The agenda to fix the euro is hampered by conflicting national interests. Creditor countries demand fiscal house cleaning and debtor countries ask for risk sharing. There is currently a political deadlock about how the adjustment burden should be distributed, perpetuating a state of vulnerability that is not in the collective interest of euro area members. This column, part of the Vox debate on euro area reform, argues that overcoming this coordination failure requires reforming the political governance of the EU, rather than just its economic governance.
This post has been first published on VoxEU.

On the occasion of its 40th anniversary, three panel discussions, CEPII brought together experts, foreign and French, decision-makers and academics to discuss the major challenges that France and Europe are facing ten years after the crisis and the deep transformation of the international economic relationships.
See videos et presentations.

Trade between Japan and the EU is not a big deal in world trade, barely more than 1%. Their Economic Partnership Agreement can nevertheless be very influential because, jointly, they are a party in more than 40% of world trade, and much more in innovative sectors.

IMF cuts global growth forecasts following Brexit vote. Paul Krugman has taken a different point of view by arguing there is no reason to worry in the immediate future. This opposition reflects clearly two different opinions on the short-term consequences of uncertainty.

European financial markets face a shortage of liquid assets. New regulations increase banks’ demand for liquid securities, mainly sovereign bonds, but the European fiscal rules constrain the supply of public debt. Further, the QE is draining bonds from the market. Some proposed forms of “Eurobonds” or new debt securities issued by European supranational organizations could solve this problem.

This column reports the nature and the amplitude of economic cycles in the Euro area since 1970, with a focus on the role of financial factors in generating these cycles.

Back in 2010, the Eurozone countries insisted a lot that the IMF provides exceptional financing to Greece. They will be duly reminded when the reckoning moment has come.

From May 21 to May 23, the ECB organized its 2nd annual forum on Central banking. Mario Draghi's inaugural speech, as well as discussions on May 23rd, focused mainly on the need for structural reforms to strengthen growth in Europe.

While European external surpluses are accumulating and domestic demand is slacking, insisting on improving the Union’s external competitiveness, as some in the Commission are presently doing, is paradoxical. For Europe, the paramount risk is not losing its competitiveness. It is not recovering cohesion and growth.

The ECB has announced that it will launch in March its first round of quantitative easing. The announcement contains some good and bad surprises: the size of the ECB's plan is gigantic, while the Central Bank was unclear about the Greek issue. How was this announcement perceived by markets?