CEPII : Recherche et Expertise sur l'Economie MondialeCopyright CEPIIhttps://www.cepii.fr/Tue, 10 Mar 2026 13:44:39 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/css/img/header/logo_header_fr_40ans.pnghttps://www.cepii.fr/fr60Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1178Tue, 10 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1178Anthony Edo, Jérôme Valette]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1177Mon, 9 Mar 2026 08:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1177A growing number of studies show the significant impact of major geopolitical events and alignments between countries on international trade. We propose a new dataset, based on the GDELT database, that captures the exposure of country pairs to all types of geopolitical frictions, including low- and medium-importance events. The statistical indicators, which are monthly and bilateral, provide information on the geopolitical climate surrounding the relations between each country pair over time. The database covers 201 countries over nearly 10 years. Our econometric analysis confirms that geopolitical tensions create an unfavorable climate for international trade. We estimate that An increase of one standard deviation in our tension indicator has an effect on trade equivalent to a tariff ranging from 0.06% to 8.19%, depending on the specification. We also observe that the sensitivity of international trade to geopolitical events has increased significantly since the COVID-19 crisis.
Nathan Chevalier, Matthieu Crozet, Charlotte Emlinger, Daniel Mirza]]>https://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/publications/wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=15031Wed, 4 Mar 2026 12:21:37 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/publications/wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=15031Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1176Mon, 2 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1176Isabelle Méjean]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1175Tue, 24 Feb 2026 14:37:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1175Kevin Lefebvre]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1174Fri, 20 Feb 2026 11:22:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1174Christophe Gouel]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1170Wed, 11 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1170Houssein Guimbard]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1169Thu, 5 Feb 2026 16:07:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1169Échaudés par les difficultés d’approvisionnement lors de la sortie de la crise du Covid, puis par la montée des tensions internationales et l’approfondissement des fragmentations géopolitiques, les entreprises et les décideurs publics ont pris conscience de la nécessaire diversification des activités à l’international. Faire appel à des fournisseurs opérant depuis des pays différents, et ne pas faire dépendre son chiffre d’affaires à l’exportation d’une zone limitée, apparaissent comme des éléments clés pour réduire l’exposition au risque. Pour autant, en matière de commerce international, la diversification n’offre pas nécessairement de garantie de protection contre les risques. C’est ce que montre l’étude du lien entre diversification des portefeuilles d’exportation, calculée à partir d’un indicateur inspiré de la littérature en biodiversité, appliqué à près d’un million d’entreprises de pays en développement ou émergents, et volatilité des ventes totales à l’étranger : accroître le nombre de partenaires commerciaux tend bien à réduire la volatilité, mais rechercher des marchés plus hétérogènes produit l’effet inverse.
 Données source :  let462.xlsx
Matthieu Crozet, Emmanuel Milet, Thierry Mayer]]>https://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/publications/lettre/abstract.asp?NoDoc=14947Mon, 26 Jan 2026 07:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/publications/lettre/abstract.asp?NoDoc=14947Anthony Edo, Jérôme Valette]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1162Mon, 26 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1162Vincent Vicard]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1168Mon, 26 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1168Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1165Fri, 23 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1165Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1166Fri, 23 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1166Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1167Fri, 23 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1167MIRAGE is a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, initially devoted to trade policy analysis and more recently applied to long-term growth and environmental issues. It incorporates energy, carbon pricing, imperfect competition, and rigid investment allocation, in a sequential dynamic setup where installed capital is assumed to be immobile. The model provides trade analysis with detailed treatment of trade costs and Armington specifications, drawing upon a detailed measure of trade barriers through the MAcMap-HS6 database. Production features nested CES functions with capital-energy bundles under both perfect and imperfect competition frameworks, while final demand follows a LES-CES utility function. The sequential dynamic framework enables longterm simulations by combining total factor productivity calibration with macroeconomic projections from the MaGE model. The most recent version offers significant improvements in electricity sector modeling with renewable energy representation, base-load and peak-load dinstinctions, and detailed greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accounting with carbon market mechanisms. This documentation provides complete technical specifications, calibration procedures, and implementation guidelines for researchers and policymakers using MIRAGE for economic policy analysis.

Access to
MIRAGE WEBSITE
Antoine Bouët, Lionel Fontagné, Christophe Gouel, Houssein Guimbard, Cristina Mitaritonna]]>https://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/publications/wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=14955Mon, 19 Jan 2026 09:50:48 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/publications/wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=14955Charlotte Emlinger]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1163Mon, 19 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1163Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1164Mon, 19 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1164Anthony Edo]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1159Fri, 16 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1159Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1160Fri, 16 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1160Mathieu Couttenier, Julian Marcoux, Thierry Mayer, Mathias Thoening]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1158Tue, 13 Jan 2026 14:10:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1158Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1157Mon, 12 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1157Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1156Wed, 7 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1156Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1154Tue, 6 Jan 2026 00:01:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1154Thomas Grjebine]]>https://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1155Tue, 6 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/BLOG/bi/post.asp?IDcommunique=1155We develop a model of international trade and geopolitical disputes, embedding a diplomatic game of escalation to conflict within a quantitative model of trade. Bilateral disputes arise exogenously, and rival countries engage in negotiations to avoid war. In equilibrium, negotiations may fail, resulting in conflict. All welfare-relevant geoeconomic factors, such as the realized costs of war, the concessions to prevent it, and the probability of escalation, depend on the opportunity cost of war, itself shaped by observed trade flows. We provide a simple procedure to estimate these factors in a model of trade calibrated to current data. This approach is then used to quantify the geoeconomic factors characterizing the US-China relationship, both historically and under various ``decoupling'' scenarios. We find that the growing US dependence to Chinese products and markets over the past thirty years has increased the cost of geopolitical disputes with China for the US. In this context, decoupling from China through increased tariffs may offer geopolitical benefits. Yet, the analysis highlights a fundamental security dilemma: because export and import dependencies influence bargaining power in negotiations, decoupling may reduce the diplomatic concessions needed to maintain peace but can paradoxically raise the risk of escalation by weakening incentives for restraint.
Thierry Mayer, Isabelle Méjean, Mathias Thoenig]]>https://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/publications/wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=14943Mon, 5 Jan 2026 16:10:58 GMThttps://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/publications/wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=14943