G3, D7 JEL classification
   
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