

HOW MUCH FISCAL BACKING MUST THE ECB HAVE? THE EURO AREA IS NOT (YET) THE PHILIPPINES¹

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ABSTRACT. This paper gives a detailed explanation of why a central bank without fiscal backing can lose control of inflation. Moreover, it argues that such danger emerged only recently for the ECB due to its increasing quasi-fiscal activities. Finally we argue that it might not generally be a good idea to provide fiscal backing for the ECB. That said, the backing of the central bank's equity capital by fiscal policy ("fiscal backing") appears to be a viable strategy if and when the central bank's accounting losses are not related to the state of public finances. If, however, central bank portfolio losses are a direct outcome of deteriorating public finances, preserving the central bank's equity capital may lead to a policy of high inflation, possibly above the ECB's target level.

JEL Classification: G32; E42; E51; E58; E63.

Keywords: Central Bank Independence; Central Bank Capital; Counterparty Risk; Repurchase Agreements; Collateral; Fiscal Backing; Liquidity; Haircuts.

RÉSUMÉ. Cet article propose une explication détaillée des raisons pour lesquelles une banque centrale sans capacité fiscale (« fiscal backing ») peut perdre le contrôle de l'inflation. Nous mettons en évidence que ce risque n'est apparu que récemment, du fait du développement des activités quasi-budgétaires de la BCE. Nous montrons en outre qu'il n'est pas toujours souhaitable de doter la BCE d'un « fiscal backing ». Ce dernier semble être une stratégie viable uniquement dans le cas où les pertes comptables de la banque centrale ne sont pas liées à l'état des finances publiques. Si, toutefois, la détérioration des finances publiques engendre directement des pertes de portefeuille au niveau de la banque centrale, la préservation de ses fonds propres peut conduire à une politique inflationniste.

Classification *JEL* : G32 ; E42 ; E51 ; E58 ; E63.

Mots-clefs : indépendance de la banque centrale ; capital de la banque centrale ; risque de contrepartie ; collatéral ; capacité fiscale.

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“Of the ultimate solvency of the Bank of England, or of the eventual safety of its vast capital, even at the worst periods of its history, there has not been the least doubt”
Walter Bagehot, “Lombard Street”, 14th ed., 1873, page 208.

1. INTRODUCTION

In view of the markedly increased balance sheets of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the light of its “crisis operations”, this contribution investigates a probably under-researched topic, *i.e.* whether there is a need to think more about the fiscal “back-up” of the ECB, even if this was just for the theoretical case.

Recent institutional arrangements in the United Kingdom which ensure that the Treasury underwrites the risk attending emergency lending – such as has been the case with Northern Rock in September 2007 – are said to provide even greater assurance of the Bank of England’s financial position. Anyway, until the recent crisis emerged, the Fed and the BoE have made profits uninterruptedly since decades. However, more recently concerns have been raised about (potential) financial difficulties being experienced by advanced country central banks – and in central banks in important emerging financial markets.⁴

A vast amount of literature has emphasized the dangers of *fiscal dominance* influencing the conduct of monetary policy (Sargent, 1986, who, in turn, attributes the idea to Neil Wallace). It applies the game of chicken to the potential conflict between an independent monetary authority and the fiscal authority. The monetary authority strives at price stability but also has an eye on financial stability. The fiscal authority too gives some weight to price and financial stability. However, it is not willing to correct an unsustainable primary fiscal deficit through spending cuts or tax increases and wants the central bank to monetise the public deficit and public debt. The result where the central bank surrenders and in the end monetises public debt and deficits is usually called *fiscal dominance*. *Monetary dominance*, on the contrary, stands for the result in which the fiscal authority gives in and cuts public spending and/or raises taxes to stabilise or even reduce the public debt to GDP ratio to make a sovereign default an improbable event (Buiter, 2010).

In the paper we argue in accordance with Buiter (2010) among others that, in reality, the usual outcome is fiscal dominance. Monetary dominance is not more than a rare exception to the rule. The reason is that regardless of the formal laws ensuring operational independence or even operational and target independence of the central bank, the fiscal authority has the political clout to force the central bank to do its bidding when it comes to a litmus test (Belke and Potrafke, 2009).

In contrast, the idea that an independent central bank could be constrained in achieving its policy objectives by its own balance sheet situation is a relatively novel idea. If one accepts this potential constraint as a valid concern, the financial strength of the central bank as a stand-alone and independent entity becomes highly relevant for ascertaining monetary policy

4. An early but insightful source is BusinessWeek (2003).

credibility. Hence, it is necessary to assess the corporate financial structure of the central bank as a single and separated entity, especially when one is evaluating the monetary policy credibility of an independent central bank, *i.e.* a central bank which in a strict sense is neither constrained to pay specific dividends to government nor the recipient of automatic treasury coverage of losses (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008).

In fact, we are currently not only *far away from a fiscal "back-up" of the ECB* but, in more general terms, also from anything like a narrow notion of a 'fiscal euro area', in the same way as we dispose neither of a fiscal EU in a broader sense nor even a European Economic Government (Buiter, 2009c). Willem Buiter, for instance, has repeatedly called this shortage a *fiscal vacuum* since there is no single fiscal authority, facility, or arrangement that has the potential to recapitalise the ECB/Eurosystem as a whole in cases when the Eurosystem suffers from capital losses that call into question its capacity to conduct its monetary policies in strict accordance with its mandates to secure price stability and financial stability (Buiter, 2009a,b,c). This issue has only become pressing due to the financial crisis in which the exposure of the ECB/Eurosystem to private credit risk through its exposure to repos and other collateralised lending has increased significantly. Actually, has the global financial crisis thus silently broken at least a few barriers to the ECB's restrictions on the use of monetary policy?

Central bank financial problems have turned out to be quite prominent for decades, in particular, those difficult situations where central bank financial structures have been weakened by quasi-fiscal operations. In these astonishingly widespread cases, central banks have proven to be unable to meet their most basic functions (among others, the supply of banknotes) due to financial distress. They have changed policy in order to reduce losses and, in at least one case, *i.e.* the Philippines, have even been forced into liquidation (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008) – hence the choice of the title of our paper.

A final explanation of the growing attention being paid to central bank finances would be that it could simply be considered to be a *by-product of the increased attention given to central bank independence* in general during the last two decades. A particularly prominent example of this pattern is the interpretation by the European Union of financial independence as one of the key components of central bank independence. The creation of the ECB led to considerable thinking about central banking best practice in general and to central bank independence in particular (Belke and Potrafke, 2009, Stella and Lönnberg, 2008).

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the main arguments often brought forward in favour of a fiscal "back-up" of a central bank, starting from the unconventional monetary policies conducted by the Fed and the BoE in the wake of the financial crisis. Section 3 then proceeds with a discussion of why the issue of fiscal backing has also become increasingly relevant for the ECB. Above all, we try to clarify who will come up for eventual losses. In Section 4, we turn to the investigation of some general issues. Among them is the pressing question of why central banks can go bankrupt at all. We also assess both seigniorage and the inflation tax as straight ways out from bankruptcy, but at the same time representing the inevitable menace of future inflation. What is more,

we investigate which options the euro area does have in view of the perceived flaws in the institutional framework. Starting from the Fed as a (negative) reference point, we present and evaluate some arguments against an explicit fiscal “back-up” of the ECB in Section 5. In Section 6, we generalize our investigations conducted in Section 5 and deliver some simple bookkeeping exercises to clarify issues. In Section 7, we present a quantitative analysis of the ECB’s balance sheet. Based on these figures, we conclude that the backing of the central bank’s equity capital by fiscal policy (“fiscal backing”) appears to be a viable strategy only if and when the central bank’s accounting losses are not related to the state of public finances. Section 8 finally concludes.

2. FISCAL “BACK-UP” OF A CENTRAL BANK – THE MAIN ARGUMENTS

To concede that the ECB does not dispose of any fiscal “back-up” is essentially equivalent to saying that there is no guarantee, insurance, or indemnity for any *private* credit risk it takes. Proponents of a fiscal “back-up” of the ECB argue that this is both a huge error and omission in the design of the ECB and the Eurosystem and threatens to render the ECB significantly less able than the Bank of England and the Fed to engage in unconventional monetary policy, including quantitative easing (QE) and credit easing (see, for instance, Buiter, 2009b, and Sibert, 2009).⁵

Through repurchase operations, the ECB has increased its holdings of European government bonds for an equivalent of approximately 90 billion euros between August 2008 and July 2009. How to determine which bonds to hold remains uncertain from the point of view of the ECB. Above all, the lack of a fiscal “back-up”, *i.e.* a fiscal authority behind the euro area, is said to make it rather difficult for the ECB to cover the potential losses from its securities investments. Inevitably, the ECB would then feel inclined to invest in the most secure bonds, even though this has the potential to increase the yield differential among government bonds in the euro area, thus impairing the objectives of monetary and fiscal convergence and making monetary policy more difficult to manage. Some propose that the bank could arbitrarily buy bonds issued by governments whose economies are diverging (such as Greece and Portugal), but doing so it would assume a political role which would heavily collide with the political independence of the ECB. What is more, this kind of implicit bailout would also endanger its strict orientation at the price stability mandate due to the moral hazard effects these targeted country-specific bond purchases would entail (Bastasin, 2009).

If one agrees in accordance with the Anglo-saxon tradition that the ECB should as the Fed and the BoE play a larger *macro-prudential financial stability* role, one should acknowledge that it is *difficult for the ECB to fulfil this role* before the issue of whether and how the Eurosystem is to be recapitalized in the event of capital losses is addressed and somehow

5. The literature that sprung out in the 90s about the potential moral hazard (and spillovers) of fiscal lacks of discipline and their impact on the common central bank gives the context to the arguments made in this section. For a survey see Belke and Polleit (2010), Section 6.5. “The Relation between Fiscal and Monetary Policy”, pp. 531ff.

also resolved. As long as there remains some uncertainty concerning its recapitalization, the ECB could not be as aggressive as necessary when implementing non-standard measures – in particular the introduction of full allotment at fixed rates when providing central bank liquidity in the Eurosystem monetary market operations. Hence, it cannot (completely) prevent a shortage of liquidity from becoming a widespread solvency problem with adverse effects on financial stability (Papademos, 2009). If the ECB's policy rate approaches zero, the ECB may have to engage in quantitative and qualitative easing: the outright purchase of private securities funded by an increase in the monetary base. In the absence of any fiscal indemnification for the resulting credit risk, the ECB will be unable to address the excessive private-public yield spreads and the rationing of credits which both indicate dysfunctional credit markets (Sibert, 2009).

Moreover, the current crisis reminds us once more that a central bank without adequate fiscal backing can be also *powerless in the pursuit of price stability* – in two directions. On the one hand, non-standard measures contribute to price stability by supporting the provision of credit beyond what could be achieved through the favourable impact of interest rate reductions and by ensuring that the easing of financial conditions induced by policy rate cuts would be fully transmitted to firms and households at a time when financial markets and institutions were under stress (Papademos, 2009). If the ECB risks going bankrupt as a dire consequence of conducting these measures there is the risk of undersupply of these measures and, thus, of inflation dropping below the ECB target. On the other hand, the lack of a fiscal “back-up” might induce a central bank to go for seigniorage revenue by means of additional inflation and hence there is a risk of inflation higher than target inflation. In this vein, authors like Sims (2003b) have shown that there are clear limits to a government's and a central bank's ability to credibly commit to an inflation target in the absence of a fiscal anchor. The reason is that, under stress, the expectations of the public as to how the central bank will respond to an extreme deterioration in its financial position will determine the effectiveness of macroeconomic stabilization efforts.⁶

Hence, in the absence of any foreign assistance, the Treasury and the taxpayer are interpreted by some as the ultimate and only guarantor of the solvency of the central bank and of its ability to closely track its price stability mandate despite its financial stability responsibilities. In the literature, this interconnectedness is sometimes called the “integrated central bank and government view”. The proponents of this view, argue that, as a matter of urgency, the fiscal authorities of the euro area should agree on a formula for dividing the fiscal burden of recapitalising the European Central Bank, should the need ever arise (Buiter, 2008).

6. For empirical correlations of financial stress and policy performance of central banks, in particular with regard to inflation, see Klüh and Stella (2008). They find that a negative relationship between central bank financial strength and inflation outcomes. It turns out to be robust to the choice of alternative country samples, control variables, estimation strategies, and conceptualizations of central bank financial strength.

3. (WHY) HAS THE ISSUE OF FISCAL BACKING BECOME VIRULENT ALSO FOR THE ECB?

"Fiscal backing" of the central bank as a necessary condition for the central bank to achieve price stability was not at all an issue for the ECB until the current crisis. What is more, the endowment of the ECB with equity capital actually appears to be more ample than that of the Fed or the BoE, as some say mainly due to huge currency and foreign exchange reserves.⁷

The ESCB has lots of capital because of the reserves held by the country banks. This refers to so-called "revaluation accounts" that appear as artificial liabilities on the ECB (and other central bank) balance sheets, since reserves themselves do not provide any capital cushion. But the reason banks avoid counting these revaluation accounts formally as "capital" is that they have been accumulated through exchange rate depreciation, and can be quickly lost if the exchange rate appreciates. They do not provide a reliable safety margin, therefore.⁸

What is more, a rather important factor behind the concern regarding central bank finances has been a global decline in inflation and consequently declining central bank income from the inflation tax. Due to the increasing importance of global liquidity, the capacity of a central bank to impose taxes on its regulated financial sector has been reduced. And even more important, as the crisis has deepened, the exposure of the ECB/Eurosystem to private credit risk through its exposure to repos and other collateralised lending has become a really pressing issue (Sibert, 2009). Why is that?

First, the ECB sticks to a rather liberal definition of *eligible collateral* – "effectively anything that does not move (and a few things that do) is eligible as collateral, as long as it originates from within the Eurozone, is euro-denominated, and is rated at least BBB-" (Buiter, 2009a).⁹ Indeed, the Eurosystem has accepted increasing amounts of bad collateral since the crisis started, leading to a large exposure to serious private sector credit risk (*i.e.* default risk) on its collateralised lending and reverse operations. For reverse transactions and collateralised lending, default risk is the risk that both the borrowing bank will default and that the collateral offered by the bank will go into default (Buiter, 2009a). What is more, Ewerhart and Tapking (2008) show that a less restrictive collateral policy applied by a central bank may well lead to a welfare improvement for market participants. Yet, their analysis also suggests that essentially *unaffected by any haircut requirement*, the least liquid and *most risky assets will*

7. For instance, at the end of 2009, the ECB's recorded 'capital paid in' in the amount of EUR4.1bn, and a balance sheet volume of EUR137.9bn, so that the ratio between "capital paid in" and the bank's balance sheet volume was 2.9%. At the same time, the US Federal Reserve System showed 'capital paid in' of US\$25.6bn, a total balance sheet volume of US\$2,238.9bn, so that the capital ratio was around 1.1%. The Bank of England recorded capital and other reserves of £1.5mn and £558mn, respectively, and a total balance sheet volume of £147.9bn, amounting to a ratio of 0.4%.

8. We owe this argument to an anonymous referee.

9. The technical definition of eligible collateral by the ECB: can be found at <http://www.ecb.int/paym/coll/assets/html/list.en.html>.

be deposited with the central bank – suggesting an intuitive analogy with Gresham’s law for commodity money.¹⁰

Second, in many cases the exposure of the central bank to losses stems primarily from its role in putting its capital at risk by intervening in a systemic crisis to provide liquidity to financial institutions and/or their depositors and other creditors (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008). Losses frequently arise when, to borrow from Buiter’s terminology, in the midst of a banking crisis the central bank with its “short-term deep pockets” provides risk-fraught credit and thereafter hopes to be recapitalized by “the treasury, the agency of the state with the capacity to tax [with] long-term deep pockets” (Buiter, 2006). This pattern can be observed in a number of countries during the 1980s and subsequently also in the more recent data as, for instance, the Dominican Republic or Costa Rica. Unfortunately, *obscure accounting treatments* (which are the opposite of the ECB’s exceptionally clear accounting principles) have often *delayed the recognition of losses* (Stella, 2002).

And in fact, *the Eurosystem has already realised some significant marked-to-market losses on loans* it made to eligible Eurozone counterparty banks against the ABS collateral. For instance, in autumn of 2008, five banks (i.e., Bankhaus AG, the German arm of Lehman Brothers, three subsidiaries of Icelandic banks, and Indover NL) defaulted on refinancing operations undertaken by the Eurosystem. The amount involved was allegedly over €10 billion, and over €5 billion of provisions have been made against these impaired assets, because the mainly ABS precarious collateral is, under current market conditions, worth rather less than €10 billion (Buiter, 2009b). Although the insolvent counterparties had submitted eligible collateral in exchange for ECB funding, their collateral, mainly ABS, was in the words of a 2009 ECB press release characterized by “... limited liquidity under the present exceptional market conditions and some of the [asset-backed securities] need to be restructured in order to allow for efficient recovery, ...” (ECB 2009a, Sibert, 2009).

Who will finally come up for the losses?

Any losses registered as a consequence of the above mentioned defaults are, like all losses incurred by the Eurosystem in the pursuit of its monetary and liquidity operations, to be shared by all 16 national central banks in proportion to their shares in the ECB’s capital. But while the Eurosystem as a whole shares any losses incurred by its individual national central banks, no fiscal authority stands directly behind the ECB, and, hence, there is *no mechanism for recapitalizing the Eurosystem as a whole* available (Buiter, 2009b). Instead, each national fiscal authority stands financially behind its own NCB (Buiter, 2008). The Bank of England can turn to HM Treasury and the Fed can turn to the US Treasury, but to what body does the ECB turn to for fiscal backing? Is it the 16 euro zone Treasuries or ministries of finance? Or the 27 EU Treasuries or ministries of finance that are the shareholders of the ECB? Hence,

10. Gresham’s law states that any circulating currency consisting of both “good” and “bad” money quickly becomes dominated by the “bad” money. However, as a precondition, both variants are required to be accepted at equal value under legal tender law. This is because people spending money will hand over the “bad” coins rather than the “good” ones, keeping the “good” ones for themselves.

the ECB's lack of fiscal backing is in any case *unusual* among major central banks (Buiter, 2009a).

Again, also from this perspective, one might feel to arrive at the conclusion that currently there appears to be a *vacuum* behind the ECB and the Eurosystem with respect to losses incurred by the Eurosystem in the wake of monetary operations, liquidity interventions and credit-easing policies (Buiter, 2009c, and Sibert, 2009). The intriguing fact that there is a host of fiscal authorities which would have to coordinate in order to provide some "back-up" to the ECB if it develops balance sheet problems suggests that such "back-up" is at least more uncertain than in the US (Sims, 2003b). However, the question whether this uncertainty is good or bad for the case of the euro area will be tackled in the next sections of this contribution. Let us now turn to the question whether central banks can go bankrupt like their commercial bank counterparts. Answering this question with "Yes" is a necessary condition for a fiscal "back-up" to be beneficial for a central bank.

4. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

4.1. Can central banks go bankrupt?

Admittedly, to investigate whether a central bank can go bankrupt does not belong to every-day research in monetary economics. In this context, it is advisable to start with the basic insight that is not necessarily the case that a central bank goes bankrupt even if its equity capital is completely depleted by its engagement in unorthodox monetary policies.¹¹ The reason is that there are differences between central banks and commercial banks and a static visual inspection of the central bank balance sheet does not convey a complete picture. Whereas the Fed is always able to recapitalize itself through the issuance of base money if its liabilities are denominated in domestic currency (hence, Iceland is no example here) and not index-linked, doing so may not be optimal or even acceptable, even though it is feasible.¹² The reason is that self-recapitalisation through seigniorage may generate undesirably high rates of inflation.¹³ It should be obvious that the central bank can make the nominal present discounted value of current and future seigniorage pretty much anything it wishes it to be. For instance, the Fed could buy up the entire outstanding stock of privately held US Federal debt today, *i.e.* it could be able to monetise the public debt (see, among others, Buiter, 2008). To illustrate this mechanism more deeply, let us turn to a typical US example: let's say the

11. By the way, there are central banks around in the world which are not endowed with any equity capital. One prominent example is often said to be the Bank of Canada.

12. However, problems arise if a central bank has to settle its liabilities in foreign currency which it cannot create on its own. One prominent example is Iceland whose leading commercial banks are indebted mainly in foreign currencies. The Central Bank of Iceland cannot support its commercial banks during the current crisis because it can merely produce Iceland kronas but no foreign currencies.

13. See Buiter (2008). In addition, there are limits to the amount of real resources the central bank can appropriate by increasing the issuance of nominal base money. Sims (2003b) shows more formally that central bank depends on fiscal cooperation and back-up under certain conditions if it is to guarantee a stable price level.

mortgages continue to deteriorate in price (which is highly likely given the nature of our rating system to make them AAA) and then the banks are in no shape to take them back. If the Fed is stuck with declining assets it will have a capital problem as well. But if the Fed loses capital it will not go bankrupt like a regular company: it will just print the money to make up the difference – and this is meant literally!

4.2. Seigniorage and inflation tax as straight ways out from bankruptcy – the inevitable menace of future inflation

But even the repayment of liabilities in own currency by creating additional amounts of money tends to pose difficulties. This is because a central bank creates inflation dangers by printing additional money designed to avoid bankruptcy. The inherent problem with this solution is that the citizens have finally to pay for the risks originally incurred by the central bank. For instance, such losses diminish the profits made by the ECB which is finally distributed to the Bundesbank. But there is a much larger and nearly inevitable danger connected with it – inflation. The ECB cannot go bankrupt according to common comprehension because “it is sitting at the fountain-head of money” which it can create by itself.

However, if inflation is chosen as the preferred way-out, there is the danger that consumers have to pay with increasingly higher goods prices for the incompetence of monetary policy. Hence, authors like Buiter presume that in case of a crisis of a central bank the related government will increase the equity capital of the latter. Hence, in the absence of foreign assistance, the Treasury and the taxpayer should, according to the “integrated central bank and government view”, be the ultimate and only guarantor of central bank solvency and of its ability to pursue its price stability mandate despite its financial stability responsibilities (Buiter, 2008). But beware that in this case, then, the tax payer would have to atone for the incompetence of its central bankers (Buiter, 2009a,b,c, Sims, 2003b)

Certainly, up to now the Fed possesses the tremendous advantage that its “clients” cannot storm the institute in order to withdraw their deposits as would be the case of a bank-run with respect to commercial banks. What is more, the Fed disposes of some other possibilities which allowed her to get away with red balance-sheet figures already in the past. For instance, the US government is allowed to directly recapitalize the Fed by means of freshly printed bonds.

If the Fed or the ECB were to experience minor perturbations in the strength of their balance sheets, fiat money could cover them either immediately or through the retention of future seigniorage. The analysis by Sinn and Feist (2004) suggests that, for instance, Germany would profit from increasing seigniorage only under-proportionally. But it is actually *dangerous to extrapolate too far from the local equilibrium when experience is no guide* (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008). What happens, for instance, with central bank credibility and

independence from the viewpoint of the markets if the US government recapitalizes the Fed directly with newly printed government bonds again and again?¹⁴

4.3. Which options does the euro area have in view of the perceived flaws?

In view of the scenarios depicted in the preceding sections, the euro area has *several options* to choose from.

First, it is important to note in this context that the ESCB has already seized one option – although this has nothing to do with a systematic fiscal “back-up” – in the framework of its open market operations. It has extended the maximum maturity of its fixed-rate credit (against eligible collateral) from six months to up to two years in order to avoid materialized losses from huge depreciations of the underlying assets.

Second, the ECB/Eurosystem might receive a full, joint-and-several guarantee for the credit risk (default risk) involved from the 16 euro area national governments. Without such a guarantee, the ECB/Eurosystem can pursue its financial stability objectives only by risking its capacity to pursue its price stability mandate. As has been shown in the preceding section, this is exactly because in the absence of a fiscal “back-up” a central bank has to avoid bankruptcy by going for high inflation to capture sufficiently high seigniorage revenues. Buiter (2009c), for instance, proposes three alternatives:

- a supranational euro area-wide tax and borrowing authority which is preponderantly responsible for the fiscal backing for the ECB/Eurosystem as the less probable but most suitable solution,
- a euro area-wide fund, financed by the 16 euro area governments (proportionally, for example, to their relative shares in the ECB’s capital), which the ECB/Eurosystem could draw upon (of course subject to qualified majority support in the Eurogroup) if it were to suffer losses as a result of euro area-wide monetary policy, liquidity and credit-easing operations, or
- an *ad hoc*, hastily agreed upon fiscal burden sharing rule for the 16 euro area national governments to restore the capital adequacy of the ECB/Eurosystem. This is the less suitable but most realistic one.¹⁵

Note that options 2b and 2c by definition imply a loss of independence for the ECB. However, it seems wrong to apply the “perceived flaws” argument to the ECB without any qualifications, whereas it might be entirely plausible in the context of developing and emerging countries and Iceland with their high foreign dependence and, since the start of the financial crisis, also for the Fed and the BoE. Moreover, there might be some more general and fundamental arguments speaking against the advantages of a fiscal “back-up”

14. The link between the seigniorage issue and central bank independence developed above shows how fragile central bank independence can be. It could be directly related to the argument made by di Bartolomeo and Pauwels (2006) who show that the sustainability of independence relies on specific parameters’ values and configurations.

15. However, as the events in December 2010 demonstrated, a fourth option would be to increase the ECB’s equity capital can be increased via “injections” from national central banks. See, in detail, Section 7.

of a central bank even in industrialized countries. Let us elaborate on them in the following sections.

5. ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN EXPLICIT FISCAL “BACK-UP” OF THE ECB

In order to derive some arguments against an explicit “back-up” of the ECB it makes much sense to start from the following questions. Does it really make a difference to tax the people directly via enhancing money growth and inflation in order to increase revenues from seigniorage and the inflation tax or to incur additional government debt in order to recapitalize the central bank (or, even worse, to let the government sign any desired amounts of pieces of papers and with a stroke of a pen declare them to be government bonds)? How effective are both strategies if the public scrutinizes them as being not more than accounting tricks? Is this a sustainable way out of the crisis? I would like to argue that the obvious answer is “No”.

5.1. The Fed situation as a reference point

The Fed is still able to masterfully conceal the true state of its balance sheet. Nobody is forcing her to carry out due depreciations of the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) held. However, this kind of behaviour cannot continue forever: at one point in time, the Fed will have to go through its balance sheets and, then, will have to absorb the resulting minus amount by actuating the printing press or by exploding US government debt. This might exactly be the moment in which the Fed loses control over inflation rates. A so-called “black swan” event may occur.¹⁶

In this context, one should always be aware of the fact that the Federal Reserve note is mere paper, *i.e.* fiat, money which cannot be redeemed for anything tangible such as gold or other commodity. When people realise that the Federal Reserve note is not even secured by US treasuries and or the Fed has real tangible assets, but its balance sheet is littered with junk bonds and toxic waste, there will be a run on the Fed, *i.e.* when Americans and foreigners no longer have faith in the Federal Reserve notes as «money» and in the US government as a solvent institution.¹⁷

Installing a fiscal “back-up” cannot prevent this in the end, as recently expressed forcefully by Nouriel Roubini: “The process of socialising the private losses from this crisis has already moved many liabilities of the private sector onto the books of the sovereign. At some point a sovereign bank may crack, in which case the ability of the government to credibly commit to act as a backstop for the financial system... could come unglued.”¹⁸ From this perspective,

16. Already now there is a debate in the US, ranging from the proposal by Senator Ron Paul to audit (and probably tame) the Fed to the (arguably more reasoned) discussion of the issue in Blinder (2010).

17. If a debt rescheduling will become necessary, there will be an advantage for the US: the majority of its creditors is located in foreign countries and will have, as in the case of Argentina, to consider themselves satisfied with lower quotas. This will be valid above all for the European claims.

18. See <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/164>.

the US scenario appears to be even worse and less sustainable than that of Greece and much worse with respect to its potential impacts on the "rest of the world". But why then transferring the concept of a fiscal "back-up" to the ECB at all? Would this be legitimate then?

The US have actually tackled the problem of melting asset values in its own balance sheet in a more pragmatic fashion as any other country. The linchpin is constituted by the *alliance between the government and the central bank, i.e. among the (seemingly) bankruptcy-resistant but liquidity dryout exposed US Treasury and the always liquid but bankruptcy-prone Fed*. As Roubini (2009) expressed it: "Thus, the U.S. financial system is de facto nationalized, as the Federal Reserve has become the lender of first and only resort rather than the lender of last resort, and the U.S. Treasury is the spender and guarantor of first and only resort."¹⁹

5.2. Assessment of the ECB situation

We would like to argue that the ECB/Eurosystem is not yet hurting for its financial substance, however (although it is highly impacted by the potentially dramatic US scenario, for instance, via global liquidity transmission). For instance, the Eurosystem's income from monetary policy operations was probably around €28.7 billion in 2008. A high degree of price stability and large denomination notes (including €500 and €200 notes, while the best the US can come up with is a \$100 bill) make the euro "the currency of choice for tax evaders, tax avoiders, money launderers, and other criminal elements everywhere. This makes for massive seigniorage revenue for the ECB and the Eurosystem" (Buiter, 2009b).²⁰

5.3. ECB: substantial safety measures?

The decisive question is how many ABS papers are currently deposited as collateral with the ECB by the commercial banks and how large the risk is assessed to be. The ECB itself refers to several safety measures such as the adjustment of haircuts which are intended to keep the ABS risk as small as possible (ECB 2008, Section 6.4). Moreover, the rating standards have been tightened for ABS papers which are accepted by the ECB. This is meant to hinder the depositing of worthless junk ABS papers with the ECB by the commercial banks.

In September 2008 Jean-Claude Trichet provided details about the (at that time) new liquidity rules, which came into force in February 2009, to give the banks time to adjust. From the onwards, the ECB applied a haircut, or discount, on asset-backed securities (ABS) of 12%, in addition to a 5% valuation discount for assets that are not marked-to-market (which is the case

19. See <http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/04/global-recession-insolvent-opinions-columnists-roubini-economy.html>.

20. Buiter himself calculates the massive seigniorage revenue of the ECB as follows: "Even if the 'normal' euro seigniorage as a share of GDP at a 2 percent rate of inflation is only 0.2 percent of GDP, the capitalised value of the current and future stream of seigniorage, assuming that the long-term nominal interest rate exceeds the long-term growth rate of nominal GDP by one percentage point, would be 20 percent of Euro Area annual GDP. That would allow the ECB to absorb quite massive losses to its balance sheet, which as it happens equals 19.5 percent of Euro Area annual GDP". See <http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/05/does-the-ecbeurosystem-have-enough-capital>.

with most of these assets), making for a cumulative haircut of 16.4%.²¹ What is more, on 10 May 2010, the ECB Governing Council decided to purchase government bonds – as it turned out bonds issued by government which were considered increasingly financially weak by market investors.²² Finally, it should be noted that as the international credit market crises drew on, the ECB Governing Council announced additional liquidity measures such as, for instance, longer-term refinancing operations, “special term and supplementary longer-term refinancing operations” and “regular and one-year longer-term refinancing operations” – thereby greatly increasing the ECB’s portfolio of collateral.²³

However, a critical point which deserves closer investigation with respect to the ECB balance sheet is whether impairments prevailing with these asset-backed securities are much larger than the corresponding haircuts – or whether losses could result from its government bond portfolio. Moreover, it is well known that bad collateral drives out good collateral in lending relationships with the central bank and that such replacement is not likely to be stopped by an adjustment of haircuts (Ewerhart and Tapking, 2008). In the end, this is equivalent to checking whether some risk of losses has been rolled over to the public. Finally, nobody should deceive herself with respect to the ABS securities deposited with the ECB: the bank risks which are borne by the government and the central bank and, with this, by all citizens via higher future inflation and/or taxes are probably so huge that it cannot be excluded that the bill cannot be paid for in the emergency case.

Moreover, it is currently very attractive for commercial banks in some economies like the US and the UK to *off-load their potentially toxic assets* still included in their balance sheets at the central bank. The liquidity received in return is not used for the extension of credit to the private sector but to lower the risk weighted capital adequacy ratio. By this, the banks must provide less equity capital as without the generous liquidity provision. In addition, the intake of potentially toxic assets as collateral in the central bank balance sheet *artificially keeps the corresponding asset prices up*. To avoid such kind of problematic issues, any exit strategy should rather also consider how to deal with the asset side of the ECB’s balance sheet. However, a closer look at the ECB statute (Art. 18) on open market and credit operations reveals that the above passages referring to toxic papers might be valid, for instance, preponderantly with respect to the Fed and the BoE but certainly less so for the ECB (European Central Bank, 2008), due to the specific accounting principles of repo operations in the euro area and the reserve liabilities of the national euro area central banks which are sufficiently endowed with reserves to cope with serious shocks to the system. The above mentioned moral hazard appears to be prohibited to a much larger extent in the euro area (Belke, 2009).

Actually, the strategy pursued by the Fed was rather different than from that of the ECB. In order to improve the liquidity of the system, most central banks also put in place non-conventional

21. For unsecured loans, the ECB started to apply a haircut of 5%, which is a very significant change, since this is the largest asset class.

22. See ECB (2010a).

23. For an overview see <http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/communication.en.html>.

interventions, with the specific objective of ensuring sufficient liquidity to the interbank market, and de facto substituting commercial banks in that market. Open market operations have been reinforced notably by expanding the range of assets accepted as collateral, and to include assets whose value was difficult to determine in the market, thus transferring some of the bad loans onto the balance sheets of the central banks. Furthermore, central banks have increased their exposure, by engaging in longer term loans to the banking sector. Hence one of the common features to the reaction of central banks such as the Fed and the BoE has been to hugely increase their quasi-fiscal operations without entering into formal agreement with the treasuries. However, the ECB has to be treated differently in this respect. It primarily started to deal with the subprime crisis through short-term refinancing operations, which provided the very short-term liquidity that the system needed, without nevertheless increasing the long-term amount of money.

However, the ESCB's balance sheet (see FIGURE 3 below) shows that the bulk of the expansion in its balance sheet is in a category called "long term refinancing operations". To ease liquidity tensions in the 16-country currency club and kick-start lending, the ECB launched in late 2008 a range of refinancing operations that the region's banks could tap. The ECB started to unwind them late last year. But in May, when the sovereign debt crisis began to have dangerous ripple effects in other markets around the globe, the ECB reinstated some of the fixed-rate, unlimited allotment operations it had discontinued. Hence, we are still in the mode of unlimited supply of liquidity.

What originally mainly addressed in the paper was the Securities Market Programme (started by the ECB in May 2010; according to the ECB homepage so far only just as €60bn of sovereign debt, have been purchased by the ECB/Eurosystem as of July 2) and continued until today) which can best be analysed in the framework of structural operations. The latter can be carried out by the Eurosystem through reverse transactions, outright transactions and issuance of debt certificates. These operations will be executed whenever the ECB wishes to adjust the structural position of the Eurosystem vis-à-vis the financial sector (on a regular or non-regular basis). Structural operations in the form of reverse transactions and issuance of debt instruments will be carried out by the NCBs through standard tenders. Structural operations in the form of outright transactions will be executed through bilateral procedures. The expansion of the ECB balance sheet via longer-term operations actually signals the expansionary environment in which the SMP takes place. What is more, it sheds some doubtful light on the ECB's efforts to calm the public by emphasizing its efforts to throughout sterilize its outright bond purchases within the SMP. Finally, all the discussions about a potential „bail-out“ of countries within the framework of the current rescue package neglect the fact that a much larger bail-out can be read off the ECB balance sheet. In this paper we put our main focus on the purchases of "toxic" government bonds by the ECB within the SMP, not least because under the Securities Market Programme (SMP), the ECB/Eurosystem can not only purchase sovereign debt outright, it could also purchase any private securities it sees fit, including, in principle, bank debt, bank subordinated debt or bank equity.

We argue that the ECB intervenes in “dysfunctional markets” for government debt in a sterilized but completely discretionary manner. This *must* effectively lead to a redistribution of risk among member states.

However, an even more alarming aspect the public might not be sufficiently aware of is that the ECB supports the respective member countries and their banks in the framework of its ordinary and also longer-term monetary policy operations. The ECB grants the troubled and distressed commercial banks to refinance hundreds of billion euro, *i.e.* 40 to 50 percent of GDP for Ireland respectively Greece, at a one percent interest rate. As expressed in the FT Editorial from November 16, 2010: “Irish banks only survive thanks to European Central Bank lending: they currently suck up about a quarter of the ECB’s liquidity provision... But the sickness is part of why sovereign yields have spiked, troubling the bond market of other peripheral European states.” Without this transfer of nearly free money, both countries would almost certainly have gone bankrupt some time ago. Assuming that Greek banks should have to pay the same risk premium as the Greek government, ECB lending to Greece amounts to a subsidy worth more than the transfer from the EU Structural Funds (Gros, 2010). Notably, referring to QE by the Fed is no excuse here, because US QE cannot at all be compared to the quasi-QE programmes conducted by the Fed, since the latter does not target its bond purchases to, for instance, Florida or other specific federal states.

As mentioned before, the ECB is now the buyer of only resort for Irish bonds, possibly the only policy institution able to prevent the collapse in Irish and Portuguese bonds from spreading. But this may imply that Mr. Trichet has to ignore opposition from within the ECB council to the ECB’s bond-buying program and further expand purchases of sovereign assets.

Finally, *there might not even be any significant and obvious need of fiscal backing* because the ECB *did not engage to a very large extent in outright bond purchases*, except the covered bond purchasing programme with a ceiling of EUR60 billion and - partly by definition - highest possible quality standards (ECB 2009b). This strategy of not engaging in risky bond purchases of unspecified duration is down to more than good luck. It is partly due to different mandates and partly due to differences in severity of the crisis and the different degree of exposure to securitization and bank-dependence in the two zones (Belke, 2009). However, we would like to concede that there is a certain problem of the ECB at hand with the securities underlying its repos, *i.e.* a too low haircut. However, this “problem” does not appear to take systemic dimensions.

6. GENERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST FISCALLY “BACKING UP” A CENTRAL BANK

Some argue that fundamental problems arise when the central bank, voluntarily or under political pressure (!), engages in risky financial transactions on behalf of the Treasury, but without a full guarantee from the Treasury for the losses it may incur as a result of these risky quasi-fiscal actions as is the case of the Fed today but less so in case of the much more independent ESCB (Buiters, 2009a). However, at least with respect to the ECB and

its institutional surroundings one should clearly call into question any necessity to force the central bank into overly risky financial operations. In this respect, it is extremely useful to *carefully separate the recognition of financial losses and the actual causes of the losses* and to learn from the daunting experiences with Japan (Business Week, 2003). As Box 1 below shows, the financial status of the Bank of Japan has been the subject of rather intense debate in recent years particularly owing to the balance sheet risk it has undertaken as part of its (in the end, inefficient) quantitative easing policy associated with prolonged deflation (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008).

Box 1 – The BoJ: a history of quasi-fiscal activities

Since 1997, the central bank's outright purchases – as opposed to repurchase agreements – of Japanese government bonds have exploded. To keep the money markets flush with cash, the bank has devoured billions in bonds on the secondary market. At that rate, it has absorbed a dominant share of all new Japanese government bond issuance in some years. On top of that, it has bought billion worth of stocks from commercial banks, which needed to sell off their corporate shares to raise cash. And the central bank has been under intense pressure from the Liberal Democratic Party which was ruling during those times and its allies in the Finance Ministry to buy more stocks, more corporate bonds, and even real estate. Insiders worried more and more about the huge growth in the bank's potential liabilities and argued that there should be a limit to the bank's discretionary purchase of such risky assets. The reason is not only that these kind of policies proved to be ineffective but also that massive central bank bond purchases could set the stage for a bubble that would drive prices skyward and make the BoJ more and more dependent from the government standing ready to bail out the BoJ in case of emergency (for a vivid analysis of the issues see, for instance, Business Week, 2003).

Hence: whether central banks should be forced into overly risky financial operations is another matter and indeed there are good reasons for central banks to avoid this and other "quasi-fiscal" activities. Given that government financial responsibility for such operations is often slow to be assumed, outright prohibition of them may be the best course of action to preserve independence (MacKenzie and Stella, 1996, Stella and Lönnberg, 2008).

I would like to argue that there are additional arguments which tend to speak against a systematic fiscal backing up of a central bank. Among them are the following:

- Risks consist of the conditions that could be imposed on the central bank in the event of an injection of capital by the state (fiscal backing) turning out or, at least, perceived to be necessary. Admittedly, in case of a missing fiscal backing, central banks might feel forced to change policies in order to reduce losses in some cases. But a fiscal "back-up"

could also *undermine the ability of the central bank to conduct its monetary policy*.²⁴ That is because one cannot rule out the possibility that the capital injection would come with *special conditions* attached constraining the central bank's activities. Nor is it possible to exclude the possibility that the central bank's financial weakness, even if it is a direct consequence of its central bank mandate, could be exploited by the principal with the aim of replacing an awkward bank management by not discharging it from liability. As the political business cycle literature shows, this could be well the case with a leftist government and hard-nosed central bankers and the other way round (Ernhagen, Vesterlund and Viotti, 2002, and Belke and Potrafke 2009).²⁵

To summarize, from the viewpoint of an independent central bank the point is that the actions necessary to avoid its own financial default circumscribe the strength of the policy outcome the central bank can orchestrate - even if we are supposing it has no financial commitment to its shareholder(s) and no domestic currency liquidity constraint (Ize, 2005). Thus the interesting focus of analysis is not whether the central bank can avoid technical insolvency but whether the central bank can meet its policy commitments given its financial situation (Stella, 1997).

- In a number of countries in which the central bank is endowed with a certain kind of fiscal "back-up" it can safely be said that the central bank is both the manager and obligor of the sovereign's domestic debt. In those cases the *conflict of interest* that is usually present between the government and central bank - raising interest rates to influence inflation leads to higher sovereign debt service cost (at least in the short run) - *is not solved at all but is just moved to another level and is now observed within a single institution* (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008). That said, a bailout of a central bank via a fiscal "back-up" could forever undercut a central bank's independence.
- The fact that operations of fiscal "back-up" usually take place *in the context of government fiscal distress* suggests why it is particularly naive to assume that government will "stand behind" the central bank in a timely way to ensure that policy commitments are met. The power to tax, often cited as the ultimate guarantor of the currency, is unlikely to be employed precisely during those extreme circumstances when the central bank would require backing for its operations. Indeed, it is precisely during those circumstances that the inflation tax is seen as an efficient tool and price stability a dispensable luxury. Experiences worldwide suggest that *Buiter's treasury's "deep long pockets" may be quite deep and in the end - or at least during a very material time frame - potentially empty* (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008).

24. Goodfriend (1994), for instance, has noted that Congress does have the power to reduce Fed surplus and that "If carried far enough, stripping the Fed of its liquid assets would obviously interfere with its ability to conduct monetary and credit policy. Equally important, however, it would undermine the Fed's financial independence by denying it enough interest income to finance its operations without having to ask Congress for appropriations or resorting to inflationary money creation."

25. However, a counter-argument could run as follows: if a central bank can rely on such back-up, it will need to invoke it only very rarely, so its effective degree of independence may be still quite great. For this line of reasoning see, for instance, Sims (2003a,b).

- There is the danger that any fiscal “back-up” in a strict sense might represent not more than a mean but artful thimble-rigger trick. In principle, the US Government is able to recapitalize the Fed by means of newly printed government bonds again and again, *i.e.* the government signs any desired additional amounts of pieces of papers and declares them with a stroke of a pen to represent government bonds (which by itself has a damaging effect for the reputation of the already circulating US bonds). To give an illustration, the central bank’s total assets amount to €100, equity capital to €10 and liabilities in the form of bank money holdings to €90 (see FIGURE 1). Assume now that the central bank’s assets need to be written off by, say, €20 (due to, say, a credit default). In such a situation, the losses exceed the bank’s total equity capital. Of course, this “accounting malaise” does not (in the least) affect the bank’s capacity to make payments: it holds the monopoly of creating the means of payments.

Assets	Balance sheet of the central bank		Liabilities
Assets	100	Sight deposits	90
		Equity capital	10
Σ	100	Σ	100

However, if the balance sheet structure shall be restored, the government can, in principle, transfer newly created securities (if needed with a zero yield) to the central bank in the amount of, say €20. The latter, in turn, will increase the bank’s assets by €20 and, at the same time, restore equity capital back to its former level. Such a technique was actually applied in Germany after the currency reform of 1948 and early 1990, in the course of the German reunification, to recapitalize the commercial banking system.

Assets	Balance sheet of the central bank		Liabilities
Assets	100	Sight deposits	90
		Equity capital	10
			-20
Claims on government	+20	Equity capital	+20
	100		100

Let us now elaborate further on the deeper insights gained by our simple bookkeeping example.

- However, how valuable the additional claims on the government are *de facto*, and how credible their value is to market agents has a decisive bearing on whether we are legitimized to equate the increase of the monetary base with an increase in truly debitable equity capital. The lack of credibility of such kind of solution is immediately visible to everyone in the markets, a fact which will almost surely feedback to the sustainability of the fiscal “back-up” solution. From a theoretical perspective Sims (2003a) notes that in general equilibrium models — “... uniqueness and stability of the price level depends on beliefs

of the public about how the system would react in the face of extreme circumstances like very high inflation, severe financial instability, or deflations in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is approached." As already stated above: under conditions of stress, the expectations of the public as to how the central bank will respond to an extreme deterioration in its financial position will decisively impact on the effectiveness of macroeconomic stabilization efforts.

Even worse: the root of long-standing problems of central bank refinancing has been the provision of too much credit to ailing banking systems. Fiscal backing of central banks certainly will not diminish this tendency, on the contrary, it cannot be excluded that fiscal backing leads to a vicious circle depicted further above when we analyse the Fed situation as a reference point. One should not follow the Fed in this respect and should not provide a fiscal "back-up" of the ECB. This is valid also with an eye on the structural breaks in the relation between the Fiscal government and the central bank in Germany in the years 1923 and 1948. The latter were based on and in the end were also caused by a debt and inflation dynamics which has mainly been driven by the incentive system inherent in the political process as a reaction to the demands of influential interest groups. The only possible counter-measure would be the changeover of the monetary order from a fiat to a commodity-based currency.

Taking this as a background, a particularly cynical view is that the treasury always controls central bank finances, whatever the law or practice might suggest. Hence, the "integrated public finance" view is valid always and everywhere. In this vein, Buiter (2006) argues that although a central bank may be able to resist, for a certain time, any attempts by the treasury to appropriate its assets, "ultimately, a determined treasury will be able to overcome such obstacles, be they conventions, laws or constitutional arrangements, provided there is popular political support for such depredations." While we do not exclude this statement to be valid in the very long run, we do certainly *agree to a lesser extent* with his notion that in realistic scenarios such as today's euro area where there is political support for central bank independence, laws, institutional arrangements and central bank financial strength are *irrelevant* for credibility and policy outcomes across a meaningful time horizon. In the long term, of course, all laws, arrangements and constitutions are able to be modified (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008). This discussion of the bypassing of institutions by a "determined" treasury or government could well receive some theoretical and empirical backgrounds and thus be given more flesh. Useful and well-known references are notably Coleman (2001), Waller (1991) and Lohmann (1992), among others.

Where shall we go from here? To answer this question it seems to be advisable to back our arguments with a quantitative analysis of the ECB's balance sheet.


7. A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ECB'S BALANCE SHEET

From the middle of 2007 to the beginning of December 2010, the ECB's balance sheet expanded from €1208bn to €1924bn. In the same period, the bank's holdings of euro denominated securities issued by euro area residents rose from €93.7bn, or 7.8% of the bank's balance sheet volume, to €450.6bn (or 23.4%). The bulk of these transactions reflects the ECB's refinancing of the euro area banking sector.

On 4 June 2009, the ECB Governing Council announced to purchase covered bonds in the amount of €60bn in the period July 2009 to June 2010.²⁶ On 10 May 2010, the bank announced to "conduct interventions in the euro area public and private debt securities markets"²⁷, resulting in government bond purchases of €72bn until December 2010.

Due to the strong expansion of its balance sheet, the Eurosystem's equity capital (capital and reserves) fell from 5.6% of total liabilities at the end of June 2009 to 4.1% at the beginning of December 2010. On 16 December 2010, the ECB Governing Council announced to raise its subscribed capital by €5bn, from €5.76bn to €10.76bn, in three annual stages.²⁸

Figure 1 – ECB assets: quantitative and qualitative developments over time



Source: Thomson Financial, ECB, own calculation.

26. See ECB (2009b).

27. ECB (2010a).

28. The move will raise the ECB's paid-up capital from €4.14bn to €5.3055bn on 29 December 2010. For detailed explanations of ECB balance sheet items see Vergote, Studener, Efthymiadis and Merriman (2010).

The move followed an assessment made by the ECB last year on the adequacy of its statutory capital and “in view of increased volatility in FX rates, interest rates, gold prices and credit risk” – latter having clearly increased by purchases of government bonds with low credit quality –, while also “from a longer-term perspective, the increase is also motivated by the need to provide an adequate capital base in a financial system that has grown considerably”.²⁹

While the ECB’s equity capital can be increased via “injections” from national central banks, it should be noted that by doing so the equity capital base of the Eurosystem as a whole (ECB plus national central banks (NCBs)) would not rise, but remain unchanged. In fact, should additional equity capital be needed for absorbing portfolio losses (due to accounting (mark-to-market) and/or borrower defaults) it must come from “outside”.

For bolstering the central bank’s equity capital, the government can, in principle, issue new debt titles and hand them over “for free” to the central bank.³⁰ Such a measure would, however, increase the government debt level – without providing state coffers with additional (base) money. Needless to say, such policy action would be viable only if and when public finances appear to be solid from the viewpoint of investors.

If the central bank losses are due to a deterioration of public finances – resulting in a fall in bond prices in general –, however, the bolstering of central bank equity capital via issuing new government debt may no longer be possible. This is because the accompanying rise in public debt may erode investor confidence further, translating into further declining government – and also possibly bank and corporate – bond prices. The latter, in turn, would erode the central bank’s equity capital base further.

Once in process, the ongoing decline in bond prices – and thus the decline in central bank equity capital – can only be brought to a halt if and when the central bank starts pursuing a “minimum price policy” for bonds: The central bank can announce to purchase bonds at a pre-determined price. While such a policy would prevent further accounting losses as far as the central bank bond portfolio is concerned (and even allow to raise bond prices from hitherto observed market price levels), it actually results in a monetisation of outstanding bonds, as the bond purchases have to be paid for by newly issued central bank money.

That said, the backing of the central bank’s equity capital by fiscal policy (“fiscal backing”) appears to be a viable strategy if and when the central bank’s accounting losses are not related to an unfavourable state of public finances. If, however, central bank portfolio losses are a direct outcome of deteriorating public finances, preserving the central bank’s equity capital may lead to a policy of high inflation, possibly hyperinflation. In a sense, we feel inclined to equate this scenario with Willem Buiter’s *strong fiscal dominance* outcome, according to which “the fiscal authority (or authorities) can force the central bank into current and future monetary issuance that can reasonably be expected to lead to future inflation

29. ECB (2010b).

30. So called “Ausgleichsforderungen” (which might be translated as “claims for equalization”) were used in Germany in 1948, when the D-mark replaced the Reichsmark, and again in the course of the German reunification in 1990.

higher than the central bank deems consistent with price stability" (Buiter, 2010). However, in contrast to Buiter, our previous considerations should have made clear that we believe that it is not unlikely to happen in the euro area as well.

8. CONCLUSION

In reality, many countries have found themselves in "extreme circumstances", and their experience suggests that the current ECB situation is not at all representative of the issues facing a number of developing or emerging market central banks and, nowadays, also the Fed and the BoE (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008). Hence, we would like to argue that it *does not seem to be true-to-fact* and would represent an exaggeration *if one makes a systemic case out of some problems of adequate haircuts underlying repo operations* and takes it as an argument in favor of a fiscal backing of the ECB.

In the introduction, we already mentioned that in other regions of the world, however, central bank financial problems have turned out to be quite prominent for decades, in particular, those difficult situations where central bank financial structures have been weakened by quasi-fiscal operations. In these astonishingly widespread cases, central banks have proven to be unable to meet their most basic functions (among others, the supply of banknotes) due to financial distress. They have changed policy in order to reduce losses and, in at least one case, *i.e.* the Philippines, have even been forced into liquidation. But the case of Philippine Central Bank is not (yet) the case of the ECB – not least due to the specific accounting principles of repo operations in the euro area and the reserve liabilities of the euro area national central banks (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008).

Proponents like Greenspan, Lindsey, Goodhart and Buiter, among others, strongly advise to have a fiscal "back-up" of a central bank by the government. Of course, this represents quite an unequivocal and strong form of the *integrated central bank and government view*. Both currency and deposits at the central bank – the entire monetary base – are considered to be the direct liability of the government. However I would like to argue that, at least for the euro area, this is *neither a valid assumption nor a good recommendation*. Interestingly enough, such a distinction between monetary regimes – there are those where the state explicitly or implicitly stands behind the central bank and those where it does not – is the essential starting point for the formal analysis of the fiscal "back-up" issue in Sims (2003a).

Seen on the whole, thus, instead of striving for a fiscal backing of the ECB, political actors in the euro area should instead and under all circumstances *continue to avoid such an "anything goes" monetary policy* under which the central bank could seek to relieve the debt burden of banks and corporations by adding more stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate to its portfolio. The main idea of this policy would be not only to stop potential deflation but generate inflationary expectations that would give companies pricing power and give an incentive to consumers to start spending again. But exactly this is far from happening, because market agents do not find this booking trick overall credible. What is

more, experiences worldwide suggest that Buiter's treasury's "deep long pockets" may be quite deep and in the end - or at least during a very significant time frame - potentially empty (Stella and Lönnberg, 2008). If an "anything goes" monetary policy is further on avoided in the euro area, a fiscal "back-up" of the ECB will *not* be needed, even if this was just for the theoretical case.

Watch out, ECB: a central bank's credibility is one asset that's irreplaceable!

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