CEPII

**CENTRE
D'ÉTUDES PROSPECTIVES
ET D'INFORMATIONS
INTERNATIONALES**

Does input-trade liberalization affect firms' foreign technology choice?

Maria Bas and Antoine Berthou

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DOES INPUT-TRADE LIBERALIZATION AFFECT FIRMS' FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY CHOICE?

Maria Bas and Antoine Berthou

HIGHLIGHTS

- A theoretical model is used to describe how heterogenous firms adjust their technological choices when the price of imported inputs is cut by trade liberalization;
- The effect of input-trade liberalization on firms' technology choice is heterogeneous. It benefits most middle range productivity firms using low-technology before input tariff cuts.
- Empirical analysis relying on Indian firm level data confirms these predictions.
- The average input tariff reductions during the 1999-2006 period, 12 percentage points, is estimated to produce a 2.6 percent increase in the probability of importing capital goods for the average firm and 4 percent for the average firm importing intermediate goods.

ABSTRACT

Foreign technology transfers play a key role in economic growth. This paper investigates the effects of input-trade liberalization on firms' decision to upgrade foreign technology embodied in imported capital goods. We develop a theoretical model of endogenous technology adoption, heterogeneous firms and imported inputs. Assuming that imported intermediate goods and high-technology are complementary and the existence of technology adoption fixed costs, the model predicts a positive effect of input tariff reductions on firms' technology choice to source capital goods from abroad. This effect is heterogeneous across firms depending on their initial productivity level. Using firm-level data from India and imports of capital goods to measure high-technology, we demonstrate that the probability of importing capital goods is higher for firms producing in industries that have experienced greater cuts on tariffs on intermediate goods. Our findings also suggest that only those firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution have benefited from input-trade liberalization to upgrade their technology as predicted by the model. These empirical results are robust to alternative specifications that control for industry and firm characteristics, tariffs on capital goods, other reforms and alternative measures of technology.

DOES INPUT-TRADE LIBERALIZATION AFFECT FIRMS' FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY CHOICE?

Maria Bas and Antoine Berthou

POINTS CLEFS

- Un modèle théorique est développé afin de montrer comment les entreprises hétérogènes ajustent leurs décisions d'adoption technologique lorsque le prix des biens intermédiaires importés est réduit après l'ouverture commerciale.

- L'effet de la réduction des tarifs douaniers des biens intermédiaires importés sur le choix technologique des entreprises est hétérogène entre les entreprises selon leur niveau de productivité initiale. Seules les entreprises au milieu de la distribution de productivité ont bénéficié de la libéralisation commerciale des biens intermédiaires.

- L'analyse empirique utilise des données des entreprises indiennes et confirme ces prédictions.

- La réduction moyenne des droits de douane des biens intermédiaires pendant la période 1999-2006, 12 points pourcentage, a produit une augmentation de la probabilité d'importer des biens d'équipement de 2.6 pourcent pour l'entreprise moyenne et 4 pourcent pour les entreprises qui importent des biens d'équipement.

RÉSUMÉ

Les transferts de technologie étrangère jouent un rôle clé dans les pays en voie de développement. Ce document étudie les effets de la libéralisation commerciale des biens intermédiaires sur la décision des entreprises d'adopter une technologie étrangère incorporée dans les biens d'équipement. Nous développons un modèle théorique d'adoption technologique endogène, firmes hétérogènes et biens intermédiaires importés. Dans ce modèle, les biens intermédiaires importés et la technologie avancée sont complémentaires et l'adoption technologique entraîne des coûts fixes. Le modèle prédit un effet positif de la réduction des tarifs douaniers des biens intermédiaires importés sur le choix technologique des entreprises. Cet effet est hétérogène entre les entreprises selon leur niveau de productivité initiale. En utilisant des données des entreprises indiennes et des importations des biens d'équipement comme indicateur de la technologie étrangère, nous montrons que la probabilité d'importer des biens de capital est plus élevée pour les entreprises qui produisent dans des industries ou les réductions de droit de douane sur les biens intermédiaires

sont plus importantes. Nos résultats suggèrent que seules les entreprises au milieu de la distribution de productivité ont bénéficié de la libéralisation commerciale des biens intermédiaires.

Classification JEL :   F10, F14, D24

Mots clés :   Libéralisation commerciale des biens intermédiaires, décision d'importer des biens d'équipement, hétérogénéité des entreprises et données des entreprises.

DOES INPUT-TRADE LIBERALIZATION AFFECT FIRMS' FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY CHOICE?[1]

Maria Bas [*]

Antoine Berthou [†]

1. INTRODUCTION

Trade liberalization has produced in the past two decades steady growth in imports of intermediate and capital goods in developing countries. The endogenous-growth literature has provided theoretical arguments for the role of foreign intermediate inputs in enhancing economic growth (Ethier, 1979, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991).[2] The specific influence of trade in capital goods on economic growth has also been emphasized in a number of theoretical and empirical works (Lee, 1995; Eaton and Kortum, 2001; Goh and Olivier, 2002). It is generally considered that capital goods produced in advanced economies are more sophisticated than those produced in developing economies, so that trade in capital goods allows fostering productivity growth in the latter through foreign technology transfers.[3] Importing capital goods is found to be a relevant channel of R&D spillovers across countries (Xu and Wang, 1999). Trade or financial liberalization are therefore expected to improve economic growth, by decreasing the cost of foreign capital equipments (Eaton and Kortum, 2001; Alfaro and Hammel, 2007).

Our paper investigates the link between input-trade liberalization and technology adoption through imports of capital goods. Input-trade liberalization may affect technology adoption

---

[*]CEPII (Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales). Tel: +33 1 53 68 55 77. FAX: +33 1 53 68 55 01. E-mail: maria.bas@cepii.fr. Postal address: 113, rue de Grenelle, 75007 Paris, France.

[†]Banque de France. E-mail: Antoine.berthou@banque-france.fr.

[2]Recent firm-level studies have confirmed that input-trade liberalization played a key role on firm productivity growth (Schor, 2004; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2010), the ability to introduce new products in the domestic market (Goldberg et al., 2010), export performance (Bas, 2012; Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2013) and mark-ups changes (DeLoecker et al., 2012). Other works highlight a positive link between imports of intermediate goods and firm productivity in developing countries (Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; Halpern et al., 2009).

[3]For instance, in the case of the Indian economy, about 75% of the value of capital goods imported originate from OECD economies. We obtain this number using product-level imports for India provided by the CEPII-BACI database, which are then merged with the BEC product categories that disentangle capital goods from other types of goods.

through a *direct* channel, where the reduction of tariffs on capital goods decreases their price and allows firms to import a larger volume of these goods. In this work, we take a different perspective and emphasize an *indirect* channel. We focus on the effect of tariff cuts on variable intermediate inputs on firms' decision to upgrade foreign technology embodied in imported capital goods, through a complementarity channel between foreign intermediates and capital equipment. Such complementarity is observed in our micro-data of Indian firms used in the empirical analysis. Only a subset of firms in our sample import capital goods and almost all of them also import intermediate inputs. Moreover, imports of capital goods are less frequent than imports of other types of goods, which suggest that such import activity is associated with a technological investment decision.

We first develop a simple model of heterogeneous firms, endogenous technology adoption and imported inputs that rationalizes the channels through which input-trade liberalization affects firms' decision to upgrade foreign technology embodied in imported capital goods. Input-trade liberalization reduces the costs of imported intermediate inputs and allows firms to reduce their marginal costs and increase their profitability. In the presence of fixed cost of technology adoption, heterogeneous firms and complementarity between imported inputs and high-foreign technology, the model yields two main testable implications. First, input tariff reductions increase the probability of importing capital goods. Second, the effect of input-trade liberalization on firms' technology choice is heterogeneous across firms depending on their initial productivity level. Firms that will benefit from input-trade liberalization are the middle range productivity firms using low-technology before input tariff cuts.

Next, we test the model implications using the Indian firm-level dataset, Prowess, over the 1999-2006 period. This data was collected by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).[4] The Prowess dataset provides information on imports distinguished by type of goods (capital equipment, intermediate goods and final goods). To establish the causal link between the availability of imported intermediate goods and firms' decision to import capital goods, we rely on the unilateral trade reform that took place in India at the end of the 1990s as a part of the 'Ninth Five-Year Plan'.[5] We depart from previous studies of input-trade liberalization by distinguishing tariffs on variable inputs from tariffs on capital equipment products. The empirical identification strategy disentangles the direct effects of tariffs on capital goods and the indirect effects of tariffs on other intermediate goods on firms' decision to import capital equipment goods from abroad. Using effectively applied most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs data and an input-output matrix, we construct tariff measures on variable inputs and on capital goods separately. We first present evidence that our tariff measures are free of reverse causality concerns. We extend the previous works in the literature and show that input tariff changes are uncorrelated with initial firm and industry characteristics during the trade reform under the 'Ninth Five-Year Plan'. We then exploit this exogenous variation in input tariffs across industries to identify the effect of the availability of foreign intermediate goods on firms' decision to import

---

[4]We focus on the period 1999-2006 in order to maximize the number of firms each year.

[5]Section 4 describes the policy instruments applied by the Indian Government during this reform.

capital goods taking into account changes in specific tariffs on capital goods.

The empirical findings confirm the theoretical predictions. Firms producing in industries with larger input tariff cuts have a higher probability of importing capital goods. Our results imply that the average input tariff reductions during the 1999-2006 period, 12 percentage points, is estimated to produce a 2.6 percent increase in the probability of importing capital goods for the average firm and 4 percent for the average firm importing intermediate goods. These results take into account the direct effect of capital goods tariff changes. We then investigate if the impact of input-trade liberalization is heterogeneous across firms. Only those firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution import capital goods after input tariff reductions. As predicted by the model, our findings suggest that the least productive firms do not benefit from input tariff cuts to upgrade foreign technology. Input tariff changes do not affect either the most productive firms that already produce with the foreign technology before the reform.

These findings are robust to specifications which control for industry and firm observable characteristics that could be related to tariff changes and might change over time. The results are also robust and stable to several sensitivity tests. First, we investigate if reductions on tariff on intermediate goods are associated with the decision to start sourcing capital goods from abroad when we restrict our sample to firms that have not imported capital goods in the previous years. Second, the estimates are also robust when we take into account other reforms that took place in India. Third, the previous findings remain also stable when we exclude foreign or state-owned firms from the sample. Fourth, we also find a positive effect of input tariff cuts on the intensive margin of imports of capital goods. Finally, we show that as expected input tariff cuts are associated with an increase of imports on intermediate goods. We also find a positive effect of input-trade liberalization on firms' sales and on an alternative technology measure (the decision to invest in R&D).

These findings contribute to the literature on trade liberalization and firms' technology choice. Most of the existent theoretical studies focus on the effects of foreign demand shocks on firms' technology or quality upgrading related to final goods tariff changes affecting exports in bilateral trade agreements or expansion of other export opportunities (Yeaple, 2005; Verhoogen, 2008; Bustos, 2011; Aw et al., 2011; Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Costantini and Melitz, 2008; Bas and Ledezma, 2012). Relative to this literature, the contribution of this paper is to focus on an unexplored channel through which trade liberalization might also affect firms' technology choice, namely, a supply shock related to changes in the costs of imported intermediate inputs. Changes in tariffs on intermediate goods might affect firms' performance and thereby, firms' technology upgrading decision through multiple mechanisms: reduction of production costs, foreign technology transfer and complementarity between imported intermediate inputs and high-technology. Our findings show that input tariffs changes are also an important factor to explain firms' technology choice.

Our results also complete the existing evidence regarding the microeconomic effects of input-trade liberalization on firm performance. Concerning the case of India, most studies use the

Prowess dataset to investigate the effects of trade liberalization in India in the early 1990s. Input tariff cuts have contributed significantly to firm productivity growth and also to the ability of firms to introduce new products. Topalova and Khandelwal (2010) show that input-trade liberalization improved firm productivity by 4.8 percent in India, while Goldberg et al. (2010) demonstrate that input-tariff cuts in India account on average for 31 percent of the new products introduced by domestic firms. DeLoecker et al. (2012) show that trade liberalization reduces prices and that output tariff cuts have pro-competitive effects. They find that price reductions are small relative to the declines in marginal costs due to the input-tariff liberalization. Recent studies focused on the role of input-trade liberalization in shaping firms' export performance in other developing countries. Using firm level data from Argentina, Bas (2012) finds that firms producing in industries with larger input-tariff cuts have a greater probability of entering the export market. Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2013) show that Chinese firms that have benefited from input tariff cuts bought more expensive inputs and raised their export prices. These findings suggest that input-trade liberalization induces firms to upgrade their inputs at low cost to upgrade the quality of their exported products.

The next section presents a simple theoretical framework of endogenous foreign technology adoption that rationalizes the main channels through which input-trade liberalization affects firms' decision to upgrade technology. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the trade-policy background in India and evidence on exogenous input tariff changes. Section V presents the estimation strategy and the empirical results. Section VI introduces several robustness tests. The last section concludes.

2. THEORETICAL MODEL

Previous models of heterogeneous firms and technology or quality upgrading focus on the impact of foreign demand shocks, mainly through export variable cost changes, on firms' decision to upgrade their technology/quality. Yeaple (2005) develops a trade model of heterogeneous skills, technology choice and ex-post heterogeneous firms. In this model, trade liberalization by a reduction of trade variable costs enhances technology adoption and skill-upgrading. Verhoogen (2008) develops a model of firm heterogeneity and quality differentiation, where more productive firms produce high quality goods to the export market. Expansion of export opportunities leads more-productive firms to upgrade the quality of their goods for the export market. Bustos (2011) builds on Yeaple (2005) and Melitz (2003) to develop a trade model of heterogeneous firms and endogeneous technology adoption. In her model trade variable cost reductions increase expected export revenues and enhance technology upgrading. Bas and Ledezma (2012) extends Melitz (2003) model by including an additional stage of investment choice over a continuous support that determines firm productivity. In this model, trade liberalization also affects investment choice and productivity through an expansion of foreign demand. Other works that include fixed costs of innovation or technology upgrading in a Melitz-type model are Aw et al. (2011); Lileeva and Trefler (2010); Costantini and Melitz (2008). In those models, trade liberalization also shapes technology choice via a foreign demand channel through changes in final

goods trade variable costs.[6]

Our model is also related to Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) who extend Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firms model to include an endogenous input and output quality choices. They add a domestic intermediate-input sector that produces inputs of different qualities. They consider two scenarios. In the first one, input quality and firm capability draws are complements to generate output quality. In the second scenario, they assume fixed costs of quality upgrading and that producing high-quality output requires high-quality inputs.[7] Only in this second scenario, firms' quality choice depends on the scale of market to which the plant sells. This second variant of the model will then predict that an exogeneous increase in market access induces quality-investments.[8] Given that inputs are only domestically produced, trade liberalization will not affect production factor costs.

We depart from these models of trade, heterogeneous firms and technology/quality upgrading that focus on foreign demand shocks related to final goods trade variable cost changes and expansion of market access. Our focus relies instead on a supply shock, namely variations in the relative production costs associated to input-trade liberalization. Assuming that firms produce their final product with both domestic and imported intermediate inputs and that high-technology is biased towards foreign inputs, trade liberalization through input tariff reductions affects the relative costs of foreign inputs and thereby, firms' profitability and the incentives for technology adoption. Kasahara and Lapham (2012) also introduce in a Melitz-type model imported intermediate goods and fixed cost of importing to investigate the simultaneous choice of export final goods and import intermediates. Amiti and Davis (2012) build on Kasahara and Lapham (2012) to explain the effects of input- and output-trade liberalization on firms' wages. Bombarda and Gamberoni (2013) develop a Melitz-type model including an intermediate goods sector producing differenciated varieties for domestic and foreign markets to explain the impact of relaxing rules of origin. However, they assume that intermediate goods producers are trade frictionless. These previous models do not take into account how imported inputs affect firms' technology choice. In our framework, input-trade liberalization leads to firms' technology upgrading through a different mechanism relative to the previous models of firm heterogeneity and technology/quality choice. Since we want to emphasize the imported input channel, for the sake of simplicity we abstract from the export side of the story and the effects of trade liberalization through variations in trade variable costs affecting final goods that are already well-documented in the literature.

---

[6]Demidova (2008) extends Melitz (2003) model to a case of asymmetric technology between countries assuming that firms in each country draw their productivity from a different distribution, one dominating the other. In this model with technological asymmetries, trade liberalization benefits the more productive country.

[7]Hallak and Sivadasan (2011) also consider fixed costs of quality upgrading. They develop a model of trade with two dimensions of firm heterogeneity (productivity and caliber, the ability of to develop high quality products with lower fixed outlays). In this model, exporters have more incentives to invest in quality upgrading due to a higher total demand and because trade costs decrease with quality. Thereby, trade liberalization enhances quality upgrading.

[8]For simplicity the authors assume that there are no trade variable costs.

2.1.   Set-up of the model

The aim of this section is to motivate our empirical analysis by introducing a simple model of heterogeneous firms, endogenous technology adoption and imported inputs based on Melitz (2003). The theory rationalizes the mechanisms through which input-trade liberalization affects firms' decision to upgrade technology.

Preferences. The representative household allocates consumption from among the range of differentiated varieties of final goods ω . Consumer preferences are assumed to take the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function: $U = \left[\int_{\omega \in \Omega} q(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$, where $\sigma > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties and Ω the set of available varieties. The optimal demand function for each differentiated variety is given by: $q(\omega) = Q \left[\frac{p(\omega)}{P} \right]^{-\sigma}$, where $Q \equiv U$ is the aggregate consumption of available varieties, P the price index and $p(\omega)$ the price set by a firm. $R = PQ$, aggregate revenue. The price index dual to the CES utility function is $P = \left[\int_{\omega \in \Omega} p(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$.

2.2.   Production

There are two sectors in the economy. One sector produces a homogeneous domestic constant-return-to-scale intermediate-input x_d with one unit of labor requirement under perfect competition. Labor is inelastically supplied and the wage is used as a numeraire. This homogeneous intermediate goods sector is characterized by perfect competition, so that the price of domestic inputs equals the marginal cost of producing the input: $p_x = w = 1$. Similar to previous works on heterogeneous firms and imported intermediate goods (Kasahara and Lapham (2012) and Amiti and Davis (2012)), we assume that inputs are available in the country in fixed measure exogenously determined.[9]

The other sector produces a continuum of differentiated final goods under monopolistic competition. In this sector, there is a continuum of firms, which are all different in terms of their initial productivity level φ. Each firm produces a distinct horizontally-differentiated variety of final good in a monopolistic competition market structure. The production of each variety of final good q involves a fixed production cost f in terms of labor.[10] Firms combine two types of intermediate goods to produce the final good: domestic x_d and imported x_m inputs. To keep the model simple, we assume that all firms used both intermediate goods.[11] Final good producers are price-takers in intermediate-input markets. The price of imported inputs takes into account

---

[9]This assumption of a fixed measure of intermediate goods allows us to focus on the cost-reduction channel of intermediate goods trade in a tractable way avoiding the possible multiple equilibriums of models like Venables (1996).

[10]This assumption allows us to study the decision of firms that face homogeneous fixed costs.

[11]In the case of India, 65% of firms used imported intermediate goods (see descriptive statistics in Table 1).

the input tariff $\tau_m > 1$. The technology to produce final goods is characterized by a CES production function that combines domestic and imported intermediate goods. The elasticity of substitution between the two types of inputs is $\theta = \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$. Dometsic and imported inputs are imperfect substitutes, $0 < \alpha < 1$ and $1 \le \theta \le \infty$.

$$q_i(\varphi) = \varphi \left(x_{di}^{\alpha} + \gamma_i^{\alpha} x_{mi}^{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \qquad for \ \ i = \{l, h\} \qquad (1)$$

Firms can produce the final good with a low- or a high-technology with subscripts l and h. Low-technology is available to all firms. High-technology implies incurring an additional fixed technology adoption cost f_h in terms of labor, which represents an investment in a new and more advanced technology that reduces marginal costs of production.[12] The parameter γ_i represents the complementarity between imported intermediate inputs and high-technology. The high value of this factor is only available to firms that pay the fixed technology cost. Therefore, $\gamma_h > 1$ if the firm produces with high-technology and $\gamma_l = 1$ if the firm produces with low-technology. The complementarity between imported inputs and high-technology yields to a higher efficiency in the production process reducing firms' marginal costs. This complementarity translates in a foreign-input biased high-technology. Given that imported and domestic intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes, the complementarity assumption implies that firms producing with high-technology are imported-input intensive and firms producing with low-technology are domestic-input intensive. This assumption is realistic in the case of developing countries like India. Using as a proxy of high-technology imported capital equipment goods[13], the evidence presented on Section 3 suggests that imported intermediate inputs are complementary with foreign technology embodied in imported capital goods for Indian firms. This evidence shows that almost all firms that import capital goods are imported-input intensive.

Two groups of firms can then be identified in this setting: (1) low-technology firms, the lowest productivity firms producing with domestic-input intensive technology M_l; and (2) high-technology firms, the most productive ones, which have acquired the foreign-input intensive high-technology M_h.

Each firm chooses its price to maximize its profits subject to a demand curve with constant elasticity σ. The equilibrium price reflects a constant markup over marginal cost:

$$p_i(\varphi) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{c_i}{\varphi} \qquad (2)$$

In this model, marginal cost can be divided into an intrinsic productivity term φ and the CES cost index c_i, which combines the prices of domestic and imported intermediate goods. Since

---

[12]The assumption that the fixed technology adoption cost is also measured in terms of labor allows us to study the technology choice of firms that face homogeneous fixed costs.

[13]Imported capital equipment goods are a good proxy of high-technology in India since more than 75% of imports of capital equipment goods are originated from developed economies from OECD, according to our calculations using the CEPII-BACI dataset.

the price of domestic intermediate goods is equal to the wage which is used as a numeraire, the CES cost index for the low- and high-technology firms can be expressed as a function of input tariffs and the complementarity parameter: $c_l^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} = 1 + \tau_m^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}$ and $c_h^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} = 1 + \left(\frac{\tau_m}{\gamma_h}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}$. High-technology firms pay a fixed technology cost that allows them to reduce their marginal cost by increasing their efficiency through the complementarity between imported inputs and high-technology ($\gamma_h > 1$). The CES cost index of high-technology firms c_h is then lower than the one of low-technology firms c_l. The ratio $\frac{c_h}{c_l}$ is determined by:

$$\frac{c_h}{c_l} = \left(\frac{\tau_m^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} + 1}{\tau_m^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} + \gamma_h^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \tag{3}$$

This ratio expresses the relative cost of high-technology firms to low-technology firms. The relative cost $\frac{c_h}{c_l}$ is an increasing function of input tariffs. Partially differentiating equation (3) with respect to the input tariffs (τ_m), we find that $\partial \frac{c_h}{c_l} / \partial \tau_m > 0$ since $0 < \alpha < 1$ and $\gamma_h > 1$. The lower the input tariffs the lower the relative unit costs of firms using the high-technology vis-à-vis low-technology firms. This result is explained by the fact that using high-technology improves the efficiency of production through the use of foreign inputs. Adopting the high-technology induces a technical change that is biased towards the use of foreign inputs given the substitutability between domestic and imported intermediate goods in the CES production function. This makes the production process more sensitive to input tariff changes.

The ratio of the relative high-technology unit cost to low-technology expressed in equation (3) is the key variable in this model that captures the differential effect of input-tariff changes on firms' revenues and profits. Combining the demand and the price function, firms' revenues are given by $r_i(\varphi) = \left(\frac{P}{p_i(\varphi)}\right)^{\sigma-1} R = A c_i^{1-\sigma} \varphi^{\sigma-1}$, where R is the aggregate revenue and $A = P^{\sigma-1} R \left(\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}\right)^{\sigma-1}$ is an index for market demand. High-technology firms' revenues can be written as a function of revenues of low-technology firms $r_h(\varphi) = r_l \left(\frac{c_h}{c_l}\right)^{1-\sigma}$. Hence, firms that upgrade technology have a comparative advantage cost that allows them to raise their revenues by the term $\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l}\right)^{1-\sigma}$. Note that this term is higher than one since the elasticity of substitution among final goods is $\sigma > 1$ and $c_l > c_h$. Profits for both types of firms are given by $\pi_l(\varphi) = \frac{r_l(\varphi)}{\sigma} - f$ and $\pi_h(\varphi) = \frac{r_l(\varphi)\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l}\right)^{1-\sigma}}{\sigma} - f - f_h$.

Given that the price is a constant mark-up over marginal costs, in this model firms with a higher productivity draw using high-technology set lower prices than low-technology firms due to a better exogenous productivity draw (φ) and a higher input efficiency thanks to the complementarity between imported intermediate goods and the high-technology (γ_h). Since the demand is elastic, these lower prices imply that more productive firms using high-technology have also

larger revenues and profits.

2.3. Firms' decisions

The decision to exit or stay and produce

Firms have to pay a sunk entry cost f_e to enter the market before they know what their productivity level will be. Entrants then derive their productivity φ from common distribution density $g(\varphi)$, with support $[0,\infty)$ and cumulative distribution $G(\varphi)$. After observing its productivity draw, firms decide whether to stay and produce or to exit the market. Since there is a fixed production cost f, only those firms with enough profits to afford this cost can produce. The profits of the marginal firm that decides to stay and produce with low-technology are equal to zero: $\pi_l\left(\varphi_l^*\right) = 0$. The value φ_l^* is the survival productivity cutoff to produce with low-technology. This cutoff is determined by the following condition:

$$\pi_l\left(\varphi_l^*\right) = \frac{r_l\left(\varphi_l^*\right)}{\sigma} - f = \frac{A}{\sigma}c_l^{1-\sigma}\varphi_l^{*\sigma-1} - f = 0 \tag{4}$$

Equation (4) implies that the survival productivity cutoff to produce with low-technology is determined by $\varphi_l^{*\sigma-1} = f\, c_l^{\sigma-1}\frac{\sigma}{A}$. All firms that have a productivity draw lower than the survival cutoff are not able to pay the fixed production cost, they make losses and exit the market ($\varphi < \varphi_l^*$). Firms with a productivity draw greater than the survival cutoff stay in the market and produce ($\varphi > \varphi_l^*$).

The decision to adopt high-technology

If a firm decides to stay in the market once it has received its productivity draw, it may also decide to upgrade its technology to reduce its marginal costs on the basis of its profitability. Technology choice is endogenously determined by the initial productivity draw. Firms with a more favorable productivity draw have a higher potential payoff from adopting the high-technology that is biased towards foreign inputs, and hence are more likely to find incurring the fixed technology cost worthwhile. Thus, firms that will upgrade technology are the most productive ones whose increase in revenues due to the adoption of high-technology enables them to pay the fixed technology cost. Technology adoption allows firms to increase their profitability through the complementarity channel between imported intermediate goods and high-technology in the production process.[14] The indifference condition for the marginal firm

---

[14]Firms' technology adoption decision takes place after they discover their productivity draw. There is no other uncertainty or additional time discounting apart from the probability of exit (δ). Thus firms are indifferent between paying the one time investment cost F_h or paying the amortized per period portion of this cost in every period $f_h = \delta F_h$.

to acquire the new and more advanced technology is given by $\pi_h(\varphi_h^*) = \pi_l(\varphi_h^*)$:

$$\frac{r_h(\varphi_h^*) - r_l(\varphi_h^*)}{\sigma} = f_h \tag{5}$$

The high-technology productivity cutoff φ_h^* is the minimum productivity level for the marginal firm that is able to adopt the high-technology. Equation (5) implies that $\varphi_h^{*\sigma-1} = \frac{f_h}{c_h^{1-\sigma} - c_l^{1-\sigma}} \frac{\sigma}{A}$. By combining equation (4) with (5), we obtain φ_h^* as an implicit function of φ_l^*:

$$\varphi_h^* = \varphi_l^* \left(\frac{f_h}{f}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \left(\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l}\right)^{1-\sigma} - 1\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \tag{6}$$

Where the relative unit costs $\frac{c_h}{c_l}$ is a function of input tariffs and the complementarity parameter determined in equation (3). The sorting of firms by technology status depends on the relationship between fixed costs of production, of technology adoption and variable costs of importing intermediate goods. If fixed costs of adopting the high-technology are lower than fixed production costs all firms will use the high-technology. The parameter condition that ensures that $\varphi_h^* > \varphi_l^*$ is given by $f_h > f\left(\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l}\right)^{1-\sigma} - 1\right)$.

Figure 1 illustrates the technology choice by plotting the low- and high-technology profits as a function of initial productivity level. Firms with a productivity level lower than the survival productivity cutoff are not profitable enough to pay the fixed production costs, make losses and exit the market ($\varphi < \varphi_l^*$). Firms with a productivity level that is higher than the survival cutoff but lower than the high-technology productivity cutoff, have enough profits to afford the fixed production costs but not enough to pay the fixed high-technology costs ($\varphi_l^* \leq \varphi < \varphi_h^*$). These firms stay in the market and produce with the low-technology. Firms with a productivity level greater than the high-technology productivity cutoff are able to produce with the high-technology biased toward imported inputs ($\varphi \geq \varphi_h^*$).

We are interested in determining how changes in input tariffs affect firms' decision to upgrade technology depending on their productivity levels. This question can be answered by investigating the impact of input-tariff changes on the high-technology productivity cutoff φ_h^*. Equation (6) shows that input tariffs affect the high-technology productivity cutoff through a direct effect captured by the relative unit costs of high-technology vis-à-vis low-technology and through an indirect effect captured by the impact of input tariffs on the survival productivity cutoff φ_l^*. Hence, to determine the high-technology productivity cutoff, we need to solve first for the equilibrium level of the survival productivity cutoff. This is done in the next section.

Figure 1 – Technology choice by productivity levels

2.4. Industry equilibrium

The equilibrium value of the survival productivity cutoff φ_l^* can be solved independently of other equilibrium variables. Two conditions determined the equilibrium value of φ_l^*: the zero cutoff profit condition (ZCP) and the free entry condition (FE). These conditions establish two different relationships between average profits and the survival productivity cutoff. The value of φ_l^* at equilibrium will then pin down the rest of the model's variables. All aggregate variables are defined in the Appendix.

The Free Entry Condition (FE): before entering the market and knowing their productivity level, firms calculate the present value of average profit flows $\widetilde{v}$ to decide whether to enter the domestic market: $\widetilde{v} = \left[\sum\limits_{t=0}^{\infty} (1-\delta)^t \widetilde{\pi} \right]$. The net value of entry given by: $v^e = \frac{1-G(\varphi_l^*)}{\delta} \widetilde{\pi} - \delta f_e$,

where $1 - G(\varphi_l^*)$ is the ex-ante probability of survival and δf_e is the amortized per-period portion of the sunk entry cost.[15] In equilibrium, where entry is unrestricted, the net value of entry is equal to zero. Once firms pay the fixed entry costs, entrants then draw their productivity from a known Pareto distribution function $g(\varphi) = k \frac{\varphi_{\min}^k}{(\varphi)^{k+1}}$ with $\varphi_{\min} > 0$ the lower bound of the support of the productivity distribution and a shape parameter k. The Pareto cumulative distribution function is $G(\varphi) = 1 - \left(\frac{\varphi_{\min}}{\varphi}\right)^k$. Assuming that productivity draws are Pareto distributed implies that firm size and variable profits are also Pareto distributed with a shape parameter $k/(\sigma - 1)$. The condition for average variable profits to be finite is that $k > \sigma - 1$.[16]

$$\widetilde{\pi} = \frac{\delta f_e}{1 - G(\varphi_l^*)} = \left(\frac{\varphi_l^*}{\varphi_{\min}}\right)^k \delta f_e \qquad \text{(FE)} \qquad (7)$$

The Zero Cutoff Profit Condition (ZCP): also determines a relation between average profits of each type of firm and the productivity level of the marginal firm.

$$\widetilde{\pi} = \rho_l \pi_l(\widetilde{\varphi_l}) + \rho_h \pi_h(\widetilde{\varphi_h}) \qquad \text{(ZCP)} \qquad (8)$$

Where $\widetilde{\varphi_l}$ and $\widetilde{\varphi_h}$ correspond to the average productivity levels of firms producing with low- and high-technology, which depend on the productivity cutoff levels. $\rho_h = \frac{1 - G(\varphi_h^*)}{1 - G(\varphi_l^*)} = \left(\frac{\varphi_h^*}{\varphi_l^*}\right)^{-k}$ and $\rho_l = 1 - \rho_h$ represent the ex-ante probability of using high- and low-technology.

The free entry condition represents a relationship between the average profits and the low-technology productivity cutoff level where the average profits are an increasing function of the cutoff. Under the zero cutoff profit condition, average profits are a decreasing function of the cutoff. Combining the free entry (equation (7)) and zero cutoff profit conditions (equation (8)), we can solve the equilibrium survival productivity cutoff. The derivations are detailed in the Appendix:

$$\varphi_l^{*k} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{k - (\sigma - 1)} \left[\frac{f + \left[\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l}\right)^{1-\sigma} - 1\right]^{\frac{k}{\sigma-1}} \left(\frac{f_h}{f}\right)^{\frac{-k}{\sigma-1}} f_h}{\delta f_e} \right] \varphi_{\min}^k \qquad (9)$$

---

[15]The factor of discount is modeled following Melitz with a Poisson death shock probability (δ).
[16]Axtell (2001) provides empirical evidence that the Pareto distribution is a good approximation of firm size distribution.

Where $k > \sigma - 1$ and the relative unit costs $\frac{c_h}{c_l}$ is a function of input tariffs τ_m and the complementarity parameter γ_h determined in equation (3). In this model, the equilibrium productivity cutoff φ_l^* is a function of the input tariffs, the fixed production and high-technology costs and the complementarity technology parameter. Note that one of the particularities of Melitz-type models' is that the survival productivity cutoff does not depend on market size. This cutoff then determines the technological cutoff level (φ_h^*) defined in equation (6).

2.5. Input-trade liberalization and technology upgrading

2.5.1. *The predictions of the model*

In this section, we present the predictions derived from the simple model concerning the relationship between input-trade liberalization and technology choice. This simple model yields two main predictions related to the determinants of the probability of upgrading technology.

The probability of adopting high-technology is determined by the relationship between the two productivity cutoffs defined in equation (6): $\rho_h = \left(\varphi_h^*/\varphi_l^*\right)^{-k}$. This equation shows that the probability of upgrading technology is a function of fixed production costs, fixed costs of high-technology, input tariffs and the complementarity parameter. Input tariff cuts increase the likelihood of firms to upgrade high-technology.

Proposition 1: *The probability of adopting high-technology ρ_h is a decreasing function of input tariff:* $\partial \rho_h / \partial \tau_m < 0$.

Using equation (6), we can express this probability as a function of the relative unit cost of high-technology that depends on input tariffs: $\rho_h = (f_h/f)^{\frac{-k}{\sigma-1}} \left((c_h/c_l)^{1-\sigma} - 1\right)^{\frac{-k}{1-\sigma}}$. From equation (3), we know that $\partial \frac{c_h}{c_l} / \partial \tau_m > 0$ since $0 < \alpha < 1$ and $\gamma_h > 1$, thereby, $\partial \rho_h / \partial \tau_m < 0$, since $\sigma > 1$.

This model also predicts a heterogeneous effect of input-trade liberalization on firms' technology choice. The assumptions of firm heterogeneity and fixed costs of high-technology adoption imply that those firms that will be able to benefit from input-trade liberalization are the most productive firms using low-technology before input-tariff cuts. Using equation (6) and (9) to determine the high-technology productivity cutoff, we know that this cutoff decreases with input-tariff reductions. Input-trade liberalization induces the highest-productivity firms producing with low-technology to switch to high-technology.

Proposition 2: *The high-technology productivity cutoff φ_h^* is an increasing function of input tariffs:* $\partial \varphi_h^* / \partial \tau_m > 0$

Proof. *See Appendix.*

Input tariff reductions also induce a selection effect of most productive firms in this model. The least productive firms producing with low-technology intensive in domestic inputs will lose competitiveness and market shares relative to high-technology firms due to input-trade liberalization. Indeed, input tariff reductions imply an increase in the relative costs of domestic inputs vis-à-vis foreign intermediate goods.[17] The least productive firms that are domestic-input intensive are forced to exit the market. Equation (9) shows that the survival productivity cutoff increases with input tariff reductions: $\partial \varphi_l^* / \partial \tau_m < 0$. This is shown formally in the Appendix. Unfortunately, the Indian dataset that we exploit in the empirical analysis is not suitable to test this prediction since we cannot identify entry and exit of firms.[18]

We focus on two testable predictions derived from propositions 1 and 2. These testable implications are presented in the next section. They show the direct effects of input-trade liberalization on firms' decision to upgrade technology.

2.5.2. *Testable implications*

One way that firms have to upgrade their technology in developing countries is through foreign technology transfers. Importing capital equipment goods from developed countries allows firms to adopt a modern and high-technology relative to the domestic technology. Moreover, imports of capital goods involve important sunk investment costs that not all firms can afford.[19] In the empirical analysis, we focus on firms' technological decision to import capital equipment goods in India . The simple model presented in the previous section yields two testable implications on the relationship between changes in input tariffs and firms' decision to upgrade technology embodied in foreign capital goods.

Input tariff cuts imply a reduction of the relative costs of foreign inputs vis-à-vis domestic ones. Taking into account that the high-technology is biased towards imported inputs and the substitutability between intermediate goods, input-trade liberalization in this framework enhances the cost-advantage of high-technology firms. Thereby, input tariff cuts reduce the relative unit costs of using high-technology, increasing profits of high-technology firms relative to low-technology firms creating incentives to upgrade technology. Hence, input-trade liberalization induces more firms to adopt the high-technology embodied in imported capital goods. Proposition 1 shows that input tariff reductions increase the likelihood of firms to upgrade high-foreign technology embodied in imported capital goods.

Testable implication 1: *Input-trade liberalization has a positive effect on firms' decision to*

---

[17]Low-technology firms that are intensive in domestic inputs suffer from the increase in the relative costs of intermediate goods vis-à-vis high-technology firms intensive in foreign inputs.

[18]Since firms are under no legal obligation to report to the data collecting agency, the Prowess data do not allow us to identify entry and exit of firms.

[19]Using detailed product-level data on imports by Indian manufacturing plants, Fernandes et al. (2012) show the existence of fixed costs of importing. They also find evidence on a positive effect of firm productivity on import decision.

import capital goods.

Which are the firms that decide to upgrade foreign-technology after input-trade liberalization?

The effect of input tariff reductions on firms' technology choice is heterogeneous across firms depending on their initial productivity level φ. Proposition 2 shows that the high-technology productivity cutoff φ_h^* decreases with input tariff reductions. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of input-trade liberalization on firms' technology choice for firms with different productivity levels. Input tariff cuts reduce the high-technology productivity cutoff, allowing the most productive firms producing with low-domestic technology before input-trade liberalization to upgrade their technology embodied in imported capital goods ($\varphi_h^{*'} < \varphi < \varphi_h^*$). These firms will experience an increase in the expected profits of high-technology, due to input tariff reductions, that allows them to cover the fixed technology adoption costs.

Figure 2 – Heterogeneous effect of input-trade liberalization on firms' technology choice

(a) Before input-liberalization

(b) After input-liberalization

Firms adopting high-technology

Testable implication 2: *The effect of input-trade liberalization is heterogeneous across firms. Firms that will benefit from input tariff cuts to upgrade foreign technology embodied in imported capital goods are firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution.*

In the following sections, we test these empirical implications using the episode of India's trade liberalization at the end of the nineties.

3. DATA

3.1. Firm level data

The Indian firm-level dataset is compiled from the Prowess database by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).[20] This database contains information from the income statements and balance sheets of listed companies comprising more than 70 percent of the economic activity in the organized industrial sector of India. Collectively, the companies covered in Prowess account for 75 percent of all corporate taxes collected by the Government of India. The database is thus representative of large and medium-sized Indian firms. As previously mentioned this dataset was already used in several studies on the performance of Indian firms.[21]

The dataset covers the period 1999-2006 and the information varies by year. It provides quantitative information on sales, capital stock, income from financial and non financial sources, consumption of raw material and energy, compensation to employees, expenditures on R&D and ownership group. This dataset allows us to estimate firm total factor productivity (TFP) using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology. The Prowess database provides detailed information on imports by category of goods: finished goods, intermediate goods and capital goods. In our main empirical specification, we use imports of capital goods (machinery and equipment) to measure foreign technology. Although we are not able to test directly for the impact of imported capital goods depending on the country of origin (e.g developed vs. developing countries), one realistic assumption for the case of a developing country like India is that most imports of capital goods are sourced from more advanced economies and thus, they are a good proxy of a modern and high-technology. Looking at imports of capital goods at HS6 product level of India by country of origin reveals that about 75% of their imports came from developed countries in the period 1999-2006.[22]

Input-trade liberalization might also allow firms to access to high-quality inputs. Using detailed firm-product level data for Colombia, Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) compare the price of domestic and imported inputs and provides evidence that higher-quality inputs may be relatively more available internationally. Due to data constraints, we are not able to look at the effects of input-liberalization on quality up-grading. The Prowess database does not provide any information on quantities to compute unit values as a proxy of quality of intermediate goods. Despite that we can not observe the quality of intermediate goods, for imported capital goods we can

---

[20]The CMIE is an independent economic center of India that provides services of primary data collection through analytics and forecasting. Further information can be found at http://www.cmie.com/.

[21]See Topalova and Khandelwal (2010), Topalova (2004), Goldberg et al. (2010), Goldberg et al. (2009), Alfaro and Chari (2009), DeLoecker et al. (2012).

[22]We used the BACI database provided by the CEPII as well as the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification of HS6 products by intermediates, capital goods and consumption goods.

infer that they are more advanced or of a higher quality relative to domestic capital equipment goods produced in India since most of the imports of capital goods come from developed economies.

Our sample contains information for around 4,700 firms in organized industrial activities from manufacturing sector for the period 1999-2006. Since we use lagged independent variables, the total number of observations firm-year pairs in our estimating sample is 19,685. In order to keep a constant sample throughout the paper and to establish the stability of the point estimates, we keep firms that report information on all the firm and industry level control variables. Although our panel of firms is unbalanced, there is no statistical difference in the average firm characteristics between the initial year (1999) and the final year (2006) of our sample.

Table .1 in the Appendix reports descriptive evidence of firm level variables used in the empirical analysis. During the period 1999-2006, only 34 percent of firms in the sample import capital goods, while most of the firms (65 percent) import intermediate goods. Moreover, firms import intermediate inputs on yearly basis, while firms import capital goods more sporadically. Looking at the firms that source both foreign goods reveals that most of the firms that import capital goods also purchase imported intermediate goods (32% of the firms in our sample). This descriptive evidence suggests that there exists a certain complementarity between imported capital and intermediate goods in India. The fact that only half of the firms that import intermediate goods are able to source imported capital equipment goods imply that the decision to source capital goods from abroad is related to an important fixed technological investment that only a subset of firms can afford. This empirical evidence suggests that firms' decision to import capital equipment goods in India is related to a technological choice. Moreover, this descriptive analysis confirms the main assumptions on the fixed costs of importing capital goods and the complementarity between imported intermediate and capital goods of the simple theoretical framework presented in the previous section.

3.2. Input-tariff data

To identify the impact of input-trade liberalization on firms' foreign technology choice, we use input tariffs at the 3-digit-NIC industry level. Tariffs data is provided by WITS and are at the industry level ISIC (rev 2).[23] In order to identify the effect of input tariff changes on firms' decision to import capital goods, we construct different tariffs measures for capital goods and for variable intermediate goods. In this sense, we depart from previous studies on input-trade liberalization to consider both variable inputs and capital goods in the construction of input tariffs.

This methodology allows us to disentangle the indirect effects of tariffs on intermediate goods on firms' decision to import capital goods from the direct effects of tariffs on capital goods.

---

[23]We use correspondence tables to convert tariffs into ISIC rev 3.1. that match almost perfectly with NIC 3-digit classification. This dataset is available at http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/.

For each 3-digit industry, s, we generate a capital goods tariff as the weighted average of tariffs on the capital goods used in the production of final goods of that 3-digit industry, where the weights reflect the share of capital goods of the final goods industry on total expenditures in capital goods using India's input-output matrix in 1993. We rely on fixed input weights and a pre-sample year input-output matrix to avoid possible endogeneity concerns between variations in input weights and industry and firm performance. Using a disaggregated input-output matrix, 14 from a total of 52 industries are classified as capital goods.[24] Similarly, for each industry, s, we generate an input tariff as the weighted average of tariffs on all the other intermediate goods (excluding capital goods) used in the production of final goods of that industry, where the weights reflect the input industry's share of the output industry's total expenditures in other inputs using India's input-output matrix in 1993.

We compute input (capital goods) tariffs as $\tau_{st} = \sum_z \alpha_{zs} \tau_{zt}$, where α_{zs} is the value share of input (capital) z in the production of output in the 3-digit industry s. Take for example an industry that uses three different intermediate goods in the production of a final good. Suppose that the intermediate goods face a tariff of 5, 10 and 15 per cent, and value shares of 0.10, 0.30 and 0.60, respectively. Using this methodology, the input tariff for this industry is 12.5 percent (5 ×0.10 + 10×0.30 + 15×0.60).

Table .2 shows the average output, input and capital goods tariffs during the 1999-2006 period, in the initial, the final year and the percentage point change during the period. Average output tariffs have declined by 17 percentage points and average input tariffs by 12 percentage points during the period, while capital goods tariffs were only slightly reduced by 1 percentage point. This descriptive evidence suggests that changes in input, output and capital goods tariffs were heterogeneous and also that they were weakly correlated.[25] There is also significant variation in movements in input tariffs by industry over the 1999-2006 period. At the 2-digit industry level, industries that experienced the greatest input tariff cuts are chemicals, plastic, computers, electrical products and textile (Figure 3). At the more disaggregated 3-digit industry level there is more variation in input tariffs. The 3-digit industries with the largest fall in input tariff are electrical wires and cables, batteries, plastic products, garments, other chemicals and miscellaneous textile products.

Two industry-level controls are included in the empirical specifications to control for competitive pressures. We include in all specifications effectively applied output tariffs (collected rates) at the 3-digit NIC code level. In order to capture domestic competition we use an Herfindhal index that measures the concentration of sales for each industry.

---

[24]Capital goods industries are tractors and agriculture machinery, industrial machinery, industrial machinery (others), office computing machines, other non-electrical machinery, electrical industrial machinery, communication equipments, other electrical machinery, electronic equipments, ships and boats, rail equipments, motor vehicles motor cycles and other transport equipments.

[25]The correlation between average output tariffs and input tariffs is 0.42 and with capital goods tariffs is -0.002.

4. TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN INDIA

4.1. Episodes of trade liberalization in India

The main feature of trade reform in India was the substantial trade-integration process experienced in the 1990s. In this section, we describe the different waves of India's trade liberalization and the trade-policy instruments that were applied.

India's trade policy during the 1970 and 80s was characterized by the license raj. This trade system was grounded on trade protection policies with an emphasis on import substitution. This trade regime was very restrictive, with high levels of nominal tariffs and import licenses in almost all sectors.

Two waves of trade liberalization can be distinguished in India during the 90s. The first unilateral trade-reform plan was launched in the early 1990 as a consequence of the debt crisis and as a part of an IMF program. Trade liberalization was at the core of structural reforms launched during the Eighth Five-Year Plan period from 1992-1997. Under this plan, gradual tariff cuts were applied in all sectors at the same time that non-tariff barriers and licenses were removed. During this period India becomes a member of the WTO (World Trade Organization) in 1995. One of the commitments of India when decides to join WTO is to continue the process of trade liberalization started at the early 90s. Although average tariff were reduced by 21 percentage points between 1992 and 1997, they remain relatively high in most sectors as compared to other developing countries. The average output tariffs across all industries is 35 percent in 1999.

The second wave of trade liberalization started at the end of the nineties when the government decides to launch the 'Ninth plan'. This second reform consisted in new tariff reductions and eliminations of remaining trade restrictions. As stated in the 'Ninth Five-Year Plan' one of the objectives concerning trade policy was: 'Import tariffs have also been reduced significantly over time, but our import tariff rates continue to be much higher than in other developing countries. Continuing with high levels of protection is not desirable if we want our industry to be competitive in world markets and it is therefore necessary to continue the process of phased reduction in import tariffs to bring our tariff levels in line with levels prevailing in other developing countries'.[26] Between 1999 and 2006 average tariff were reduced by 17 percentage points from 35 percent in 1999 to 17.9 percent in 2006 (Table .2).

Previous works on India's trade liberalization have mainly focused on the first wave of trade reforms. Goldberg et al. (2010), Topalova and Khandelwal (2010) and DeLoecker et al. (2012) investigate the effects of output and input tariff reductions on firms' product scope, TFP and markups during the period 1989-1997, respectively. In this work, we focus on the second wave of trade liberalization that took place at the end of the nineties and the consequent tariff reductions that were implemented afterwards. We restrict our analysis to the second wave of

---

[26]The objectives of the 'Ninth Plan' are explained in detailed in the Web site from the Planning Commission of the Government of India: http://planningcommission.nic.in/.

trade reform for two reasons. During the first wave of trade liberalization between 1989 and 1998, the number of firms in the Prowess dataset in the manufacturing sector was three times higher in 1998 relative to 1989, while during the period 1999-2006, there is much less volatility in the sample.[27] Since the Prowess dataset is a balance-sheet data and it is not compulsory for firms to report information, we can not relate the unbalance nature of the dataset in the early 90s to entry or exit of firms. Moreover, the information of interest for our analysis on imports of capital and intermediate goods has several observations with missing values in the initial period, while during the 1999-2006 period all firms report detailed information on the type of imported goods.

Focusing on the second trade reform plan implemented at the end of the 1990s has the advantage of relying on a panel that is more balanced and with complete information on firms' decisions to import capital goods and intermediate products. However, the main issue that arises is whether firms have anticipated the following tariff reductions after the first trade liberalization plan was implemented. One simple exercise is to regress the change in output tariffs between 1999 and 2006 on initial tariff levels. The estimation results show a negative correlation between the change in tariffs and the level of tariffs at the beginning of the period, with a coefficient of -0.151 and a standard error of 0.084. The coefficient then is only significant at 10 percent. This estimation suggests that industries with the highest initial tariffs experienced the largest tariff reductions. The question here is whether firms in more protected industries have lobbied for lower tariffs. In the next section, we investigate this issue and present evidence that input tariff reductions during the second wave of trade reforms are uncorrelated with firm and industry characteristics at the end of the nineties when the second plan was launched.

4.2. Exogenous input tariffs variations

One of the challenges in the investigation of the relationship between input-tariff reductions and firm decisions to upgrade foreign technology embodied in imported capital goods is potential reverse causality between tariff changes and firms' import choices which would bias our estimates.[28] In this case, changes in input tariffs could reflect some omitted industry characteristics.

One way of addressing this issue is to test whether tariff changes are exogenous to initial industry and firm characteristics. Similar to previous works analyzing the effects of trade liberalization on different firm performance measures, Topalova and Khandelwal (2010), we regress first changes in input tariffs on a number of industry characteristics computed as the size-weighted average of firms' characteristics in the initial year of our sample. Table .3 shows the coefficients on the change in input tariffs (1999-2006) on industry level regressions of initial industry characteristics (sales, capital stock, wage-bill, imports of intermediates and capital goods) on these

---

[27]In 1989 the number of firms is 1,500 and it raises to 4,500 in 1998, while in 1999 the number of firms is about 4,600 and in 2006 is 4,900.

[28]Karacaovali (2011) shows theoretically and empirically how productivity at the industry level could affect tariff rates at the sectoral level.

tariff changes. The estimates confirm that input tariff changes between 1999 and 2006 were uncorrelated with initial industry-level outcomes in 1999. As such, it seems unlikely that firms producing in industries with greater input-tariff cuts were able to lobby for these lower tariffs.

Next, we extend the analysis of Goldberg et al. (2010) on the period 1989-1997 by providing additional evidence that input tariff changes between 1999 and 2006 were uncorrelated with initial firm performance measures in 1999 that we are considering in this analysis. Table .4 shows estimates from regressing firm characteristics in 1999 such as the importer status, the share of imported capital goods over total sales, the logarithm of capital stock, firm TFP and sales on the variation in input tariffs across industries between 1999 and 2006. Had the government targeted specific firms/industries in its second plan of trade liberalization, we would expect tariff changes to be correlated with initial firm performance. However, the correlation is insignificant.

This evidence suggests that the government did not take into account pre-reform trends in firms' imports of capital goods and other performance measures when deciding to reduce tariff in the second wave of trade reform at the end of the nineties.

5. ESTIMATION STRATEGY

5.1. Input tariff cuts and firm decision to import capital goods

Using specific tariffs on inputs (different from capital goods tariffs), we investigate the relationship between the availability of imported intermediate goods and firms' decision to upgrade foreign technology embodied in imported capital goods. To test the first implication of the model, we estimate the probability that firm i imports capital goods in year t using the following linear probability model:

$$Importer(k)_{ist} = \gamma_1 Input\tau_{s,t-1} + \gamma_2 Z_{s,t-1} + \gamma_3 X_{i,t-1} + \mu_i + \upsilon_t + \varepsilon_{ist}(I)$$

Here $Importer(k)_{ist}$ is a dummy variable for firm i producing in industry s having positive imports of capital goods in year t. $Input\ \tau_{s,t-1}$ represents the MFN input tariffs with respect to the Rest of The World of industry s in year $t-1$. $Z_{s,t-1}$ is a set of industry level control variables and $X_{i,t-1}$ is a set of firm level observable characteristics varying over time. All specifications include firm fixed effects, μ_i, that take into account unobservable firm characteristics and year fixed effects that control for macroeconomic shocks affecting all firms and industries in the same way, υ_t. Since tariffs vary at the 3-digit industry level over time, the errors are corrected for clustering across 3-digit industry-year pairs.[29]

As discussed above, input-tariff changes are not correlated with either initial firm characteristics or industry characteristics during the period 1999-2006. To deal with additional concerns of

---

[29]Our clustering strategy corrects for correlation of standard errors within each industry-year group. The results are robust to specifications that clustered standard errors at the industry level.

reverse causality and omitted variables, we introduce different control variables at the industry level which may affect firms' import decisions of capital goods and could reflect the effects of input-tariff changes. The γ_1 coefficient on input tariffs might then simply be picking up the effects of variations of tariffs on capital goods. Hence, we first include India's import tariffs on capital goods to capture the direct effects of variations in tariffs affecting capital equipement products on firms' decision to import those capital goods. Second, all specifications also include tariffs on final goods. This variable captures foreign competition pressures. Finally, we also include a Herfindhal index at the sectoral level to control for domestic competition.

Next, we explicitly take into account changes in observable firm characteristics that could affect firms' import patterns. Using the same dataset, Bas and Berthou (2012) have found evidence on a positive correlation between firms' decision to import capital goods and firms' capital intensity. We therefore expect that non-importing Indian firms which experienced significant growth in their capital intensity during the period under analysis were more likely to import capital goods. $X_{i,t-1}$ is a set of firm level controls such as firms' capital intensity (measured as capital stock over wage-bill) and the age of the firm. The Prowess dataset contains the year of creation of the firm that allows computing the age of the firm.[30]

Table .5 shows the estimation results for equation (I) using a within-firm estimator. These results show the impact of lower input tariffs on the decision to import capital goods. In column (1) the coefficient on the input tariffs is negative and significant at the 5% confidence level, indicating that the drop in input tariffs between 1999 and 2006 increased the probability of importing capital goods. The estimated input tariff coefficient is robust to the inclusion of MFN tariffs for final goods set India. In column (2) we introduce tariffs on capital goods to be sure that the input tariffs are not just capturing the effect of changes in direct tariffs of imported capital equipment products. Not surprisingly, reductions on tariffs on capital goods enhance the probability of upgrading foreign technology embodied in imported capital goods. More interesting, the indirect effect of reductions of tariffs on intermediate inputs remains robust and stable. This finding indicates that our input tariff measures are not picking up the effects of variations on trade variable costs on capital goods imports. We next include additional industry and firm level variables to control for industry and firm observable characteristics that vary over time and which could be related to input tariffs. The coefficient of interest on input tariff is robust and stable when we control for domestic competition measured by the Herfindhal index, the age of the firm and firm capital intensity in column (3). The coefficient on input-tariff changes remains negative, significant and stable, however. It is very similar in size to the estimations with only industry-level controls shown in columns (1) and (2).

Finally, if the availability of foreign intermediate goods induces firms to start importing capital goods, we would expect the effect of lower input-tariffs to be greater for firms that actually import intermediate inputs. Columns (4) and (5) carry out this test. First, we inlcude a dummy variable equal to one if the firm imports intermediate goods. Firms sourcing inputs from abroad

---

[30]The Prowess dataset does not report consistent information on number of employees.

are more likely to also import capital goods (column 4). Next, we introduce an interaction between input tariff and importer of intermediate goods status (column 5). The estimated coefficient implies that a 10 percentage point fall in input tariffs leads to 2.1% to almost 3.2% increase in the probability of importing capital goods for the average firm and for those actually importing intermediate goods. Between 1999 and 2006, input tariffs declined on average by 12 percentage points, with an associated implied increase in the probability of importing capital goods of about 2.6 percent for the average firm and almost 4 for the average firm importing intermediate goods.

5.2. The heterogeneous effects of input tariff cuts

The simple model presented in Section II shows that input-trade liberalization affects firms differently according to their initial productivity. The most productive firms might already import capital goods before input-trade liberalization, while the least productive firms might not be able to afford the fixed cost of importing capital goods despite input tariff changes. The model predicts that firms using low-technology before the reform that have a productivity level closed to the high-technology productivity cutoff will benefit from input tariff reductions to face the sunk costs of importing capital goods. We explore in this section whether the impact of input-tariff changes on firms' decision to import capital goods depends on previous firm productivity.

To investigate the heterogeneous effect of input-trade liberalization on firms' decision to import capital goods, we introduce interactions between input-tariff changes and firms' TFP in the initial year of the sample (1999). Firms are divided up into four initial TFP quartiles, with the first quartile representing the least productive firms.[31] We then interact input-tariff with the firms' initial TFP quartiles. We estimate the following linear probability model for the decision to import capital goods:

$$Importer(k)_{ist} = \sum_{\rho=1}^{4} \chi^{\rho}(Input\tau_{s,t-1} \times Q_{is}^{\rho}) + \sum_{\rho=2}^{4} \lambda^{\rho} Q_{is}^{\rho} + \gamma_2 Z_{s,t-1} + \gamma_3 X_{i,t-1} + \mu_i + \upsilon_t + \varepsilon_{ist} (II)$$

Here $Importer(k)_{ist}$ is a dummy variable for firm i in 3-digit industry s having positive imports of capital goods in year t. Firms are classified into four quartiles (Q) of TFP in 1999 by ρ: Q_{is}^{1} is a dummy variable for firm i belonging to the first quartile and so on. $Input\tau_{s,t-1} \times Q_{is}^{\rho}$ are the interaction terms between the quartiles and input tariff. We include the same industry (output tariffs, capital goods tariffs and Herfindhal index) and firm level (age, capital intensity and the intermediate goods importer status) controls as in the previous estimations.

The estimation results for equation (II) are presented in Table .6. Column (1) reports as a benchmark the estimates presented in column (4) of Table .5. Columns (2) to (4) introduce

---

[31]Firm TFP is estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology.

the interaction terms between input tariffs and firms' initial TFP quartiles. The impact of input tariffs on the probability of importing capital goods is only significant for the third initial TFP quartile. This result is consistent with the predictions of our model. Since firms faced fixed sunk costs of importing capital goods, only those firms that were not importing capital goods before the input-tariff reform and that are productive enough to pay the importing fixed costs are able to import capital goods thanks to the reduction of input tariffs.

6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS

6.1. The decision to start importing capital goods

We explore the robustness of our baseline specification when we restrict our sample to firms that have not imported capital goods in the previous years. We investigate whether a reduction on tariff on intermediate goods is associated with the decision to start sourcing capital goods from abroad.

The estimates from linear probability estimations of equation (I) and (II) with firm and year fixed effects for the restricted sample of firms that have not imported capital goods in the last four years are reported in columns (1) to (2) of Table .7. In this case, the coefficients on input tariff are higher compared to the baseline specification. We should keep in mind that this could be due to the reduction of the sample size to half from 19,685 to around 10,000 observations. The point estimates indicate that a 10 percentage point reduction of input tariffs increases the probability to start importing capital goods by 3.4 percent (columns (1)). As expected, the interaction term between input tariffs and the initial fourth quartile of firm TFP is now significant indicating that the initially most productive firms (third and fourth quartile) benefit from input tariff cuts to start importing capital goods from abroad (column (2)). When we restrict our sample to firms that have not imported capital goods before, the coefficient on input tariff is still negative, significant and stable (columns (3)). The coefficients of the interaction terms between input tariffs and the initial quartiles of firm TFP are only significant for the fourth and third quartiles of firm TFP. The point estimate is statistically higher for the fourth quartile (column (4)). These findings are in line with the theoretical model: input-trade liberalization only benefits the most productive firms to start importing capital goods.

As an alternative test we include the past experience in importing capital goods in the baseline estimations. In this case, we keep the full sample of firms and include the lagged importer status of capital goods of the firm measured by a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm has been an importer of capital goods in the previous year. This specification allows us to take into account the past experience of importing capital goods that can reduce the fixed costs in the present. These results are reported in columns (5) and (6). As expected the previous import status has a positive effect on the decision of importing capital goods in year t. The point estimates of input tariffs remain almost unchanged relative to the ones presented in the baseline specifications in Table .5 and .6.

These findings confirm positive effect of tariff reductions on intermediate goods to start sourcing capital goods from abroad.

6.2.   Other reforms in India

During the nineties India has experienced structural reforms in several areas of the economy. In order to test if the coefficient on input tariffs is picking up the effects of other reforms that took place in India, we carry out alternative sensitivity tests.

Table .8 presents the results. The benchmark estimation presented in column (5) of table .5 is reported in column (1). Next, we include in column (2) industry-year fixed effects to take into account all unobservable characteristics varying over time that could affect industries. In this case only the interaction term between input tariff and the importer of intermediate goods status variable is included. The coefficient of this interaction term is negative and significant, and the magnitude is very similar to the one found in the baseline specification reported in column (1).[32]

Since other reforms like labor market regulations were introduced at the beginning of the nineties at the State level, we introduce region-year fixed effects to control for unobservable characteristics affecting the 21-Indian states in columns (3) and (4). As can be seen the coefficient of interest on input tariffs and on the interaction term between input tariffs and the initial quartiles of firm TFP remain robust and stable to the inclusion of region-year fixed effects. The point estimates of input tariffs remain almost unchanged relative to the ones presented in the baseline specifications in Table .5 and .6.

Overall, these results confirm that our previous findings do not suffer from omitted variables bias related to other policy-reforms that took place in India.

6.3.   Alternative samples

In this section, we address another potential concern related with firms' ownership. We test our main specification for different samples of firms to investigate whether firms' ownership is driving our previous results.

Previous studies on multinational firms show that foreign firms in developing countries tend to use more advanced technologies and be more productive relative to domestic firms (Javorcik, 2004). In general, the fact that foreign companies are more efficient and use more advanced technology could potentially explain our results. Foreign affiliates might benefit more from input tariff changes to upgrade foreign technology embodied in imported capital goods since they have connections with foreign headquarters located abroad. In order to address this issue, we exclude from our sample multinational firms in columns (1) and (2) of Table .9. Our coefficients

---

[32]Note that in the specification in which we include industry-year and firm fixed effects in column (3), the effect of input tariff and initial quartiles of firm TFP in 1999 will be completely subsumed by the fixed effects.

of interest on input tariff (column (1)) and on the interaction term between input tariff and the initial firm TFP quartile (column (2)) remain robust and stable when we restrict the sample to domestic firms, implying that input-trade liberalization matters for non-multinational firms.

Moreover, previous works using the same firm-level dataset have emphasized the role of state-owned firms relative to private companies in India (Topalova, 2004; Alfaro and Chari, 2009). One could argue that state-owned companies might have a greater lobby power to induce the government to reduce tariff on those goods that they use as intermediate ones in the production of final goods. In order to address this issue, we restrict the sample to private firms in columns (3) and (4), while columns (5) and (6) present the results for state-owned companies. The point estimates of input tariff (column (3)) and the interaction term between input tariff and the initial firm TFP quartile (column (4)) remain robust and stable for the sample of private firms. However, they are no longer significant when we restrict the sample to state-owned firms. This result suggests that state companies did not benefit from input tariff reductions to import capital goods. These sensitivity tests confirm that foreign and state-owend firms are not picking up our previous findings.

6.4.   Input-tariff cuts and the intensive margin of imports of capital goods

If imports of intermediate goods are complementary with imports of capital goods, we expect that input tariff reductions will also enhance larger volumes of imports of capital goods. One concern that arises in the estimation of the determinants of the intensive margin of imports of capital goods is that this variable is observed only over some interval of its support. In this case, the sample is a mixture of observations with zero and positive values. An OLS estimation of the logarithm of imports of capital goods will exclude the zero import values leading to sample-selection bias and inconsistent parameter estimates as the censored sample is not representative of the entire sample of Indian firms.

There are two different ways of addressing this issue. The first way is to rely on an OLS estimation with firm fixed effects regressing import shares (imports of capital goods over total sales) on input tariffs. This dependent variable retains the observations of non-importing capital goods firms and consists in a similar strategy to the one presented in Equation (I). Nevertheless, the drawback is that it does not address the censored nature of the data. The distribution of import shares is indeed left-censored and produces inconsistent estimates under linear models since the expected value of a censored variable is a non-linear function of the covariates.[33] In this case, the Tobit estimation is more suitable than OLS. We thus also present Tobit estimates with imports of capital goods shares on the left-hand side explicitly taking censoring into account by considering the zero values as a left-censored. The predicted values from Tobit estimations account for the lower limit of the censored data.[34] Tobit models with individual fixed effects

---

[33]In addition, OLS estimation yields predicted values of the dependent variable outside of the valid range as it ignores the censored nature of the dependent variable.

[34]We should keep in mind that Tobit estimation relies on the assumption of homoskedastic normally-distributed

have an incidental parameters problem, and are generally biased (Greene 2003). We thus report results from both pooled Tobit, without unobserved effects (either fixed or random), and random effects Tobit.[35]

Table .10 shows the results for the share of imports of capital goods over total sales. Columns (1) and (2) show the within firm estimation of input tariff changes on import shares using OLS with firm fixed effects. Once we control for firm and industry characteristics in column (2), the coefficient on input-tariff is still negative and significant, implying that input-trade liberalization increases the share of imports of capital goods. However, as previously noted, this specification ignores the censored nature of the data and yields inconsistent estimates. Columns (3) and (4) show the marginal effects at the sample mean from pooled Tobit estimation of tariffs on imports of capital goods shares; columns (5) to (6) report the results from random-effects Tobits. The coefficient of interest on input tariffs is negative and significant in all of the specifications.

6.5. The channels of transmission

The simple theoretical model presented in Section II emphasizes that input-tariff reductions allow firms to increase their revenues to afford the high-technology. In this section we explore the possible mechanisms through which input-tariff cuts might affect firms' decision to import capital goods. We look at the effects of input-trade liberalization on firms' demand of foreign inputs and domestic sales.

We expect that Indian firms increase the use of imported inputs after input-trade liberalization. We first show that input tariff reductions are associated with an expansion of firms' imported inputs. Column (1) of Table .11 presents the estimates of regressing the share of imported intermediate goods over total inputs of firm i in year t on input tariffs in $t-1$. As can be notice, input tariff cuts have induced an expansion of imported inputs.

Next, we explore the relationship between input-tariff cuts and domestic sales. We thus estimate equation (I) with the logarithm of firms' domestic sales as dependent variable. The effect of input tariff reductions on firms' sales is not significant for the average firm (column (2)). However, those firms that actually import intermediate goods have benefited from input tariff cuts to increase their sales as showed in column (3).

6.6. Alternative technology measure

This section investigates if our results are robust to an alternative technology measure. Using R&D investments as a measure of technology upgrading, columns (4) to (5) of Table .11 explore

---

errors for consistency.

[35] In the random effects Tobit, firm unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be part of the composite error. Random-effects Tobits are unbiased if firm characteristics are exogenous (uncorrelated with the regressors). Honore (1992) has developed a semiparametric method dealing with this issue which captures unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity. He proposes a trimmed least squares estimator of censored regression models. Nevertheless, this semiparametric estimator for fixed-effect Tobits is not suitable here due to the relatively small sample size.

the effects of input-tariff changes on the decision to invest on R&D. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm reports positive R&D investments in year t. We also find here that lower input tariffs are associated with increased firm technology upgrading.

This empirical evidence is consistent with previous work. Goldberg et al. (2010) find an increase in the number of new domestic products introduced by Indian firms in the domestic market after input-tariff cuts in India. Amiti and Konings (2007) show that the productivity gains of Indonesian firms rise with input-tariff reductions. Teshima (2009) finds positive effects of output-tariff reductions on firm R&D activities via foreign competition, but insignificant effects from input-tariff cuts. Bas (2012) shows that Argentinean firms expand their technological expenditures after input tariff cuts.

7. CONCLUSION

The main contribution of this paper to the literature on the micro-economic effects of input-trade liberalization on firm performance is to investigate theoretically and empirically the efficiency gains from input-trade liberalization on firms' decision to source capital goods from abroad.

We develop a simple theoretical model of heterogeneous firms that explains the channels through which changes on tariff on intermediate goods might affect firms' technology upgrading decision. Assuming that foreign intermediate inputs and high-technology are complementary and fixed costs of technology upgrading, the model predicts a positive effect of reductions of tariff on intermediate goods on firm' choice to adopt a high-technology. The impact of input-trade liberalization is heterogeneous across firms depending on their initial productivity level.

Using firm-level data from India and imports of capital goods as a proxy of modern and high-technology, we test the main implications of the model. Our findings demonstrate that the probability of importing capital goods is higher for firms producing in industries that have experienced greater cuts on tariff on intermediate goods. Looking at the heterogeneous effect of input-trade liberalization, we find that only those firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution have benefited from input tariff cuts. These empirical findings are robust to alternative specifications that control for imported capital goods tariffs, other reforms, and industry and firm characteristics.

REFERENCES

Alfaro, L. and Chari, A. (2009). India transformed? insights from the firm level 1988-2005. NBER Working Papers 15448.

Alfaro, L. and Hammel, E. (2007). Capital flows and capital goods. *Journal of International Economics*, 72(1):128–150.

Amiti, M. and Davis, R. (2012). Trade, firms, and wages: Theory and evidence. *Review of Economic Studies*, 79:1–36.

Amiti, M. and Konings, J. (2007). Trade liberalization, intermediate inputs, and productivity: Evidence from indonesia. *American Economic Review*, 97(5):1611–1638.

Aw, B., Roberts, M., and Xu, D. (2011). R&d investment, exporting, and productivity dynamics. *American Economic Review*, 101:1312–44.

Bas, M. (2012). Input-trade liberalization and firm export decisions: Evidence from argentina. *Journal of Development Economics*, 97:481–493.

Bas, M. and Berthou, A. (2012). The decision to import capital goods in india: Firms' financial factors matter. *World Bank Economic Review*, 26(3):486–513.

Bas, M. and Ledezma, I. (2012). Trade liberalization and heterogeneous technology adoption. Mimeo.

Bas, M. and Strauss-Kahn, V. (2013). Trade liberalization and export prices: The case of china. Mimeo.

Bombarda, P. and Gamberoni, E. (2013). Heterogeneous firms, rules of origin and rules of cumulation. *International Economic Review, forthcoming*.

Bustos, P. (2011). Trade liberalization, exports and technology upgrading: Evidence on the impact of mercosur on argentinean firms. *American Economic Review*, 101:304–340.

Costantini, J. and Melitz, M. (2008). The dynamics of firm-level adjustment to trade liberalization. *in Helpmann, E., Marin, D. and Verdier, T. (eds) The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press)*, pages 107–141.

DeLoecker, J., Goldberg, P. K., Khandelwal, A. K., and Pavcnik, N. (2012). Prices, markups and trade reform. Mimeo.

Demidova, S. (2008). Productivity improvements and falling trade costs: Boon or bane? *International Economic Review*, 49(4):1437–1462.

Eaton, J. and Kortum, S. (2001). Trade in capital goods. *European Economic Review*, 45(7):1195 – 1235.

Ethier, W. (1979). Internationally decreasing costs and world trade. *Journal of International Economics*, 9:1–24.

Ethier, W. (1982). National and international returns to scale in the modern theory of international trade. *The American Economic Review*, 72:389–405.

Fernandes, A., Ghani, E., , OConnell, S., and Sharma, G. (2012). Sourcing and sophistication decisions: Input choice by indian manufacturing. Mimeo.

Goh, A.-T. and Olivier, J. (2002). Learning by doing, trade in capital goods and growth. *Journal of International Economics*, 56(2):411–444.

Goldberg, P., Khandelwal, A., Pavcnik, N., and Topalova, P. (2009). Trade liberalization and new imported inputs. *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, 99(2):494–500.

Goldberg, P. K., Khandelwal, A. K., Pavcnik, N., and Topalova, P. (2010). Imported intermediate inputs and domestic product growth: Evidence from india. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(4):1727–1767.

Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1991). Innovation and growth in the global economy. *Cambridge, MA: MIT*.

Hallak, J. and Sivadasan, J. (2011). Firms' exporting behavior under quality constraints. Research Seminar in International Economics No. 628,.

Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009). Imported inputs and productivity. CEPR N. 5139.

Javorcik, B. S. (2004). Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms? in search of spillovers through backward linkages. *American Economic Review*, 94(3):605–627.

Karacaovali, B. (2011). Productivity matters for trade policy: Theory and evidence. *International Economic Review, forthcoming*, 52 (1):33–62.

Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008). Does the use of imported intermediates increase productivity? plant-level evidence. *Journal of Development Economics*, 87:106–118.

Kasahara, H. and Lapham, B. (2012). Productivity and the decision to import and export: Theory and evidence. *Journal of International Economics*. forthcoming.

Kugler, M. and Verhoogen, E. (2009). Plants and imported inputs: New facts and an interpretation. *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, 99(2):501–507.

Kugler, M. and Verhoogen, E. (2011). Prices, plant size, and product quality. *Review of Economic Studies*, pages 1–33.

Lee, J.-W. (1995). Capital goods imports and long-run growth. *Journal of Development Economics*, 48(1):91 – 110.

Levinsohn, J. and Petrin, A. (2003). Estimating production functions using inputs to control for unobservables. *Review of Economic Studies*, 70(2):317–341.

Lileeva, A. and Trefler, D. (2010). Improved access to foreign markets raises plant-level productivity ... for some plants. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125:1051–1099.

Melitz, M. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and agregate industry productivity. *Econometrica*, 71:1695–1725.

Rivera-Batiz, L. and Romer, P. (1991). International trade with endogenous technological change. *European Economic Review*, 35(4):971–1001.

Schor (2004). Heterogeneous productivity response to tariff reduction: evidence from brazilian manufacturing firms. *Journal of Development Economics*, 75:373–396.

Teshima, K. (2009). Import competition and innovation at the plant level: Evidence from mexico. Mimeo Columbia University.

Topalova, P. (2004). Overview of the indian corporate sector: 1989-2002. IMF Working Papers 04/64.

Topalova, P. and Khandelwal, A. (2010). Trade liberalization and firm productivity: The case of india. Forthcoming The Review of Economics and Statistics.

Venables, A. (1996). Equilibrium location of vertically linked industries. *International Economic Review*, 37:341–359.

Verhoogen, E. (2008). Trade, quality upgrading and wage inequality in the mexican manufacturing sector. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123:489–530.

Xu, B. and Wang, J. (1999). Capital goods trade and r&d spillovers in the oecd. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 32(5):1258–1274.

Yeaple, S. (2005). A simple model of firm heterogeneity, international trade and wages. *Journal of International Economics*, 65:1–20.

APPENDIX

9. APPENDIX

Aggregation

This section defines the aggregate variables. The low-technology average productivity level $\widetilde{\varphi_l}$ and the ex-ante weighted average productivity level of high-foreign-technology firms $\widetilde{\varphi_h}$ is given by:

$$\widetilde{\varphi_l} \equiv \frac{1}{G(\varphi_h^*) - G(\varphi_l^*)} \int_{\varphi_l^*}^{\varphi_h^*} (\varphi)^{\sigma-1} g(\varphi) d\varphi = \varphi_l^* \upsilon^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \left[\frac{1 - \xi^{-k+\phi-1}}{1 - \xi^{-k}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \qquad \text{if } \varphi_l^* \leq \varphi < \varphi_h^*$$

$$\widetilde{\varphi_h} \equiv \frac{1}{1 - G(\varphi_h^*)} \int_{\varphi_h^*}^{\infty} (\varphi)^{\sigma-1} g(\varphi) d\varphi = \varphi_h^* \upsilon^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \qquad \text{if } \varphi \geq \varphi_h^*$$

where $\upsilon = \frac{k}{k-(\sigma-1)}$ and $\xi = \left(\frac{f_h}{f} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \left[\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l} \right)^{1-\sigma} - 1 \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$.

The ex-post average productivity of high-foreign-technology firms takes into account the increase in the firms' efficiency due to the acquisition of the more advanced technology complementary with imported intermediate inputs. The adoption of the high technology allows these firms to reduce their unit costs and raise their market shares by this term $\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l} \right)^{1-\sigma}$. Notice that average revenues of high-technology firms can be expressed as $r_h(\widetilde{\varphi_h}) = r_l(\widetilde{\varphi_h}) \left(\frac{c_h}{c_l} \right)^{1-\sigma}$. Therefore, the weighted average productivity index of the industry $\widetilde{\varphi_T}$ represents the market shares of all types of firms: $\widetilde{\varphi_T}^{\sigma-1} = \frac{1}{M} \left[M_l (\widetilde{\varphi_l})^{\sigma-1} + M_h \left(\frac{c_h}{c_l} \right)^{1-\sigma} (\widetilde{\varphi_h})^{\sigma-1} \right]$.

The number of firms producing with low technology $M_l = \rho_l M$ and those producing with high technology $M_h = \rho_h M$ are determined by the total number of firms M and the probabilities of using low and high technology. $\rho_h = \frac{1-G(\varphi_h^*)}{1-G(\varphi_l^*)} = \left(\varphi_h^* / \varphi_l^* \right)^{-k}$ and $\rho_l = 1 - \rho_h$. The low- and high-technology average productivity levels and the aggregate productivity index define all the aggregate variables.

The price index of the industry is determined by:

$$P^{1-\sigma} = M_l \int_{\varphi_l^*}^{\varphi_h^*} (p_l)^{1-\sigma} \mu_l(\varphi)d\varphi + M_h \int_{\varphi_h^*}^{\infty} (p_h)^{1-\sigma} \mu_h(\varphi)d\varphi \; =$$

$$\left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\right)^{1-\sigma} c_l^{1-\sigma} \left[M_l \left(\widetilde{\varphi_l}\right)^{\sigma-1} + M_h \left(\frac{c_h}{c_l}\right)^{1-\sigma} \left(\widetilde{\varphi_h}\right)^{\sigma-1} \right]$$

Using the aggregate productivity $\widetilde{\varphi_T}$, the price index can be expressed as $P^{1-\sigma} = M \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{c_l}{\widetilde{\varphi_T}}\right)^{1-\sigma} =$

$M p \left(\widetilde{\varphi_T}\right)^{\sigma-1}$.

Proof. of the equilibrium survival productivity cutoff

FE (7) and ZCP (8) conditions jointly determine the equilibrium cutoff level (φ_l^*). In order to obtain this cutoff, we use the technology productivity cutoff, the average productivity for low-and high-technology ($\widetilde{\varphi_l}, \widetilde{\varphi_h}$) firms and the probability of using low- and high-technology (ρ_l, ρ_h) as defined in the previous section. The equilibrium cutoff level (φ_l^*) is given by:

$$\frac{\varphi_l^{*k}}{\varphi_{\min}^k} \delta f_e = \frac{1}{M} \left[\frac{1}{\sigma} \left[M_l \int_{\varphi^*}^{\varphi_h^*} r_l(\varphi)\mu_l(\varphi)d\varphi + M_h \int_{\varphi_h^*}^{\infty} r_h(\varphi)\mu_h(\varphi)d\varphi \right] - M f - M_h f_h \right]$$

Solving for low and high technology revenues and using $M_l = \rho_l M, M_h = \rho_h M, r_l = A c_l^{1-\sigma} \varphi_i^{\sigma-1}, r_h = A c_h^{1-\sigma} \varphi_i^{\sigma-1}$ and using equation (4), to determine A, so as to express average profits as a function of the productivity cutoff, yields:

$$\frac{\varphi_l^{*k}}{\varphi_{\min}^k} \delta f_e = \left[\rho_l \left(\frac{\widetilde{\varphi_l}}{\varphi_l^*}\right)^{\sigma-1} + \rho_h \left(\frac{c_l}{c_h}\right)^{\sigma-1} \left(\frac{\widetilde{\varphi_h}}{\varphi_l^*}\right)^{\sigma-1} - 1 \right] f - \rho_h f_h$$

By substituting the average productivity for low-and high-technology $\widetilde{\varphi}_l, \widetilde{\varphi}_h$ and using the high-productivity cutoff defined in equation (6), yields:

$$\varphi_l^{*k} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{k - (\sigma - 1)} \left[\frac{f + \left[\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l} \right)^{1-\sigma} - 1 \right]^{\frac{k}{\sigma-1}} \left(\frac{f_h}{f} \right)^{\frac{-k}{\sigma-1}} f_h}{\delta f_e} \right] \varphi_{\min}^k \qquad \text{(A.1.)}$$

This cutoff, φ_l^*, then determines the high-technology productivity cutoff level φ_h^* defined in equation (6).

Proof. of proposition 2.

This high-technology productivity cutoff is an increasing function of input tariff (τ_m). Keeping in mind that $\frac{c_h}{c_l}$ is an increasing function of τ_m[36], we take the partial derivative of the productivity technological cutoff (φ_h^*) determind in Equation (6) with respect to τ_m:

$$\frac{\partial \varphi_h^*}{\partial \tau_m} = \frac{\varphi_h^*}{\varphi_l^*} \left[\frac{\partial \varphi_l^*}{\partial \tau_m} + \frac{\partial \frac{c_h}{c_l}}{\partial \tau_m} \frac{\varphi_l^*}{\left[\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l} \right)^{1-\sigma} - 1 \right] \left(\frac{c_h}{c_l} \right)^{\sigma}} \right] \qquad \text{(A.2.)}$$

Next, we partially differentiate equation (A.1) φ_l^* with respect to τ_m, to obtain $\frac{\partial \varphi_l^*}{\partial \tau_m}$:

$$\frac{\partial \varphi_l^*}{\partial \tau_m} = (-1) \left(\varphi_l^{*k} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}-1} \frac{\partial \frac{c_h}{c_l}}{\partial \tau_m} \frac{\left[\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l} \right)^{1-\sigma} - 1 \right]^{\frac{k}{\sigma-1}-1} \left(\frac{f_h}{f} \right)^{\frac{-k}{\sigma-1}} f_h}{\delta f_e} \left(\frac{c_h}{c_l} \right)^{-\sigma} \varphi_{\min}^k \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{k - (\sigma - 1)} \right) < 0$$
$$\text{(A.3.)}$$

---

[36]Partially differentiating equation (3) with respect to the input tariffs (τ_m), we find that $\partial \frac{c_h}{c_l} / \partial \tau_m > 0$ since $0 < \alpha < 1$ and $\gamma_h > 1$.

Since $\frac{\partial \frac{c_h}{c_l}}{\partial \tau_m} > 0$, $\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l}\right)^{1-\sigma} > 1$ and $\frac{\sigma-1}{k-(\sigma-1)} > 0$, yields to $\frac{\partial \varphi_l^*}{\partial \tau_m} < 0$.

Plugging equation (A.3) into equation (A.2), a sufficient condition for $\frac{\partial \varphi_h^*}{\partial \tau_m} > 0$ is:

$$\varphi_l^{*k} > \frac{\sigma-1}{k-(\sigma-1)} \left[\left[\left(\frac{c_h}{c_l}\right)^{1-\sigma} - 1 \right]^{\frac{k}{\sigma-1}} \left(\frac{f_h}{f}\right)^{\frac{-k}{\sigma-1}} \frac{f_h}{\delta f_e} \right] \varphi_{\min}^k \qquad (A.4.)$$

To prove that this condition holds, we plug in the equation (A.4) the survival productivity cutoff φ_l^* as determined in equation (9) and we obtain:

$$f > 0$$

Table .1 – Descriptive evidence firm level variables

	1999-2006
Importer capital goods (%)	34
Importer inputs (%)	65
Importer capital goods and inputs (%)	32
Log of capital intensity (capital stock/wage-bill)	2.213 (1.122)
Age	25 (19)
Log of firm TFP (Levinsohn and Petrin)	1.369 (0.537)

Notes: The table reports the average percentage of importers during the period 1999-2006, the average level of firm capital intensity, age and TFP. Standards errors are reported in parentheses.

Table .2 – Descriptive evidence of average tariff measures

	(1) 1999-2006	(2) 1999	(3) 2006	(4) Change 1999-2006
Tariffs on final goods	28,4%	35,3%	17,9%	-17 p.p.
Tariffs on capital goods	2,0%	2,1%	1,2%	-1 p.p.
Tariffs on other inputs	25,3%	28,4%	16,6%	-12 p.p.

Notes: Columns (1) to (3) report the average levels of tariffs on final goods, capital goods and other inputs over the period, in 1999 and 2006. The last column present the percentage change of tariffs between 1999 and 2006. Capital goods tariffs are a weighted average of output tariffs on the capital goods used in the production of the final goods of that 3-digit industry, where the weights reflect the share of capital goods of the final goods industry on total expenditures in capital goods. Input tariffs are computed as the weighted average of tariffs on all the other intermediate goods (excluding capital goods) used in the production of the final goods of that industry. To disentangle capital goods tariffs from other input tariffs, 14 industries are classified as capital goods producers. These industries are tractors and agriculture machinery, industrial machinery, industrial machinery (others), office computing machines, other non-electrical machinery, electrical industrial machinery, communication equipments, other electrical machinery, electronic equipments, ships and boats, rail equipments, motor vehicles motor cycles and other transport equipments.

Table .3 – Tariff reductions between 1999 and 2006 and pre-reform industrial characteristics in 1999

Dependent variable: change in input tariffs between 1999-2006					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Sales (s,1999)	0.006				
	(0.007)				
Capital stock (s,1999)		0.001			
		(0.006)			
Wage-bill (s,1999)			0.006		
			(0.007)		
Imports capital goods (s,1999)				-0.007	
				(0.004)	
Imports intermediate goods (s,1999)					-0.004
					(0.006)
Observations	52	52	52	52	52
R-squared	0.801	0.802	0.800	0.810	0.800

Notes: The dependent variable is the changes in input tariffs between 1999 and 2006. The table shows regressions at the 3-digit industry level of changes in input tariffs on different industry level characteristics. All regressions include indicators for industry use type (consumer goods, capital and intermediates). All industry-level variables are expressed in logarithms. Heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors are reported in parentheses.

Table .4 – Initial firm characteristics in 1999 and input tariff changes between 1999-2006

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Importer of K	Imports K /sales	Capital stock	TFP	sales
Δ Input tariffs(s,99-06)	-0.404	-0.038	-1.519	-0.413	-1.264
	(0.874)	(0.031)	(1.243)	(0.352)	(1.244)
Observations	1,714	1,714	1,714	1,702	1,714
R-squared	0.087	0.029	0.041	0.215	0.044

Notes: The dependent variables in each column are the initial firm-level outcomes in 1999. The table shows the coefficients on changes in input tariffs between 1999 and 2006 from firm-level regressions of initial firm characteristics on input tariff changes and 2 digit industry fixed effects. Firm-level variables are expressed in logarithms except for the impporter of capital goods dummy and the ratio of imports of capital goods over total sales. Heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering at the 3-digit industry level.

Table .5 – Input-tariff liberalization and firms' decision to import capital goods, 1999-2006

Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the firm *i* imports capital goods in *t*.					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Input tariff(s)(t-1)	-0.235**	-0.213**	-0.208**	-0.216**	0.002
	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.110)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Importer inputs(t-1)					-0.325***
					(0.084)
Capital goods tariff(s)(t-1)		-1.098**	-1.089**	-1.143**	-1.135**
		(0.547)	(0.547)	(0.544)	(0.542)
Output tariff(s)(t-1)	0.106	0.123*	0.120	0.118	0.118
	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Herfindhal index(s)(t-1)			0.004	0.004	0.004
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age			0.050*	0.045	0.051*
			(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Capital intensity(t-1)			0.010	0.009	0.010
			(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Importer inputs(t-1)				0.100***	0.185***
				(0.011)	(0.025)
Firm fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,685	19,685	19,685	19,685	19,685
R-squared	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.016	0.017

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for firm *i* having positive imports of capital goods in year *t*. Output tariff(s)(t-1) are MFN applied tariffs from WITS-WB dataset at the 3 digit industry level and input and capital goods tariffs are constructed separately using these output tariffs and India 1993 input-output matrix. Importer inputs is a dummy equal to one if the firm imports intermediate goods. Herfindhal index measures the concentration of sales of the industry. Capital intensity is measured by capital stock over the wage-bill of the firm. The Prowess dataset reports the year of creation of the firm that allows to construct the age of the firm. Heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering at the 3-digit industry-year pairs. ***, **, and *indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.

Table .6 – The heterogeneous effects of input-tariff liberalization on firms' decision to import capital goods, 1999-2006

Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the firm i imports capital goods in t.				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Input tariff(s)(t-1)	-0.216**			
	(0.096)			
Input tariff(s)(t-1) $\times$ First quartile TFP (99)		-0.116	-0.116	-0.129
		(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.157)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) $\times$ Second quartile TFP (99)		-0.221	-0.221	-0.227
		(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.150)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) $\times$ Third quartile TFP (99)		-0.277**	-0.277**	-0.281**
		(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) $\times$ Fourth quartile TFP (99)		-0.068	-0.068	-0.072
		(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.139)
Age	0.045		-0.001	0.006
	(0.028)		(0.042)	(0.041)
Capital intensity(t-1)	0.009			0.012*
	(0.006)			(0.007)
Importer inputs(t-1)	0.100***	0.094***	0.094***	0.094***
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Capital goods and output tariff(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Herfindhal index(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,685	12,783	12,783	12,783
R-squared	0.016	0.013	0.013	0.013

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for firm i having positive imports of capital goods in year t. Input tariff(s)(t-1) are interacted with quartiles of firm TFP in 1999. Firm TFP is estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology. All control variables are defined in table .5. Industry control variables (output tariffs, capital goods tariffs and the Herfindhal index) are included in all specifications. Heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering at the 3-digit industry-year. pairs.***, **, and *indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.

Table .7 – The decision to start importing capital goods and past import experienced

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the firm *i* imports capital goods in *t*.						
	Non importer in the past 4 years		First time importing		Past import experience	
Input tariff(s)(t-1)	-0.342***		-0.895***		-0.211**	
	(0.090)		(0.327)		(0.098)	
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × First quartile TFP (99)		0.006		-0.274		-0.143
		(0.155)		(0.444)		(0.154)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Second quartile TFP (99)		-0.238		-0.216		-0.235
		(0.139)		(0.425)		(0.148)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Third quartile TFP (99)		-0.340**		-0.809**		-0.281**
		(0.132)		(0.403)		(0.132)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Fourth quartile TFP (99)		-0.407***		-1.442***		-0.084
		(0.121)		(0.400)		(0.138)
Importer capital goods(t-1)					0.029**	0.051***
					(0.015)	(0.016)
Capital goods and output tariff(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Herfindhal index(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,053	5,571	3,490	2,072	19,685	12,783
R-squared	0.037	0.030	0.039	0.044	0.010	0.016

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for firm *i* having positive imports of capital goods in year *t*. All control variables are defined in table .5. Heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering at the 3-digit industry-year. pairs.***, **, and *indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.

Table .8 – Other reforms in India

Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the firm *i* imports capital goods in *t*.				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Input tariff(s)(t-1)	0.002		-0.229**	
	(0.110)		(0.096)	
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Importer inputs(t-1)	-0.325***	-0.348***		
	(0.084)	(0.084)		
Importer inputs(t-1)	0.185***	0.190***	0.099***	0.094***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × First quartile TFP (99)				-0.104
				(0.150)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Second quartile TFP (99)				-0.179
				(0.151)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Third quartile TFP (99)				-0.285**
				(0.140)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Fourth quartile TFP (99)				-0.111
				(0.141)
Capital goods and output tariff(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Herfindhal index(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry year fixed effects	No	Yes	No	No
Region year fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,685	19,685	19,685	12,783
R-squared	0.009	0.037	0.033	0.042

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for firm *i* having positive imports of capital goods in year *t*. All control variables are defined in table .5. Heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering at the 3-digit industry-year. pairs.***, **, and *indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.

Table .9 – Alternative samples: the role of firm ownership

Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the firm i imports capital goods in t.						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Without MNF firms		Private firms		State firms	
Input tariff(s)(t-1)	-0.224**		-0.260**		0.256	
	(0.102)		(0.103)		(0.342)	
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × First quartile TFP (99)		-0.110		-0.219		0.169
		(0.163)		(0.179)		(0.465)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Second quartile TFP (99)		-0.215		-0.264		-0.181
		(0.156)		(0.165)		(0.506)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Third quartile TFP (99)		-0.283**		-0.339**		0.182
		(0.139)		(0.139)		(0.458)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Fourth quartile TFP (99)		-0.058		-0.071		-0.028
		(0.149)		(0.154)		(0.508)
Capital goods and output tariff(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Herfindhal index(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm level controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,317	11,786	15,393	9,795	4,292	2,988
R-squared	0.016	0.013	0.017	0.013	0.025	0.029

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for firm i having positive imports of capital goods in year t. All control variables are defined in table .5. Heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering at the 3-digit industry-year. pairs.***, **, and *indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.

Table .10 – Input-trade liberalization and the intensive margin of imports of capital goods, 1999-2006

Dependent variable: the share of imported capital goods over total sales of the firm i in t.						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Within		Pooled Tobit		Random effects Tobit	
Input tariff(s)(t-1)	-0.0248**	-0.0279**	-0.0660**	-0.0629**	-0.0708**	-0.0693**
	(0.0116)	(0.0121)	(0.0280)	(0.0279)	(0.0276)	(0.0275)
Capital goods and output tariff(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Herfindhal index(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm level controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
Firm fixed effects	Yes	Yes				
Random effects					Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,685	19,685	19,685	19,685	19,685	19,685
R-squared	0.008	0.010				
Log likelihood	5002	5002	5002	5002	5002	5002
Sigma u			0.0678	0.0674	0.0602	0.0594
Sigma e					0.0513	0.0513

Notes: The dependent variable is the share of imported capital goods over total sales of the firm i in year t. All control variables are defined in table .5. Heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering at the 3-digit industry-year pairs. ***, **, and *indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.

Table .11 – Input-trade liberalization and other firm performance outcomes

	(1) Imported inputs over total inputs	(2) Sales	(3) Sales	(4) R&D	(5) R&D
Input tariff(s)(t-1)	-0.112***	-0.217	0.391	-0.154**	0.012
	(0.040)	(0.320)	(0.364)	(0.063)	(0.074)
Input tariff(s)(t-1) × Importer inputs(t-1)			-0.950***		-0.251***
			(0.213)		(0.064)
Importer inputs(t-1)			0.624***		0.089***
			(0.069)		(0.018)
Capital goods and output tariff(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Herfindhal index(s)(t-1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,334	19,685	19,685	19,685	19,685
R-squared	0.005	0.033	0.071	0.011	0.013

Notes: The dependent variables are defined in each column. All control variables are defined in table .5. Heteroskedasticity-robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering at the 3-digit industry-year. pairs.***, **, and *indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.

Figure .1 – Input-tariffs across 2-digit industries 1999-2006