Fiscal rules

Charles Wyplosz
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Preliminary: the context

- Euro crisis management (2010-2011)
 - Incredible incompetence
 - Extreme politicization
 - No checks and balances
- The "crime" of May 2010
 - Ditching of no-bailout clause
 - Refusal of sovereign defaults
- Fiscal indiscipline is natural
 - SGP never was the answer

Natural indiscipline

Percent years of deficits – 1960-2011

	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Germany
Percent	80%	82%	96%	76%	78%
Last surplus	2008	1974	2006	2007	2008
	Denmark	Spain	Finland	France	U.K.
Percent	48%	78%	20%	90%	84%
Last surplus	2008	2007	2008	1974	2001
	Greece	Ireland	Italy	Japan	Netherlands
Percent	80%	80%	100%	68%	88%
Last surplus	1972	2007		1992	2008
	Norway	New Zealand	Portugal	Sweden	USA
Percent	4%	46%	100%	42%	92%
Last surplus	2011	2008		2008	2000

SGP performance (1999-2011)

Number of years in compliance, out of 13 years

Austria 4	Belgium 3	Finland 0	France 7
Germany	Greece	Ireland	Italy
5	13	4	8
Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain
0	4	10	4


Answers to fiscal discipline

- The problem: long-run discipline and short-term flexibility
 - Avoid pro-cyclical policies
- Ideal solution: clever principles
 - Long-run debt path
 - Short-run intelligent implementation
 - Governments can't do it
 - Unless delegation is possible
 - Fiscal councils can do it
 - Some examples (NL, Sweden, UK)

Answers to fiscal discipline

- Semi-clever rules
 - Many examples (Chile, Brazil)
 - Swiss debt-brake: a good example
 - Structurally adjusted "balance"
 - Notional account

Switzerland 2001 (and Germany coming up)



Euro area

- Two federal models
 - Germany: centralization
 - USA: decentralization
 Best for Europe
- Implication: decentralization
 - Best-fit national arrangements
 - Restoration of no-bailout
 - Europe's "year 1840"
 - Implementation
 - Not Brussels (centralization, politization)
 - Not European Court (centralization, competence)
 - ECB can do it